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 ESSAYS ON THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF FIRMS 
 
 
This dissertation consists of an introduction and the following four essays: 
 
Essay 1: “Labour Mobility and Returns to Experience in Foreign Firms”. 
Forthcoming, Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 
 
Essay 2: “Labour Market Transitions Following Foreign Acquisitions”. HECER 
Discussion Papers, 2009, No. 251.  
 
Essay 3: “Spillovers From Multinationals to Domestic Firms: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Profitability Effects of Labour Flows”, with Pekka Ilmakunnas 
and Mika Maliranta. Unpublished. 
 
Essay 4: “International Trade and the Distribution of Wages”, with Pertti 
Haaparanta. Unpublished. 
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1 Introduction 
The internationalisation of firms takes place both through international trade 
and through expanding operations abroad by undertaking foreign direct 
investments (FDI). Trade has historically been the most important form of 
internationalisation with marked increases since the 1960s. Trade liberalisation 
during this time period has also facilitated increases in FDI as multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) have been able to spread their production process between 
different countries. Trade was also one of the building blocks of the financial 
crisis that broke out in 2008 fuelled by large disequilibria within and among 
major national economies. Although FDI flows were hit especially hard by the 
crisis, they had been growing faster than international trade for several years 
and the expansion of activities abroad remains the driving force in the process 
of firms’ internationalisation.  
 
The internationalisation of firms both through trade and FDI has a 
particularly large influence on small open economies such as Finland. Finland’s 
exports were almost 50% of GDP in 2006 following strong growth in the 1990s, 
while the stock of FDI rose rapidly at the end of the 1990s reaching 
approximately 30% of GDP in 2006. Also FDI by Finnish firms abroad has 
seen similar developments and totaled 43% of GDP at the end of 2006 
(Statistics Finland, 2008). Analysing the effects of firms’ internationalisation is, 
therefore, particularly interesting in the Finnish context.  
 
The internationalisation of firms affects not only the firms actually involved in 
international markets but also those with only domestic activities. An 
important area of influence in and through which the internationalisation 
process operates is the labour market. The potential impacts of firms’ 
international operations on their own employees and on other firms and their 
employees have been analysed both in the literature on international trade and 
the literature on MNEs. In international trade theory these issues have mostly 
been analysed in the context of the traditional factor-proportions models with 
perfect competition, which still hold certain advantages for e.g. the study of 
distributional issues compared to the increasing returns models of the 1980s 
(Krugman, 1980) and the more recent models incorporating firm level 
heterogeneity into these models of monopolistic competition (Melitz, 2003). In 
the literature on MNEs most analysis is based on the ownership-location-
internalization framework created by Dunning (1977) and developed further 
into what Markusen (2002) calls the “knowledge capital” model.  
 
Apart from distributional effects tackled by traditional trade theories, many of 
the issues that relate the internationalisation of firms to labour markets have 
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to do with firm heterogeneity, and this is what the newer theories of 
international trade and most theories of MNEs focus on. One of the main 
features of e.g. the literature on MNEs discussed above is that MNEs are 
assumed to possess some kind of specific advantage, such as technological, 
marketing or managerial knowledge, that enables them to operate profitably in 
foreign markets. Recent theoretical work on heterogeneous firms also implies 
that only the most productive firms are involved in foreign markets and among 
these firms it is the most productive ones that perform FDI with the rest only 
engaging in exports (Helpman et al. 2004). It is an undisputed empirical 
regularity that firms involved in international operations, be it trade or FDI, 
are larger, more productive and pay higher wages than their counterparts 
involved in purely domestic activities. Some of these differences have been 
shown to exist prior to the internationalisation process with better performing 
firms self-selecting into exporting and being “cherry-picked” by foreign 
acquirers. This observed heterogeneity has implications both for employees of 
these firms and for other firms in the market.    
 
Differences between MNEs and purely domestic firms that can directly affect 
their own employees are e.g. wage level, skill structure and employment 
volatility. Domestic firms and their employees, on the other hand, may be 
influenced by MNEs competing in the same product and factor markets or by 
accessing knowledge possessed by MNEs either through market transactions or 
through spillovers. Spillovers may take place e.g. through backward and 
forward linkages, demonstration effects or labour mobility.  
2 Overview of the Essays  
This dissertation consists of four independent essays all related to the 
internationalisation of firms and the effects that this phenomenon has on the 
employees of firms involved in international activities and on purely domestic 
firms. The first two essays are related to the issue of spillovers from foreign 
owned or multinational firms to domestic firms through labour mobility. The 
first essay considers the issue from the point of view of private returns to 
employees with experience in foreign owned firms whereas the second 
concentrates on comparing productivity and wage effects of labour flows from 
multinational to domestic firms. The third essay considers the one off event of 
domestic firms moving into foreign ownership and the impact this has on job 
separations among the firms’ workforce. The final essay develops a theoretical 
model that enables the analysis of the effect of international trade on both 
intra- and intersectoral wage distributions. 
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2.1 Knowledge transfer from multinational to domestic firms through 
labour mobility: who benefits? 
Spillovers occur when domestic firms benefit from knowledge diffusing from 
MNEs, and the MNEs are not able to capture the full return to their 
knowledge. Such spillovers are expected to arise due to productivity 
advantages that multinational firms have over domestic firms. These 
productivity advantages have been documented in several empirical studies 
(see Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). As discussed in the previous section, 
theories of MNEs imply that productivity advantages are due to the fact that 
these firms require some type of specific advantage to be able to profitably 
establish themselves in foreign markets (Markusen 2002). Such an advantage 
can arise from superior technological know-how, managerial knowledge, brand 
names etc. To the extent that MNEs are more productive due to knowledge 
that is implementable within other firms, there is potential for spillover effects 
from multinational to domestic firms.  
 
Potential channels for spillovers between multinational and domestic firms 
include i) backward and forward linkages, ii) demonstration effects and iii) 
labour mobility (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). The first two essays in this 
dissertation analyse labour mobility as a potential channel of productivity 
spillovers. If knowledge is transferred from foreign to domestic firms through 
labour mobility, the extent of the spillover or externality is defined by the 
division of the costs and benefits of knowledge accumulation between the 
foreign owned firm, its employees, and the firms these employees move to.  In 
addition to models of spillovers through labour mobility between multinational 
and domestic firms, this type of phenomenon can be thought of in the context 
of models of R&D spillovers and models of on-the-job training.   
 
Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002) develop models of spillovers 
from multinationals to domestic firms through labour mobility. The models 
imply a trade-off between technological and pecuniary spillovers to the local 
economy. The trade-off arises through the multinational firm’s choice between 
allowing technology transfer and preventing it by paying the worker a 
premium. Malchow-Møller et al. (2007) develop a model where skills learned in 
high-productivity (foreign) firms are transferable to other firms and where 
workers joining high-productivity firms may receive a higher average wage and 
wage growth over their careers but a lower initial wage. Urban (2010) considers 
a model that differs from those mentioned above in that it distinguishes 
learning effects from technology spillover effects with these two effects leading 
to different impacts on host-country welfare.  
 
The spillover models described above are based on workers moving from a firm 
with better possibilities for knowledge accumulation to firms where this 
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knowledge is not available. If knowledge diffusion actually takes place from 
domestic to foreign firms, which could be the case e.g. if FDI were technology 
sourcing1, workers would be expected to benefit from mobility in this direction. 
 
Spillovers from multinational to domestic firms have mostly been studied by 
examining the effect of the presence of a multinational company in an industry 
on the productivity of domestic firms.  Most studies do not explicitly study the 
channels for these spillovers, and the evidence on the productivity effects of the 
presence of a multinational company is not conclusive (Barba Navaretti and 
Venables, 2004). The studies that do consider the mechanisms through which 
spillovers occur focus mainly on backward and forward linkages between firms 
(e.g. Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004; Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Also in these 
studies the evidence on productivity spillovers is mixed. 
 
Empirical evidence on knowledge spillovers from foreign to domestic firms 
through worker mobility is scarce. Using data from Ghana, Görg and Strobl 
(2005) study productivity of firms run by owners who previously worked at 
multinational companies. They find positive productivity effects compared to 
domestic firms when workers established a company in the same industry as 
their previous employer. Balsvik (2006) studies Norwegian manufacturing 
firms, and finds that employees who move from multinational to purely 
domestically owned firms have a positive effect on total factor productivity. 
Employees with experience in multinational firms also earn higher wages than 
their co-workers, but the productivity effect of the increased share of workers 
with experience in multinational firms is larger than the effect that experience 
in multinational firms has on employees’ wages.  
 
Martins (2005) studies knowledge spillovers from foreign owned to domestic 
firms in Portugal by examining wages of employees moving from foreign owned 
to domestic firms. He finds that employees with experience in foreign owned 
firms earn more than their colleagues in domestic firms, but that workers still 
suffer sizeable pay cuts when moving from foreign to domestic firms. He finds 
similar evidence for Brazil (Martins and Estevez, 2008), where movers from 
foreign to domestic firms take larger wage cuts than movers from domestic to 
foreign firms. Malchow-Møller et al. (2007) also study a similar issue by 
considering the effect of experience in large vs. small plants arguing that 
                                                            
1 Driffield and Love (2003) study panel data on UK industries and find that such 
“reverse spillovers” exist. They do not, however, consider the mechanisms through 
which these spillovers arise. Ali-Yrkkö (2006) uses Finnish firm level data to study the 
effect of patents on the likelihood of being acquired by a foreign firm. He finds that 
owning patents correlates with becoming a target for a foreign firm, implying that 
technology sourcing also through labour mobility may be relevant. 
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multinationals and large firms share relevant characteristics. They find that 
employees with prior experience in large plants earn a wage premium.  
 
2.2 Labour mobility and returns to experience in foreign firms 
The first essay in the dissertation considers the private returns that employees 
with experience in foreign firms earn when moving to domestic firms. If 
employees in foreign firms accumulate valuable knowledge, they would be 
expected to earn a return on this knowledge when moving to domestic firms. 
The type of knowledge often referred to in the context of spillovers, e.g.  
technological, managerial or marketing knowledge implies that knowledge 
transfer may require a certain skill level of the employee moving from a foreign 
to a domestic firm, so the educational level of employees who change jobs is 
taken into account. In addition, employees’ earnings when they begin working 
at a foreign owned firm are studied to determine whether they are paying for 
this knowledge in the form of lower wages. Furthermore, spillovers can also 
occur from domestic to foreign firms, which could be the case e.g. if FDI were 
technology sourcing. To take this into account, both mobility from foreign to 
domestic and from domestic to foreign firms are studied.  
  
The analysis is based on linked employer-employee panel data from Statistics 
Finland. The extensive data set consists of information on Finnish firms and 
workers in both services and manufacturing, and covers the period 1994 - 2002. 
Prior experience in a foreign owned firm has a positive effect on earnings of the 
university educated, over and above the effect of other previous experience. 
These employees do not appear to pay in the form of lower wages for the 
knowledge they accumulate at foreign owned firms.  
 
2.3 Spillovers from multinational to domestic firms: an empirical 
analysis of the profitability effects of labour flows 
The second essay in the dissertation searches for evidence of spillovers from 
multinational to domestic firms by examining hiring and separation of 
employees and the impact these have on firms’ performance. We decompose 
firm-level profitability, productivity and wage changes into the effects of hiring 
from foreign owned multinationals, domestic multinationals and purely 
domestic firms as well as the effects of separating workers and those who stay 
at the same firm. This bears a resemblance to the kind of decomposition used 
frequently to decompose industry level productivity change into the impacts of 
entry and exit of firms, and productivity growth in continuing firms. The 
ability to study profitability growth is particularly important when analysing 
knowledge transfer, since any potential externality may be internalised in the 
labour market. If hired workers are fully compensated for their contribution to 
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productivity growth, there is no scope for profitability effects. The analysis of 
growth rates also enables us to control for any time-invariant unobservable 
effects that could bias the estimations. In addition, when analysing profitability 
growth, we are able to account for time-varying unobservable firm differences 
in productivity and wage levels as long as they are equal in the productivity 
and wage change equations. Similarly, the analysis of profitability growth 
tackles the selection bias arising from firms seeking to hire good workers and 
lay off poor performers. If wage setting is based on productivity, the bias 
should affect productivity growth and wage growth in the same way and will 
thus not appear in our measures of profitability growth.  
 
Our analysis is based on a detailed and comprehensive linked employer-
employee panel data set from Statistics Finland. The data set covers basically 
all firms in all sectors in Finland and all of their employees. We analyse 
performance changes in the two-year intervals 1997-1999, 1999-2001 and 2001-
2003. In this study we are able to distinguish between foreign owned 
multinationals, domestically owned multinationals and purely domestic firms. 
As emphasised e.g. by Bellak (2004), the important difference is not between 
foreign and domestic ownership, but rather between multinationals and purely 
domestic firms. The results show that hiring relatively young workers from 
foreign multinationals has a positive effect on both productivity and wages. 
There is no effect on profitability, which would indicate that these workers are 
fully compensated for their positive effect on productivity, i.e. potential 
spillovers are internalised by the labour market. Separation of this type of 
personnel from foreign multinationals does, however, have a negative effect on 
profitability, implying that these workers capture returns on their productivity 
by moving to domestic firms. 
 
2.4 Labour market transitions following foreign acquisitions 
The third essay in the dissertation studies the impact that foreign acquisitions 
have on individual level employment outcomes. The analysis of the effects of 
foreign acquisitions links two distinct strands of literature: theories of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and theories of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A). Theories of MNEs imply that employment in MNEs may differ from 
purely domestic firms both through differences in skill structure (Markusen, 
2002) and in terms of the speed and magnitude of employment adjustment 
(Barba Navaretti et al., 2003). The higher share of skilled workers implies more 
rigid labour demand2 but the ability to relocate implies a speedier and 
potentially larger adjustment.  
 
                                                            
2 Hamermesh (1993). 
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The literature on mergers and acquisitions considers the effects of the actual 
change of ownership as a one-off event. The hypotheses on the effects of 
ownership change on employment derived from M&A models vary and are 
related to the different motives behind the transactions3. To the extent that 
acquisitions in foreign and domestic markets may be undertaken for different 
reasons and may involve e.g. different degrees of overlapping functions between 
the firms involved in the transaction, the implications for employees may be 
quite different following a foreign rather than domestic acquisition. 
  
Empirical research on the employment effects of foreign acquisitions is still 
quite scarce and conducted on plant and firm level data. Most previous studies 
also only consider the manufacturing sector. Previous empirical research on the 
employment effects of foreign acquisitions includes: Girma and Görg (2004) for 
the UK; Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) for Italy; Balsvik and Haller (2007) for 
Norway; Bellak et al. (2006) for Austria; Bandick and Karpaty (2007) for 
Sweden; Martins and Estevez (2008) for Brazil; and Böckerman and Lehto 
(2008) for Finland. The results from these studies are mixed.  
 
This essay seeks to complement earlier studies on the links between foreign 
acquisitions and the workforce, and contributes to the literature in two ways: 
firstly, the analysis focuses on the effects of foreign acquisitions for employment 
outcomes at the individual level, and secondly, all sectors of the economy are 
covered. By following the employees of firms subject to a foreign acquisition 
and combining this with information on individual characteristics, we can 
study whether some employee groups are e.g. more adversely affected by 
foreign acquisitions than others. Taking into account the subsequent 
employment status of employees that leave a firm following a foreign 
acquisition can also give us an idea of how severe the effects of potential 
workforce restructuring are at the individual level.  
 
We use linked employer-employee data on a representative sample of Finnish 
employees in all sectors, which enables us to analyse the flow of workers in 
plants following a foreign acquisition. We decompose these flows by destination 
states and control for individual and firm characteristics in studying the effect 
that foreign acquisition has on the probability of ending up in a particular 
state. We also seek to establish whether the effects of acquisitions are similar 
regardless of whether foreign companies are involved, i.e. we distinguish 
between the effects of purely domestic mergers and cross border acquisitions. 
 
                                                            
3 E.g. Jensen (1988), Bradley et al. (1983), Salant et al. (1985), Schleifer and Summers 
(1987). 
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The analysis shows that in the industrial sector, the job separation hazard 
increases in the year following a foreign or domestic acquisition. In the case of 
foreign acquisitions exits to both other jobs and non-employment become more 
likely with the probability of changing jobs increasing more than the 
probability of moving to non-employment. However, in certain industrial 
sectors, where technological know-how may be argued to be important, the job 
separation hazard does not increase following foreign acquisitions. There is no 
such difference between different types of industrial sectors following domestic 
mergers. M&A transactions do not appear to influence the job separation 
hazard of service sector employees in the first year following the acquisition, 
but in the second and third years after the transaction the job separation 
hazard increases with a larger change following foreign than domestic 
acquisitions. In the industrial sector the job separation hazard decreases in the 
second and third years following both foreign and domestic acquisitions, 
implying a one-off restructuring. The impact of a foreign acquisition does not 
vary by individual characteristics in either sector, whereas following a domestic 
merger there is an increase in the job separation hazard of university educated 
employees. Also older workers experience an increase in their job separation 
hazard following a domestic merger.  
 
2.5 International trade and the distribution of wages 
The fourth essay in the dissertation develops a theoretical model that enables 
the analysis of the effect of international trade on both intra- and intersectoral 
wage distributions. The discussion on the effects of trade liberalisation on 
income inequality has been going on for decades. Much of the discussion has 
been driven by a significant rise in inequality including a large rise in skill 
differentials in the US starting in the 1980s with trade being one of the most 
commonly studied causes along with technological change. Within the 
literature on international trade, most of the analysis on income inequality has 
taken place in the framework of the simple perfectly competitive factor-
proportions model with some recent contributions involving models of firm 
heterogeneity. Abstracting from trade considerations, several different theories 
attempt to model wage dispersion. These include compensating differentials, 
sorting, efficiency wage and search theories of wage dispersion (see e.g. 
Mortensen, 2003 for an overview).  
 
In this essay we adopt the approach of Burdett & Mortensen (1998), which is 
based on monopsony labour markets due to search frictions. The idea has been 
extended further by Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Manning (2003), and 
Mortensen (2003) both in theory and empirics. This approach has the 
advantage of being simple but still able to account for many empirical 
“puzzles”, such as employer characteristics being correlated with wages also 
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after controlling for worker characteristics. The model does not need the 
assumption of worker heterogeneity to account for wage distributions. In the 
model, search frictions give firms some monopsony power and together these 
two effects lead to an equilibrium where ex ante identical firms will pay 
different wages and are ex post heterogeneous. In this essay we extend the 
basic theory to a general equilibrium setting involving several sectors and 
international trade. In the context of international trade theory our model has 
the advantage of incorporating both endogenously determined firm 
heterogeneity and wage distributions. 
 
Endogenous firm heterogeneity linked to international trade has been 
previously modeled by e.g. Manasse and Turrini (2001) and Yeaple (2005). 
Manasse and Turrini explain firm heterogeneity through the existence of skill 
differences between entrepreneurs and Yeaple through skill differences between 
workers and the selection of technologies. Yeaple e.g. shows that firms selecting 
new technologies also employ the highly-skilled workers and export. Wage 
dispersion within models with exogenous firm heterogeneity has been modeled 
by e.g. Davis and Harrigan (2007) and Helpman et al. (2010). The model in 
Helpman et al. (2010) is based on search and matching frictions similar to ours.  
 
The theory we develop enables the analysis of endogenous firm heterogeneity 
as well as both intra- and intersectoral wage distributions. We can thus tackle 
issues such as the effect of international trade on the distribution of wages and 
unemployment. This is done by extending the standard Ricardian and 
Heckscher-Ohlin theories of trade, for which we mostly consider only the small 
open economy cases. The major results we reach are that: a) factor price 
equalisation does not hold in the H-O-version of the model despite the fact that 
sectors are paying at least partly the same wages; b) aggregate changes like a 
change in the aggregate firm/job destruction rate can have implications for 
sectoral allocation of factors of production (in contrast to some existing 
theories where only intersectoral differences matter); c) the theory is consistent 
with the observations that exporting firms tend to be larger firms; d) the firm 
heterogeneity is endogenous. We also provide empirical evidence on the 
differences between wage distributions of exporting and non-exporting firms 
using a linked employer-employee data set on Finnish firms and workers.  
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Labour Mobility and Returns to 
Experience in Foreign Firms* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper uses Finnish linked employer-employee panel data to study 
whether employees are able to appropriate returns to knowledge 
accumulated in foreign-owned firms when moving to domestic firms. The 
estimates indicate that highly educated employees earn a return to prior 
experience in a foreign-owned firm that is over and above the return to 
other previous experience. These employees do not appear to pay for the 
knowledge they accumulate in the form of lower starting wages in 
foreign-owned firms. 
 
JEL classification: C23, F23, J31  
Keywords: FDI; Wages; Knowledge spillovers; Linked employer-employee 
data 
 
1 Introduction 
Spillover effects from foreign-owned to domestic firms have been cited as 
one of the reasons for the creation of policies designed to attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI). For example, in Finland, a government-funded 
committee lists the perceived beneficial effects of FDI as arguments in 
favour of recommendations to increase resources for the promotion of 
inward FDI (Prime Minister’s Office, 2004). The Finnish government 
currently provides foreign companies with assistance and guidance in 
establishing a business in Finland free of charge through the Invest in 
Finland Bureau. These policies stem from claims that foreign-owned firms 
have superior technological, marketing or managerial knowledge that may 
spill over to purely domestic firms. However, evidence on spillovers from 
foreign-owned to domestic firms is not conclusive and has mostly been 
gathered by examining the effect of the presence of a multinational 
company in an industry on the productivity of domestic firms (Barba 
Navaretti and Venables, 2004). The potential channels for spillovers, that 
is, i) backward and forward linkages between foreign-owned and domestic 
firms, ii) demonstration effects, and iii) labour mobility (Blomström and 
Kokko, 1998), have not received as much attention.  The studies that do 
consider the mechanisms through which spillovers occur have focussed 
mainly on backward and forward linkages between firms (e.g., Smarzynska 
                                     
*Forthcoming in the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.   
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Javorcik, 2004; Aitken and Harrison, 1999). These studies also provide 
mixed evidence on productivity spillovers. 
 
Labour mobility as a channel for spillovers has only recently been studied. 
Employees may be a source of spillovers if they acquire superior knowledge 
at a foreign-owned firm and bring this knowledge with them to benefit their 
new employer when they change jobs. The extent of the spillover or 
externality is defined by the division of the costs and benefits of knowledge 
accumulation between the foreign-owned firm, its employees, and the firms 
these employees move to. Papers by Görg and Strobl (2005) and Balsvik 
(2009) study spillover effects through labour mobility in Ghana and 
Norway, respectively. Both find positive productivity effects when 
employees move from multinational firms to domestic firms in the same 
industry1.  
 
Martins (2005) and Balsvik (2009) find that employees with experience in 
multinational firms earn higher wages than their co-workers. Martins 
(2005), however, observes that employees on average take a pay cut when 
moving from a foreign to a domestic firm, whereas Balsvik documents a pay 
increase upon migration. Whether or not experience in foreign-owned firms 
has a differing effect on employees with different educational backgrounds 
has, to the best of our knowledge, not been studied. However, when 
considering knowledge transfer from foreign-owned to domestic firms 
through labour mobility, skill level can be important. The issue of 
employees paying for the opportunity to accumulate knowledge in foreign-
owned firms has also not received attention.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether employees are able to 
appropriate rents accruing to the potentially superior knowledge that 
foreign-owned firms possess. In particular, the focus is on distinguishing 
between the effects of experience in foreign-owned firms on the earnings of 
employees with high and low education. In addition, employees’ earnings 
when they begin working at a foreign-owned firm are studied to determine 
whether they are paying for this knowledge in the form of lower wages. 
Furthermore, spillovers can also occur from domestic to foreign firms, which 
could be the case, for example, if FDI were technology-sourcing2. To take 
this into account, mobility both from foreign to domestic firms and from 
domestic to foreign firms is studied.  
 
                                     
1 Görg and Strobl (2005) only consider employees who set up their own firm after 
leaving a multinational. 
2 Driffield and Love (2003) study panel data on UK industries and find that such 
“reverse spillovers” exist. They do not, however, consider the mechanisms through 
which these spillovers arise. Ali-Yrkkö (2006) uses Finnish firm-level data to study 
the effect of patents on the likelihood of being acquired by a foreign firm. He finds 
that owning patents correlates with becoming a target for a foreign firm, implying 
that technology sourcing through labour mobility may also be relevant. 
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The analysis is based on linked employer-employee panel data from 
Statistics Finland. The extensive data set consists of information on Finnish 
firms and workers in both services and manufacturing, and covers the 
period 1994-2002. The results show that prior experience in a foreign-owned 
firm has a positive effect on the earnings of the university-educated, with 
employees moving to domestic firms gaining more than their colleagues 
moving to other foreign firms. These employees do not appear to pay in the 
form of lower wages for the knowledge they accumulate at foreign-owned 
firms.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a 
brief overview of the related theoretical literature, and Section 3 describes 
the data used in the analysis. Section 4 outlines the empirical specification 
and presents the estimation results. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2 Theoretical background 
Spillovers from multinational to domestic firms through labour mobility 
have been theoretically modelled explicitly by Fosfuri et al. (2001) and 
Glass and Saggi (2002). The models imply a trade-off between technological 
and pecuniary spillovers to the local economy. The trade-off arises through 
the multinational firm’s choice between allowing technology transfer and 
preventing it by paying the worker a premium to stay. Malchow-Møller et 
al. (2009) develop a model where skills learned in high-productivity 
(foreign) firms are transferable to other firms and where workers joining 
high-productivity firms may receive a higher average wage and wage 
growth over their careers but a lower initial wage. 
 
Models of R&D spillovers through worker mobility, such as those of Pakes 
and Nitzan (1983), Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003) and Franco and Filson 
(2006), are similar in spirit to models of spillovers from multinationals. 
These models incorporate the fact that employees gain access to valuable 
knowledge, which may benefit them later in their career. On-the-job 
training models should also be considered in this context. For example, 
Rosen’s (1972) model, where firms differ in terms of their on-the-job 
training opportunities, provides hypotheses concerning the effect of human 
capital accumulation on earnings at different career stages.  
 
There are several interesting hypotheses that arise from the theoretical 
framework described above. First, if workers accumulate productivity-
enhancing transferable knowledge at the foreign-owned firm, they would be 
expected to earn a return on this when moving to a domestic firm. To the 
extent that wages are related to marginal productivity, productivity 
spillovers will be reflected in wages. Second, models of human capital 
accumulation, such as the Rosen (1972) model, incorporate the possibility 
that formal schooling may influence learning capacity and thereby the 
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incentives for knowledge accumulation. The type of knowledge potentially 
being transferred from foreign to domestic firms, such as technological, 
managerial or marketing knowledge (Bellak, 2004; Markusen, 1995), implies 
that an employee’s education may be relevant in this context.  
 
Third, the models mentioned above imply that employees accept lower 
wages when they begin working for a foreign-owned firm in order to gain 
the opportunity to accumulate valuable knowledge that is not available in 
domestic firms.  Once they have accumulated knowledge, their earnings will 
have to increase corresponding to their value to other firms but also, as 
discussed in Rosen (1972), because there are fewer learning opportunities 
that the employees would be willing to pay for in the form of lower wages.  
 
Finally, the theoretical framework described above is based on workers 
moving from a firm with better possibilities for knowledge accumulation to 
firms where this knowledge is not available. If knowledge diffusion takes 
place from domestic to foreign firms as in, for example, technology-sourcing 
FDI, workers would be expected to benefit from mobility in this direction.   
3 Data 
This study uses a data set from Statistics Finland that links information on 
employers, that is, firms and plants, and their employees. The data set is 
formed by linking data from various Statistics Finland databases: Finnish 
Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data, Business Register, Industrial 
Statistics and Financial Statements Statistics. The data set is based on a 
1/3 sample of individuals who were 16 to 69 years old in 1990. These 
individuals were followed until 2002, and the sample was extended each 
year by adding a 1/3 sample of 16-year-old persons. The data set contains 
extensive information on individuals’ characteristics including details on 
their education, family, labour market situation, income and so forth. The 
firm- and plant-level variables include information on industry, ownership 
and economic activity, among other areas. Information on the employer is 
linked to each individual based on the employer at the end of the year. 
Because of confidentiality, some of the firm-level information is in the form 
of classified variables (e.g., size classes), growth rates (e.g., employment 
growth), plant averages (e.g., average age of employees), or binary variables 
(e.g., ownership status). These data are collected for all available years on 
all firms and plants that employ at least one individual in the sample.  
 
Information on foreign ownership is available from 1994 onwards, which is 
not a severe restriction, considering that foreign ownership in Finland was 
scarce before this time due to strict regulations that were not abolished 
until 1992 (Golub, 2003). The data set used in this study extends from 1994 
to 2002 and includes individuals who can be linked to a plant and firm in 
every year following their first appearance in the data. As the firm panel 
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consists of only private-sector firms, this restricts our sample to the private 
sector. Unlike many previous studies, the data set used in this analysis 
covers both the manufacturing and service sectors. To enable the analysis 
of mobility, only individuals who can be followed for at least three years are 
included. The data set thus consists of 198 266 individuals who work in 80 
216 different plants, which amounts to a total of 1 899 870 person-year 
observations.  
 
In order to study whether labour mobility from foreign to domestic firms is 
a source of knowledge spillovers, the focus should be on voluntary job 
moves. Therefore, the sample is restricted to include only individuals who 
are employed at least six months every year from the time they are first 
included in the sample, which means approximately 85 percent of 
employees. This restriction implies that the included individuals have a 
reasonably strong attachment to the labour market and may help to avoid 
confounding effects of elongated spells of non-employment with the effects 
of different types of work experience. A total of 95 percent of the included 
individuals are employed for 12 months every year, which roughly ensures 
that job moves are voluntary, as discussed in Manning (2003).  
 
The data are checked for and cleared of observations with missing 
ownership indicators and discrepancies in other key variables. In addition, a 
lower bound of 500 euros for monthly wages is also imposed. Following 
these amendments the data set consists of 136 389 individuals, of whom 
approximately 72 per cent are observed in all nine years. These individuals 
work in 45 610 different plants. The total number of person-year 
observations in the restricted sample is 918 251. 
 
In this study, a job is defined as an employee-plant match, and job mobility 
is defined by combining information on the start date of employment and 
information on changes in an individual’s plant and firm codes. This 
combination of information is used to ensure as accurate a measure of job 
mobility as possible and to avoid problems related to the renewal of 
employment contracts with the same employer on the one hand and 
administrative changes in plant and firm codes on the other. A worker is 
classified as having changed jobs if he/she has both changed plants and 
started a new employment contract during the year.3 In addition, this 
measure of job mobility is corrected so that if a worker’s firm code does not 
change, that is, if the worker moves from one plant to another in the same 
firm, he/she is not classified as a mover. Plant codes are used as the basis 
of identifying job mobility because they have been found to be more stable 
and less subject to administrative changes than firm codes in this data set4. 
                                     
3 The information on employment contracts is based on pension records, which 
implies that as long as an employee is employed by the same company, she should 
be classified as continuing the same employment contract regardless of whether her 
tenure consists of, e.g., several consecutive fixed-term contracts.  
4 Acquisitions may lead to a change in the firm code.  
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The adjustment using information on continuous employment contracts and 
unchanged firm codes should minimise the classification of plant changes 
within the same firm as job changes. Obviously a worker could have 
changed jobs several times during the year, but the data enable only the 
determination of the start date of the latest employment contract, and the 
plant and firm codes are based on the last week of the year. 
 
Foreign ownership is defined on the basis of ultimate beneficiary owner 
(UBO) and a 20 per cent threshold is used in classifying a plant as foreign 
owned. The 20 per cent threshold is the only ownership indicator in the 
data available for use in this study and exceeds the 10 per cent ownership 
threshold that IMF uses in defining FDI. The definition of the ultimate 
beneficiary owner implies that firms are classified as foreign when at least 
20 per cent of a company is directly or indirectly controlled by one foreign 
party, that is, portfolio investments are not included. It has been suggested 
in the literature that the focus should actually be on the comparison of 
multinational and non-multinational firms, rather than foreign-owned and 
domestic firms (e.g., Bellak, 2004; Heyman et al. 2007). Unfortunately, 
there is no reliable indicator of multinational status in the data set for this 
period, so the analysis will be based on comparing foreign-owned and 
domestic-owned firms.5 We do, however, attempt to tackle this issue by also 
separating the analysis with respect to size classes, as multinational firms 
tend to be larger than purely domestic firms.6  
 
After the abolition of strict regulations on FDI in 1992, the share of 
employees working in foreign-owned plants has risen steadily. While the 
total number of employees in our estimation sample has increased from 
92 733 to 133 622 during our observation period, the share of employees in 
foreign-owned firms has increased continuously from 10 per cent to 18 per 
cent. The current data set does not enable the identification of the 
nationality of the parent company, but other studies (Ali-Yrkkö et al. 2004) 
indicate that Swedish companies are by far the most significant foreign 
players in Finland, with approximately one-third of foreign-owned 
companies in Finland under Swedish ownership. The second-largest group 
consists of companies with owners based in USA followed by Germany, 
Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands. The prevalence of foreign 
ownership differs substantially based on industry, as can be seen in Table 1, 
with the share of employees in foreign-owned firms highest in certain areas 
of manufacturing. It should be noted that the motives of foreign acquirers 
and foreign firms establishing new subsidiaries in Finland differ depending 
on the industry. Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2004) find that market access is an 
important motive in all sectors, but in manufacturing, the technological 
know-how of the target company is viewed as having an equally important 
                                     
5 Based on other data, the number of domestic multinationals in Finland is 
approximately the same as the number of foreign multinational companies. 
6 This is similar to the approach used in Malchow-Møller et al. (2009). 
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effect as that of most of the market access indicators.  In order to capture 
the industry differences, we include controls for industry in all our analyses.  
 
[Table 1] 
 
Overall job mobility is quite low, around 4 per cent in most years, with the 
majority of job changes occurring between domestically owned plants. Low 
mobility is likely to be driven by the fact that the analysis focuses on 
continuously employed individuals, who are also continuously observed in 
private-sector firms. Approximately 10 per cent of all job changes occur 
from a domestic to a foreign firm, and a similar proportion of employees 
move from a foreign to a domestic firm. Although mobility between foreign 
and domestic firms is quite low, it should be noted that approximately 10 
per cent of the firms in the data employ a person with previous experience 
from a foreign-owned firm. This implies that the potential for knowledge 
transfer may not be as limited as the mobility figures suggest.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to study how experience in foreign-owned firms 
affects earnings in subsequent jobs. It may of course be that workers who 
have experience from foreign-owned firms and are consequently hired to 
work for domestic firms differ in terms of other characteristics that affect 
earnings. In addition, based on previous studies, it is reasonable to also 
expect foreign and domestic firms to differ in terms of observable 
characteristics other than nationality. Tables 2, 3 and 4 show 
characteristics of employees and employers based on ownership of the firm. 
The differences in means in Table 2 are all statistically significant. 
Employees are of quite similar age on average in both domestic and foreign 
firms, and domestic firms employ on average a slightly higher share of 
female workers. The gender difference may also be related to the difference 
in the prevalence of foreign ownership in different industries.  
 
[Table 2] 
 
As explained above, the employer-employee link is observed at the end of 
each year. For every employment contract that is in force at the end of the 
year, we observe the month when the contract began. This enables us to 
measure tenure on a monthly basis (we convert the tenure variable to years 
for our analysis). As we know when each employment contract began, we 
can also fully account for accumulated tenure for employment contracts 
that are in force at the beginning of our observation period in 1994.  This 
explains why average tenure in Table 2 exceeds the length of the 
observation period. Real monthly earnings are higher for employees in 
foreign firms, which is not surprising, considering the other observable 
characteristics of foreign-owned firms: higher sales per employee, a higher 
share of educated employees (Table 3) and a higher share of employees in 
large firms (Table 4).   
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[Table 3 and Table 4] 
 
Table 5 documents changes in earnings following a job change. Employees 
appear to gain on average both from moving from a foreign to a domestic 
firm and from moving between domestic firms. The average wage gain is 
highest for job changes from domestic to foreign firms, but the average real 
wage remains lower than that of employees who move from a foreign to a 
domestic firm or to another foreign firm. Average earnings both before and 
after job changes are highest among employees who move between foreign 
firms. Other factors influencing these unconditional averages will be studied 
in the next section.  
 
 [Table 5] 
4 Estimation 
4.1 Empirical Specification 
In order to examine the possibility that workers moving between foreign 
and domestic firms appropriate returns to knowledge acquired at their 
previous employer, earnings are regressed on measures of tenure at the 
previous job as well as on interactions of this tenure with the nationality 
(domestic or foreign) of both their previous and current employer. In 
addition, to determine whether employees pay for the chance to gain 
experience at a foreign-owned firm by accepting lower wages when they 
begin working there, the nationality of the current employer is controlled 
for, as is its interaction with tenure at the current employer. A large set of 
control variables is also included.  The earnings effects of tenure at both the 
previous and current job are estimated as splines. In its simplest form, 
without the interaction terms, the specification can be written as 
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where lnwit is the log real monthly wage, Xit includes personal 
characteristics and firm characteristics, 1(·) denotes an indicator function, 
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μi is a person-specific fixed effect and γt is a time effect. The spline for 
current tenure has changing slopes at 3, 6 and 9 years of tenure, and the 
spline for tenure at the previous employer has changing slopes at 3 and 6 
years of prior tenure7. The interpretation of the coefficients is quite 
straightforward. For example, if β2 is positive, earnings increase during the 
first years on a job. If β 3 is higher than β 2, the returns to tenure increase 
after the first three years, and if β 3 is lower than β 2, the returns to tenure 
decrease after three years.  
 
To determine whether workers earn a return to knowledge they accumulate 
at foreign-owned firms, the variables measuring tenure at the previous 
employer are interacted with an indicator of foreign ownership of this 
previous employer. However, as discussed above, there is also the possibility 
of reverse spillovers; that is, knowledge transfer from domestic to foreign 
firms, so this is controlled for by interacting previous tenure with an 
indicator of the foreign ownership of the current firm (the firm that the 
employee moves to). In addition, to distinguish the effects mentioned above 
from the effects of mobility between foreign-owned firms, we include an 
interaction of previous tenure with an indicator of the foreign ownership of 
both the current and previous firm. The reference case in our analysis is 
thus an employee who currently works in a domestic firm and has not 
worked in another firm. The term “Previous tenure” captures the return to 
having worked in another domestic firm, and the interaction of this with 
“Previous employer foreign” measures the additional premium from having 
previously worked in a foreign firm for employees currently employed by 
domestic firms. Similarly, “Previous tenure” interacted with “Current 
employer foreign” measures the additional return to previous tenure 
acquired in a domestic firm for workers whose current employer is foreign. 
Finally, for employees with previous experience from a foreign firm and who 
currently work for a foreign firm, the full effect of their previous tenure is 
captured by taking into account all the terms above and adding the effect 
of “Current and previous employer foreign” x “Previous tenure”.  
 
To capture the possibility that workers accept lower wages in exchange for 
the opportunity to accumulate knowledge at a foreign-owned firm, tenure 
at the current firm is interacted with a dummy indicating foreign ownership 
of the current firm8. We also allow for differences between employees who 
                                     
7 With the data covering the years 1994 to 2002, the maximum amount of tenure 
at a previous employer is 8 years. It should be noted that although the unit of 
measurement for tenure is a year, the start date of each employment spell is known 
at the monthly level; i.e., the accuracy of the tenure measure is fractions of a year. 
The results are qualitatively similar when changing the spline cut-offs from the 
current 3, 6 and 9 years. Changes in the magnitude of the results when applying 
different cut-offs are consistent with the differences in slopes on either side of the 
original cut-off.    
8 Foreign acquisitions will, of course, confound the analysis. To control for this, the 
analysis was run excluding any individuals who were employed at the time of a 
foreign or domestic acquisition. Although this changes the composition of the work 
force being studied, the main results remain qualitatively the same. 
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will stay with their current employer and those who will later switch to 
another firm by including a dummy for whether the employee will switch 
jobs later, as well as its interaction with the future employer’s ownership. 
In addition, as discussed in Section 2, knowledge transfer may 
predominantly be related to the mobility of the more educated employees. 
Therefore, model (1) is also estimated with interaction terms between 
university education and different types of experience. 
 
Accumulated experience (in both domestic and foreign firms) may be 
correlated with individual characteristics that the employers are able to 
identify but that are not available in the data. In addition, workers with 
experience from foreign-owned firms may be different from workers with 
experience only in domestic firms, for example, if foreign firms have a more 
efficient screening process for new recruits. As the data set is a panel, the 
estimation can be done using individual fixed effects to control for these 
unobserved characteristics.9 We also control for various plant- and firm-
level characteristics, that is, plant sales per employee, firm size, an 
indicator for foreign ownership, 24 industry dummies and 6 region 
dummies. In addition, an indicator is included for whether the plant that 
the individual worked for in the previous year reduced employment by 40 
per cent or more and similarly for this period’s employer. This aims to 
control for potentially involuntary job mobility. Descriptions of the 
variables used in the analysis are listed in Table 6. To take into account the 
fact that observations for individuals in the same firm are unlikely to be 
independent, we use standard errors that allow for correlation among 
observations within a firm.  
 
[Table 6] 
 
4.2 Returns to previous experience 
The results for the estimation of model (1) with interaction terms added are 
presented in Table 7. The first column shows results for estimations where 
educational differences in the impact of experience are not taken into 
account, whereas the second column includes interactions between the 
experience variables and a dummy for having completed a university 
degree. Both estimations include person fixed effects. We will focus on the 
results that control for educational differences and include the results in the 
first column mainly as a comparison to previous studies. Panels A and B of 
Table 7 show results for the impact of tenure at the previous employer on 
current earnings for employees without and with a university degree 
                                     
9 The amount of previous experience is constant within each job spell and changes 
each time an individual changes jobs. Therefore, only individuals who have changed 
jobs have previous experience, and these individuals are observed before and after 
the job change, so the effect of previous experience is identified in the fixed effects 
estimation.  
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respectively, Panels C and D depict results for tenure at the current 
employer, and Panel E includes coefficients for some of the more interesting 
control variables.  
 
[Table 7] 
 
The combined effects of previous tenure and its interactions with ownership 
and education for different employee groups from the second column of 
Table 7 are summarised in Table 8. The first column shows the return to 
previous tenure for employees without a university education. In the first 
part of Table 8, we see that these employees earn a return of 2.9 per cent to 
the first three years of tenure at their previous domestic employer when 
they move to another domestic firm. The return for the following three 
years of previous tenure is lower and then increases again for years 
exceeding six years of previous tenure. An employee without a university 
degree who moves from a foreign to a domestic firm earns a return to the 
first three years of previous tenure that is about one percentage point lower 
than colleagues with previous experience in domestic firms (0.018 vs. 0.029). 
The difference is statistically significant and indicates that these employees 
are not being paid higher wages to attract them from foreign firms. The 
second part of Table 8 shows that employees in foreign firms with 
experience in either a domestic or foreign firm earn a return to the first 
three years of previous experience that is not statistically significantly 
different from the return received by employees moving between two 
domestic firms. The returns to the next three years of previous tenure in a 
domestic firm are lower.  
  
[Table 8] 
 
It was argued above that if there are knowledge spillovers from foreign-
owned to domestic firms through worker mobility, these may predominantly 
be the result of educated workers changing firms. The second column in 
Table 8 shows returns to previous tenure for university-educated employees. 
Regardless of the ownership of their current or previous employer, these 
employees earn a higher return to the first few years of previous tenure 
than their colleagues with no university education. The return is highest for 
employees moving from foreign to domestic firms after up to three years of 
tenure at the previous firm. This return is statistically significantly higher 
than for employees moving from foreign to other foreign firms (0.103 vs. 
0.086), which indicates that domestic firms are willing to pay up to gain 
access to these workers’ know-how. The lowest return to the first few years 
of previous tenure accrues to employees moving from domestic to foreign 
firms (0.061). Foreign firms do not appear to value experience gained in 
domestic firms as much as they value experience gained in other foreign 
firms. These results also indicate that if there are knowledge spillovers 
between foreign and domestic firms, they are likely to be flowing from 
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foreign to domestic firms and not vice versa. The fact that the first few 
years of tenure at the previous employer provide the highest return implies 
that employees accumulate valuable knowledge quite rapidly.   
 
Figure 1 illustrates wage paths for university-educated employees who 
either stay at a domestic or foreign firm for 10 years or are recruited by 
domestic firms after 5 years of tenure.10 The initial wage profiles for 
employees in foreign firms are above those for employees in domestic firms 
and, regardless of ownership, employees who will later change jobs earn 
slightly less than their colleagues. These initial wage profiles depict the 
results on returns to tenure at the current employer as shown in panels C 
and D of Table 7 and will be discussed following the analysis on returns to 
previous tenure. University-educated employees in foreign firms have higher 
wages than their colleagues in domestic firms after five years of tenure, and 
when they subsequently move to a domestic firm, they also benefit more 
from their previous tenure than those moving from a domestic to another 
domestic firm. The results imply that domestic firms are willing to 
compensate university-educated employees for experience in foreign firms to 
a larger extent than they are for experience in other domestic firms. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
Wage profiles for university-educated employees who either stay at a 
domestic or foreign firm for ten years or are recruited by foreign firms after 
five years of tenure are illustrated in Figure 2. The returns to previous 
experience in another foreign firm are higher than the returns to previous 
experience in a domestic firm. As noted above, foreign-owned firms do not 
appear to value experience gained in domestic firms as highly as they value 
experience gained in other foreign firms. This would imply that foreign 
firms also acknowledge that there is a difference in the knowledge 
accumulation process in foreign and domestic firms. On the other hand, as 
the results in Table 8 show, domestic firms value experience from foreign-
owned firms even more than other foreign firms do.  
 
[Figure 2] 
 
Figure 3 compares wage profiles of university-educated employees who are 
recruited by either a foreign or domestic firm following five years of 
experience in either type. This graph thus combines the wage profiles of job 
switchers from Figures 1 and 2. During the initial five years, employees in 
foreign-owned firms earn more, as was seen in the previous figures, with the 
initial wage premium diminishing somewhat due to lower returns to tenure. 
We see that employees who move from one foreign firm to another gain the 
most in terms of wages, but, as the results in Table 7 show, the difference 
compared to employees moving from foreign to domestic firms is due to the 
                                     
10 The profiles are calculated at median values of other control variables.  
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general foreign ownership wage premium, that is, the fact that employees in 
foreign-owned firms earn more on average regardless of their previous or 
current tenure. The highest return to previous tenure is received by 
employees who move from a foreign firm to a domestic firm, as seen in 
Table 8. The influence of the foreign ownership premium can also be seen in 
the wage profile of employees moving from domestic to foreign firms, as 
these workers gain more than their colleagues moving to other domestic 
firms even though the return to previous experience accumulated in a 
domestic firm is lower when moving to a foreign firm. All in all, university-
educated employees with previous experience in foreign-owned firms earn 
higher wages than employees with experience only from a domestic firm. 
Employees who move from one foreign firm to another continue to benefit 
from the foreign ownership wage premium, whereas those who move from a 
foreign to a domestic firm forfeit this premium but earn a higher return to 
their previous tenure as expected if knowledge spillovers exist.  
 
[Figure 3] 
 
These results would imply that there is something different about mobility 
of educated workers with experience in foreign-owned firms, compared to 
other types of mobility. This finding is interesting in various respects. 
Firstly, this type of result is consistent with the view that knowledge 
transfer depends on the skill level of the employee. Secondly, the fact that 
it is the mobility of employees with experience in foreign firms and not the 
mobility from domestic to foreign firms that appears to matter implies that 
it is experience that educated employees acquire in foreign firms that is 
valued in domestic firms and not vice versa.11 This is consistent with 
evidence that foreign-owned firms outperform purely domestic firms (e.g., 
Bellak, 2004; Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2004 for Finland). In addition, we 
observe that foreign-owned firms do not appear to value experience gained 
in domestic firms as highly as they do experience gained in other foreign 
firms, which indicates that foreign-owned firms also acknowledge a 
difference in the knowledge accumulation process in foreign and domestic 
firms. The fact that domestic firms provide a higher return to previous 
experience accumulated in foreign firms than these employees would receive 
when moving to another foreign firm can be indicative of the fact that this 
is a return to knowledge that would otherwise not be available to the 
domestic firm. When interpreting these results, it should be kept in mind 
that if job mobility itself is a way of achieving higher earnings, prior 
experience will be endogenous in the earnings equation. However, 
comparing the different types of mobility can still give an indication of the 
differences in how previous experience from foreign and domestic firms is 
valued. This issue will be discussed in the last section.  
                                     
11 Balsvik (2009) finds broadly similar results for Norwegian manufacturing, but 
does not distinguish between wage effects for employees with and without higher 
education. 
14 
  
 
4.3 Do workers pay for knowledge accumulation? 
If employees are able to reap returns to the knowledge they accumulate in 
foreign-owned firms, the models of R&D spillovers and on-the-job training 
mentioned above imply that this should lead to lower wages for those 
working (or starting to work) for the foreign firm compared to those who 
start working at domestic firms12. The wage-tenure profiles depicted in 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 also illustrated the results for returns to current tenure 
in Panels C and D of Table 7, and we will now discuss these results in 
greater detail. The combined effects of tenure and its interaction with 
ownership of the firm and education are summarised in Table 9. The results 
indicate that the return to tenure for employees with no university 
education is highest between three and six years.  Employees without a 
university education starting in foreign-owned firms earn on average 4.7 per 
cent less than their colleagues in domestic firms, but the return to the first 
years of tenure is 1.5 per cent higher in foreign firms, which implies that 
those employed by foreign firms catch up with their peers in domestic firms 
after three years of tenure.  
[Table 9] 
 
The results in Table 9 show that employees with a university education 
earn higher returns to all levels of tenure than those with no university 
degree, although in foreign firms the difference for tenure between three and 
six years is not statistically significant. University-educated employees in 
foreign firms earn a lower return to the first three years of tenure but 
benefit from an overall foreign ownership premium of 8.5 per cent. The 
return to tenure between three and six years is similar in foreign and 
domestic firms, but longer tenure is again more highly rewarded in domestic 
firms. The substantial initial wage premium in foreign-owned firms thus 
shrinks with tenure. These features are depicted in Figure 1, where the 
dotted line illustrates the wage profile for a university-educated employee 
with 1 to 10 years of tenure in a domestic firm and the dashed-dotted line 
shows the wage profile for university-educated employees in foreign-owned 
firms. Employees who will change to a new domestic employer in the future 
have slightly lower wage profiles than their colleagues who will stay at the 
firm, but, as seen in Table 9, the difference is not statistically significant. 
Taking into account the substantial initial wage premium that university-
educated employees in foreign firms earn compared to their colleagues in 
domestic firms, the results do not support the hypothesis that educated 
employees who benefit from experience in a foreign firm when moving to a 
domestic firm would initially pay in terms of lower wages for the 
opportunity to gain this experience.  
 
                                     
12 Møen (2005) finds that employees in R&D-intensive firms pay in the form of 
lower wages for the knowledge they accumulate.  
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4.4 Robustness checks 
We briefly comment on various robustness checks without presenting the 
results in tables. The results are available on request. A potential problem 
in the analysis described above is the endogeneity of the foreign-domestic 
status of the firms, which could arise, for example, if foreign firms only 
acquired the best-performing firms in Finland with the potential for positive 
spillovers. Especially in cases where a domestic multinational firm is 
acquired by a foreign firm, previous literature indicates that there is no 
substantial effect on wages (Heyman et al. 2007), which can be viewed as 
implying no change in the potential for knowledge accumulation. To tackle 
this issue, we would have liked to have controlled for plant fixed effects in 
addition to person fixed effects. Due to the number of plants in the data 
set, estimating the model with both person and plant fixed effects is not 
currently feasible for us, but we have controlled for both person and plant 
effects using a subset of the data. As previous experience in foreign-owned 
firms appears to primarily have an effect on the earnings of the highly 
educated, we have restricted the estimation to those with a university 
education. As this does not sufficiently reduce the number of plants, we 
have further restricted the analysis to manufacturing plants. This leaves us 
with 18 080 individuals who are employed at 4 359 different plants, yielding 
a total of 108 191 person years.  
 
Estimating model (1) for this group, including both individual and plant 
fixed effects as well as interactions of the current and previous tenure 
variables with ownership of the previous and current employer, gives results 
that are consistent with those reported above, implying that the plant-level 
controls we included in our earlier estimations work reasonably well in 
controlling for differences between plants. For comparison, we have also 
done the estimations for the full data set using plant fixed effects instead of 
individual fixed effects. The results from these estimations show even 
stronger effects for the different types of experience, as may be expected 
when not controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity. The relative 
impacts of the different experience variables remain similar when 
controlling for plant and not individual fixed effects. To eliminate the 
confounding effect of foreign acquisitions, the analysis has also been 
conducted excluding individuals who are employed at the time of a 
domestic or foreign acquisition. Although this changes the composition of 
the work force being studied, the main results remain qualitatively the 
same. 
 
Another issue to consider is that our analysis concentrates on the difference 
between foreign-owned and domestic firms instead of multinational and 
local domestic firms, as has been argued to be important. In an attempt to 
investigate whether this would make a notable difference, we have split our 
analysis based on firm size rather than on nationality, as in the analysis of 
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Malchow-Møller et al. (2009)13. This approach is based on the fact that 
multinational firms are on average larger than purely domestic firms. The 
results for this analysis indicate that returns to both current and previous 
tenure are somewhat higher in large firms and that the impact of previous 
tenure in large firms on wages is slightly positive. However, there is no 
difference in the effect of previous tenure in large firms for employees with 
and without a university degree. This may be related to the firm size-wage 
effect14; that is, because larger firms pay on average higher wages and 
employees who voluntarily move from a large firm to a smaller firm will not 
accept wage cuts, we will observe employees with experience in large firms 
earning more than their colleagues in small firms. As we found that the 
educational level of employees plays a role in our analysis of experience in 
foreign-owned firms, these results imply that, to the extent that firm size 
can be used to control for multinational status, there are additional 
differences based on the ownership of the firm that can be meaningful.  
 
The frequency of job switching is often intense at the beginning of the 
career, when the wage curve is rather steep. This could influence the results 
on returns to previous experience, so to account for age differences in 
returns, the estimations have also been done including interactions of age 
classes with previous tenure. The results show that university-educated 
workers under the age of 35 benefit from previous experience in a foreign 
firm that exceeds 6 years but that otherwise, age does not influence the 
results. This finding indicates that for this group of workers there is an 
additional gain in accumulating longer experience, which could be related 
to, for example, being promoted to a managerial position in the foreign 
firm. These results are also consistent with our analysis on potential 
spillovers from foreign to domestic firms.  
 
To analyse in greater detail whether employees accept wage discounts when 
entering foreign firms, we have also conducted the estimation using data on 
a single cohort of university graduates. Earnings equations for the years 
1994 to 2002 were estimated for individuals who obtained a university 
degree in 199315; that is, their initial years in the labour market are 
documented in full. However, no wage discount when entering foreign-
owned firms was observed.  
 
We have also analysed the robustness of the results presented above to the 
use of different experience measures and functional forms of the estimation 
equation. The first modification incorporates a cubic in previous and 
current tenure instead of estimating the effects as splines.  The results are 
consistent with those above. In addition, an experience measure 
incorporating previous experience from not only one employer but all 
                                     
13 We use a size threshold of 300 employees. 
14 See, e.g., Oi and Idson (1999). 
15 Only those who were under 30 years old in 1993 are included in order to ensure 
as well as possible that they are actually entering the labour force for the first time. 
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previous employers observed after 1994 has been used. The results are, 
again, similar to those above, which may be expected, as we are only able 
to use data from 1994 onwards. This polynomial regression has also been 
run using an experience measure incorporating both previous experience 
and current tenure; that is, tenure was included both in the experience 
variable and as a separate regressor. This commonly used form of the wage 
regression also yields results consistent with those above. In addition, to 
take into account the fact that the distribution of previous tenure is 
restricted by experience only being measured from 1994 onwards, the model 
has also been estimated from 1998 onwards, using experience data starting 
in 1994. The results are also qualitatively robust to this change. 
Furthermore, to focus more on wage changes around the time of the job 
change, we have included indicators for the years immediately prior to and 
after the job change in the estimation with our basic splines. The 
coefficients on these indicators are not significant, and our main results 
remain unchanged, indicating that our measures of previous tenure are 
robust.  One further robustness check concerns the size of the firms used in 
our analysis. The data set used in our estimations consists of firms of all 
sizes, that is, we include very small firms with fewer than 5 employees. In 
order to ensure that this is not an issue, we have run the estimations 
including only firms with at least 50 employees. This does not alter the 
results.  
5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to ascertain whether workers are able to 
appropriate rents to the potentially superior knowledge possessed by 
foreign-owned firms when moving to a domestic firm and, in particular, 
whether this is related to the different educational backgrounds of the 
workers. The analysis shows that previous tenure in a foreign-owned firm 
has a positive effect on the earnings of the university educated that is over 
and above the effect of other previous experience. This return is higher for 
educated employees moving from foreign to domestic firms than for their 
colleagues moving to other foreign firms. These findings are consistent with 
models of knowledge diffusion through labour mobility, where a domestic 
firm may bid for a worker at a foreign-owned firm in order to gain access to 
her knowledge. The results are also in line with the view that if there is 
knowledge transfer from foreign-owned to domestic firms, it may require a 
certain skill level of the employee who is changing jobs. The results also 
show that the educated workers who benefit from experience in a foreign-
owned firm do not earn lower wages while employed by the foreign firm. 
Foreign firms are not able to capture the full return to their knowledge; as 
a result, policies designed to attract foreign direct investment can be 
beneficial. 
 
One needs to be somewhat cautious in interpreting these results, as there 
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may be some process whereby job mobility in itself is a way of achieving 
higher earnings, as detailed in the literature on returns to tenure and job 
mobility16. Therefore, prior experience can be endogenous in the earnings 
equation, as the potential for achieving a higher wage is likely to be one of 
the determinants of job mobility. With no instrument for previous 
experience currently available, we include plant fixed effects in addition to 
person fixed effects in one of our extensions in order to alleviate the 
problem. The results from this robustness check are consistent with our 
main analysis. To the extent that we are mostly capturing voluntary job 
mobility, the bias caused by the endogeneity of previous experience can be 
thought to be positive for all of the different types of experience under 
consideration. As a result, it can be interesting to compare the returns 
found for different types of experience despite the fact that each will 
contain the mobility bias mentioned above. Indeed, our results can be 
indicative of how the actual unbiased effects for previous experience in 
different types of firms differ from each other. It should also be kept in 
mind that if spillovers occur through labour mobility, they are likely to 
arise from domestic firms poaching employees with useful expertise. This 
implies that the results cannot be interpreted as the effect of moving some 
random worker but can be interesting as an analysis of spillovers.  
                                     
16 See Topel (1991), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Altonji and Williams (1997), 
Antel (1986), Mincer (1993), Abowd et al. (2006). 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Employees by industry and firm ownership 
 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics by firm ownership 
 
Total
Industry Frequency Frequency Percent
Mining and Quarrying 3 300 418 13 %
Manufacture of food products, beverages and 
tobacco 42 104 6 644 16 %
Manufacture of textiles 6 557 910 14 %
Manufacture of wearing apparel, leather and leather 
products 8 404 481 6 %
Manufacture of wood, wood products, pulp, paper 
and paper products 81 473 2 420 3 %
Publishing, printing 32 586 1 969 6 %
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products, 
nuclear fuel, chemicals, chemical products and man-
made fibres
26 155 7 684 29 %
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 16 945 2 411 14 %
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 14 660 5 650 39 %
Manufacture of basic metals 25 088 1 594 6 %
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 30 546 5 694 19 %
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c, 
electrical and optical equipment 108 612 25 192 23 %
Manufacture of transport equipment 25 187 8 734 35 %
Manufacturing n.e.c. 13 564 1 109 8 %
Electricity, gas and water supply, Construction 63 561 5 222 8 %
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household 
goods, Hotels and restaurants
177 664 29 640 17 %
Transport, storage and communication 115 355 7 736 7 %
Financial intermediation 34 121 2 546 7 %
Real estate, renting and business activities 92 369 14 628 16 %
Total 918 251 130 682 14 %
Foreign
Domestic Foreign
Means of employee characteristics
Age 41.01 41.25
(9.80) (9.85)
Female 0.33 0.30
(0.47) (0.46)
Tenure (years) 12.16 12.71
(9.42) (9.46)
Tenure at previous firm (years) 3.11 3.76
(10.34) (11.66)
Real monthly earnings (2002 euros) 2 460 2 869
(1 170) (1 441)
Means of plant characteristics
Sales per employee 207 546 272 030
(1 065 960) (643 627)
Observations 787 569 130 682
Standard deviations in parentheses
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Table 7  Wage effects of experience in different types of firms 
 
 
PANEL A (1) (2)
Effects of tenure at previous employer for all employees
Previous tenure under 3 years 0.047 0.029
(27.86)** (14.67)**
Previous tenure between 3 and 6 years -0.012 -0.009
(4.71)** (2.95)**
Previous tenure over 6 years 0.028 0.018
(4.26)** (2.54)*
Previous employer foreign 
x Previous tenure under 3 years 0.010 -0.011
(3.05)** (2.55)*
x Previous tenure between 3 and 6 years 0.003 0.021
(0.58) (2.61)**
x Previous tenure over 6 years -0.016 -0.026
(0.82) (0.98)
Current employer foreign 
x Previous tenure under 3 years 0.004 0.006
(0.78) (1.05)
x Previous tenure between 3 and 6 years -0.010 -0.006
(1.91) (0.99)
x Previous tenure over 6 years 0.005 0.006
(0.29) (0.28)
Current and previous employer foreign 
x Previous tenure under 3 years 0.007 0.006
(1.37) (0.81)
x Previous tenure between 3 and 6 years -0.009 -0.020
(0.89) (1.43)
x Previous tenure over 6 years 0.011 0.026
(0.32) (0.48)
PANEL B
Effects of tenure at previous employer for the university educated
University education 
x Previous tenure under 3 years 0.051
(15.34)**
x Previous tenure between 3 and 6 years -0.007
(1.48)
x Previous tenure over 6 years 0.044
(2.88)**
x Previous employer foreign 
x Previous tenure under 3 years 0.034
(5.85)**
x Previous tenure between 3 and 6 years -0.025
(2.01)*
x Previous tenure over 6 years -0.001
(0.02)
x Current employer foreign 
x Previous tenure under 3 years -0.025
(3.43)**
x Previous tenure between 3 and 6 years -0.000
(0.00)
x Previous tenure over 6 years -0.005
(0.14)
x Current and previous employer foreign 
x Previous tenure under 3 years -0.004
(0.38)
x Previous tenure between 3 and 6 years 0.029
(1.40)
x Previous tenure over 6 years -0.039
(0.54)
Table continues on next page
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Table 7 Continued  
 
PANEL C
Effects of tenure at current employer for all employees
Tenure under 3 years 0.019 0.005
(8.99)** (3.58)**
Tenure between 3 and 6 years 0.014 0.013
(6.71)** (6.05)**
Tenure between 6 and 9 years 0.005 0.002
(4.23)** (1.82)
Tenure over 9 years 0.009 0.008
(19.94)** (18.86)**
Current employer foreign -0.008 -0.047
(0.67) (3.94)**
Current employer foreign 
x Tenure under 3 years 0.006 0.015
(1.94) (4.28)**
x Tenure between 3 and 6 years 0.003 0.003
(1.17) (1.05)
x Tenure between 6 and 9 years -0.008 -0.010
(1.52) (1.49)
x Tenure over 9 years 0.001 0.001
(1.51) (3.40)**
Will change to another employer in the future -0.004 -0.008
(0.40) (0.75)
Will change to foreign employer in the future -0.011 -0.012
(0.84) (0.94)
PANEL D
Effects of tenure at current employer for the university educated
University education
x Tenure under 3 years 0.038
(9.44)**
x Tenure between 3 and 6 years 0.004
(1.82)
x Tenure between 6 and 9 years 0.010
(6.58)**
x Tenure over 9 years 0.004
(10.81)**
x Current employer foreign 0.132
(7.87)**
x Current employer foreign 
x Tenure under 3 years -0.028
(4.90)**
x Tenure between 3 and 6 years -0.002
(0.58)
x Tenure between 6 and 9 years 0.004
(0.86)
x Tenure over 9 years -0.002
(3.85)**
x Will change to another employer in the future -0.004
(0.37)
x Will change to foreign employer in the future 0.008
(0.59)
PANEL E
Other control variables
Age2 / 100 -0.066 -0.064
(30.10)** (35.69)**
Firm size 5 to 9 employees 0.042 0.043
(15.92)** (16.30)**
Firm size 10 to 19 employees 0.072 0.073
(22.67)** (23.39)**
Firm size 20 to 49 employees 0.090 0.091
(25.54)** (26.36)**
Firm size 50 to 99 employees 0.097 0.097
(24.82)** (25.55)**
Firm size 100 to 299 employees 0.099 0.099
(24.37)** (25.24)**
Firm size more than 300 employees 0.101 0.101
(23.75)** (24.95)**
Plant sales per employee / 1 000 000 0.001 0.001
(1.50) (1.51)
Plant employment reduction in previous year > 40% -0.002 -0.002
(0.65) (0.86)
Plant employment reduction in current year > 40% 0.000 -0.001
(0.01) (0.19)
Person fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 918251 918251
R-squared 0.89 0.90
Number of individuals 136389 136389
Notes : The dependent variable is log real monthly earnings. Coefficients on the following variables are not reported: time dummies, regional dummies, 
industry dummies. The omitted category for firm size is fewer than 5 employees. T statistics in parentheses allow for clustering at the firm level. * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 8 Summary of returns to previous experience 
 
 
Table 9 Summary of returns to current tenure 
 
  
Employees without 
university degree
University educated 
employees
Returns to previous tenure for employees currently in a domestic firm
Previous tenure in domestic firm under 3 years 0.029** 0.080**
(0.002) (0.003)
Previous tenure in domestic firm between 3 and 6 years -0.009** -0.016**
(0.003) (0.004)
Previous tenure in domestic firm over 6 years 0.018* 0.063**
(0.007) (0.014)
Previous tenure in foreign firm under 3 years 0.018** 0.103**
(0.005) (0.004)
Previous tenure in foreign firm between 3 and 6 years 0.013 -0.019*
(0.008) (0.008)
Previous tenure in foreign firm over 6 years -0.008 0.036 
(0.025) (0.027)
Returns to previous tenure for employees currently in a foreign firm
Previous tenure in domestic firm under 3 years 0.035** 0.061**
(0.006) (0.005)
Previous tenure in domestic firm between 3 and 6 years -0.015* -0.022**
(0.006) (0.007)
Previous tenure in domestic firm over 6 years 0.024 0.063*
(0.020) (0.029)
Previous tenure in foreign firm under 3 years 0.030** 0.086**
(0.007) (0.006)
Previous tenure in foreign firm between 3 and 6 years -0.014 -0.017 
(0.010) (0.011)
Previous tenure in foreign firm over 6 years 0.024 0.023 
(0.041) (0.029)
Notes:  Based on results reported in column 2 of Table 7. Standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering at the firm level. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%
Employees without 
university degree
University educated 
employees
Returns to current tenure for employees in domestic firms
Tenure under 3 years 0.005** 0.043**
(0.001) (0.004)
Tenure between 3 and 6 years 0.013** 0.018**
(0.002) (0.002)
Tenure between 6 and 9 years 0.002 0.012**
(0.001) (0.001)
Tenure over 9 years 0.008** 0.013**
(0.000) (0.000)
Returns to current tenure for employees in foreign firms
Tenure under 3 years 0.020** 0.029**
(0.003) (0.003)
Tenure between 3 and 6 years 0.017** 0.019**
(0.000) (0.003)
Tenure between 6 and 9 years -0.008 0.006*
(0.007) (0.003)
Tenure over 9 years 0.010** 0.012**
(0.001) (0.001)
Ownership of employer
Current employer foreign -0.047** 0.085**
(0.012) (0.015)
Will change to another employer in the future -0.008 -0.011 
(0.75) (0.019)
Will change to foreign employer in the future -0.012 0.000
(0.94) (0.017)
Notes: Based on results reported in column 2 of Table 7. Standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering at the firm level. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%
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Figure 1 Wage profiles for university-educated employees who are recruited by 
domestic firms or stay in one firm. 
 
Notes: DOF refers to domestically owned firm, FOF refers to foreign-owned firm. Experience is 
measured in years. Wage paths are evaluated at median values of other control variables. 
 
Figure 2 Wage profiles for university-educated employees who are recruited by 
foreign firms or stay in one firm. 
 
Notes: DOF refers to domestically owned firm, FOF refers to foreign-owned firm. Experience is 
measured in years. Wage paths are evaluated at median values of other control variables. 
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Figure 3 Wage profiles for university-educated employees recruited by foreign and 
domestic firms 
 
Notes: DOF refers to domestically owned firm, FOF refers to foreign-owned firm. Wage paths are 
evaluated at median values of other control variables. 
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Labour Market Transitions 
Following Foreign Acquisitions 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses employee flows in firms subject to foreign acquisitions 
using a large Finnish linked employer-employee data set. The results show 
that in the industrial sector, the job separation hazard increases in the year 
following a foreign or domestic acquisition. In the case of foreign 
acquisitions exits to both other jobs and non-employment become more 
likely with the probability of changing jobs increasing more than the 
probability of moving to non-employment. However, in certain industrial 
sectors, where technological know-how may be argued to be important, the 
job separation hazard does not increase following foreign acquisitions. 
Neither foreign nor domestic M&A transactions appear to influence the job 
separation hazard of service sector employees in the first year following the 
acquisition, but in the second and third years after the transaction the job 
separation hazard increases with a larger change following foreign than 
domestic acquisitions. The impact of a foreign acquisition does not vary by 
individual characteristics in either sector, whereas following a domestic 
merger there is an increase in the job separation hazard of university 
educated employees. Also older workers experience an increase in their job 
separation hazard following a domestic merger.  
 
JEL classification: J63, C23, F23  
Keywords: Foreign acquisition; Job separations; Linked employer-employee 
panel data  
 
1 Introduction 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions play a major role in the ongoing 
globalisation process and are often the subject of public debate on the pros 
and cons of increased economic integration. One of the areas of influence of 
foreign acquisitions is the labour market. In the public debate foreign 
acquisitions are often seen as increasing job insecurity due to the perceived 
ease with which multinational companies can shift their production facilities 
elsewhere following adverse changes in their operating environment. On the 
other hand, policy in many countries is designed to attract foreign direct 
investment because of its perceived positive influence on the host country’s 
economy.   
 
Empirical research on the effects of foreign acquisitions has mainly focused 
on productivity and wages. There have, nevertheless, also been a number of 
contributions to the analysis of the impact that transition to foreign 
ownership has on employment. However, the existing evidence is 
predominantly based on plant and firm level data, which implies that the 
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employment effects found in these studies may mask a number of 
interesting individual level developments taking place following a foreign 
acquisition. For example, foreign acquisitions may affect different types of 
workers in different ways. Following the employees of firms subject to a 
foreign acquisition and combining this with information on individual 
characteristics will distinguish effects related to changes in workforce 
composition. Taking into account the subsequent employment status of 
employees that leave a firm following a foreign acquisition can also give an 
idea of how severe the effects of potential workforce restructuring are at the 
individual level. The individual costs of job displacement are typically high, 
but if most separations are due to job-to-job transitions, the outcomes may 
not be so adverse. In addition, if the impact on the job separation rate is 
not substantial, these costs may not be important at the aggregate level.  
 
In addition to being predominantly at the firm and plant level, previous 
empirical research has been mostly based on data from the manufacturing 
sector, which is a limitation, considering the increased importance of the 
service sector. There may be important differences between the motives and 
impacts of acquisitions in different sectors. For example, to the extent that 
certain service sector firms may need a customer interface, it may not be as 
straightforward for an acquirer to restructure the workforce of a service 
sector firm as it would be in an industrial firm. 
 
When studying the impact of foreign acquisitions on personnel it is also 
important to try to distinguish between effects that potentially are common 
to any acquisition, be it cross-border or not, and effects that are unique to 
transactions where the acquirer is foreign. An acquisition per se may induce 
restructuring, but to the extent that the motives of foreign and domestic 
acquisitions differ, there may be quite different implications for the 
workforce. For example, there is survey evidence from Finland indicating 
that the most prevalent reasons for acquisitions of Finnish companies by 
foreign companies have to do with access to the Finnish, Nordic or Russian 
market (Ali-Yrkkö et al. 2004). There are also differences depending on 
sector, with technological know-how also being a commonly cited motive for 
foreign acquisitions in some industrial sectors. Motives for purely domestic 
mergers may differ from these, which may imply different consequences for 
employees.  
 
This paper seeks to complement earlier studies on the links between foreign 
acquisitions and the workforce, and contributes to the literature by 
conducting an individual level analysis on all sectors of the economy. I use 
linked employer-employee data on a representative sample of Finnish 
employees in all sectors, which enables me to analyse the flow of workers in 
plants following a foreign acquisition. I decompose these flows by 
destination states and control for individual and firm characteristics in 
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studying the effect that foreign acquisition has on the probability of ending 
up in a particular state. I also seek to establish whether the effects of 
acquisitions are similar regardless of whether foreign companies are 
involved, i.e. I distinguish between the effects of purely domestic mergers 
and cross border acquisitions. 
 
The analysis shows that in the industrial sector, the job separation hazard 
increases in the year following a foreign or domestic acquisition. In the case 
of foreign acquisitions exits to both other jobs and non-employment become 
more likely with the probability of changing jobs increasing more than the 
probability of moving to non-employment. However, in certain industrial 
sectors, where technological know-how may be argued to be important, the 
job separation hazard does not increase following foreign acquisitions. There 
is no such difference between different types of industrial sectors following 
domestic mergers. This may indicate knowledge sourcing as a motive 
behind foreign acquisitions in these sectors. M&A transactions do not 
appear to influence the job separation hazard of service sector employees in 
the first year following the acquisition, but in the second and third years 
after the transaction the job separation hazard increases with a larger 
change following foreign than domestic acquisitions. The finding may be 
related to the need for a customer interface which restricts the possibilities 
for immediate restructuring. In the industrial sector the job separation 
hazard decreases in the second and third years following both foreign and 
domestic acquisitions, implying a one-off restructuring. The impact of a 
foreign acquisition does not vary by individual characteristics in either 
sector, whereas following a domestic merger there is an increase in the job 
separation hazard of university educated employees. Also older workers 
experience an increase in their job separation hazard following a domestic 
merger.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a 
brief overview of the related theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 
describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4 describes transitions of 
workers and presents the analysis of the effect of foreign acquisition on 
individual employment outcomes. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
2 Related literature 
2.1 Theoretical background 
The analysis of the effects of foreign acquisitions links two distinct strands 
of literature: theories of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and theories of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Theories of MNEs have implications for 
employment through different routes. Firstly, they imply that the skill 
structure of the labour force in MNEs may differ from that of purely 
domestic firms, with MNEs having a higher share of skilled employees 
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(Markusen, 2002). This may lead to restructuring when a firm develops into 
a MNE. Secondly, MNEs may differ from purely domestic firms in terms of 
the speed and magnitude of employment adjustment due to their ability to 
relocate production on the one hand and the different skill structure of their 
labour force on the other (Barba Navaretti et al., 2003). The higher share 
of skilled workers implies more rigid labour demand1 but the ability to 
relocate implies a speedier and potentially larger adjustment.  
 
Both of the effects mentioned above arise from the differences between 
MNEs (both domestically or foreign owned) and purely domestic firms. The 
literature on mergers and acquisitions, on the other hand, considers the 
effects of the actual change of ownership as a one-off event. This literature 
has discussed several different frameworks for thinking about the 
employment effects of foreign acquisitions. These models link ownership 
change to e.g. creative destruction, market competition, scale economies 
and synergies2. The hypotheses on the effects of ownership change on 
employment derived from these models vary and are related to the different 
motives behind the transactions. For instance, exploiting synergies may 
lead to higher employment if the rise in efficiency enables an expansion in 
market share. On the other hand, disposing of overlapping functions to 
improve efficiency may lead to downsizing. An acquisition may also have 
different effects on different types of employees. Eg. if an acquisition is 
undertaken with the intention of changing management practices, this will 
most likely affect management differently than the rest of the workforce 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). To the extent that acquisitions in foreign and 
domestic markets may be undertaken for different reasons and may involve 
e.g. different degrees of overlapping functions between the firms involved in 
the transaction, the implications for employees may be quite different 
following a foreign rather than domestic acquisition.  
 
When considering individual employment outcomes following foreign 
acquisitions, it is also worthwhile to consider the implications of the 
literature on MNEs and the literature on M&As in the context of workers 
flows. In models such as Jovanovic (1979), the job-matching process ensures 
that workers are optimally assigned to jobs. In such a framework 
acquisitions may be thought of as causing turnover, if they change the 
value of a worker-employer match. This may again depend on distinct 
characteristics of foreign vs. domestic acquisitions.  
 
With increasingly integrated international markets it may be argued that 
some acquisitions by foreign firms may bear characteristics related more to 
pure acquisition effects than the multinational aspects of the transaction.   
                                                            
1 Hamermesh (1993). 
2 E.g. Jensen (1988), Bradley et al. (1983), Salant et al. (1985), Schleifer and 
Summers (1987). 
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All in all, the theoretical predictions in terms of employment effects of 
foreign acquisitions are not clear cut and the effects in the short and long 
run may be quite different. Adjustments leading to job separations in the 
short run may also lead to improved performance and increases in labour 
demand later on. Evidence from previous empirical research will be 
discussed in the next section.   
 
2.2 Previous empirical research 
Empirical research on the employment effects of foreign acquisitions has 
mostly been conducted on plant and firm level data. Studies that consider 
foreign acquisitions explicitly include the following: Girma and Görg (2004) 
for the UK, Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) for Italy, Balsvik and Haller 
(2007) for Norway,  Bellak et al. (2006) for Austria, Bandick and Karpaty 
(2007) for Sweden, Martins and Estevez (2008) for Brazil, and Böckerman 
and Lehto (2008) for Finland. The results from these studies are mixed. In 
the context of the current analysis, the most relevant is probably the 
previous on Finnish data by Böckerman and Lehto (2008) who find that 
acquisitions by foreign based firms have a negative effect on employment 
only in the manufacturing sector whereas takeovers by foreign-owned 
companies based in Finland have a substantially negative impact on 
employment in a group containing firms in construction and services. They 
also study domestic acquisitions and find that these have a negative effect 
on employment in all sectors.  
 
Studies that do not take into account the nationality of the acquiring firm 
have been conducted using both US and European data, but again almost 
exclusively with plant and firm level data. Research on US data has found 
both negative and positive effects of employment3, whereas European 
evidence implies mainly negative effects of M&A on employment4. Gugler 
and Yurtoglu (2004) compare the effects of M&A in the US and Europe 
using firm level data and find that in Europe mergers significantly reduce 
the demand for labour but in the US there is no evidence of significantly 
adverse effects. They also take into account cross border mergers and 
acquisitions but do not find significant differences compared to domestic 
acquisitions.  
 
Individual level employment effects of M&A have previously been studied 
by Margolis (2006) using French data. He distinguishes between the effects 
on the acquiring and acquired firm and finds that employees of the acquired 
                                                            
3 See Brown and Medoff (1988), Bhagat et al. (1990), Lichtenberg and Siegel 
(1990), McGuckin et al. (1995) and McGuckin and Nguyen (2000). 
 
4 See Conyon et al. (2002), Siegel and Simons (2006). 
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firm are less likely to remain with the new entity immediately after the 
takeover.  He also observes that the workers with characteristics typically 
associated with the fastest subsequent job finding are overrepresented 
among those leaving a firm following a takeover. Gibbs et al. (2006) study 
post-merger organisational integration using individual level data from 
Denmark and find that if employees of the acquiring firm are dominant in 
the new firm, as measured by number of employees in the two groups, they 
experience lower turnover. Siegel and Simons. (2008) study individual level 
employment effects of M&A using Swedish manufacturing data. They find 
that M&As significantly increase the likelihood of inter-firm mobility and 
unemployment. These studies do not, however, distinguish between foreign 
and domestic M&A.  
 
Individual level employment effects of foreign acquisitions are also related 
to the changes in the skill composition of employment. This issue has been 
studied using plant level data by Lipsey and Sjöholm (2002) for Indonesia, 
Almeida (2007) for Portugal and Huttunen (2007) for Finland. The results 
from these studies differ from one another, and in the context of the current 
analysis it is interesting to note that using Finnish manufacturing data, 
Huttunen (2007) finds that the share of highly educated workers decreases 
a few years after a foreign acquisition. Considering the implications of the 
theory of MNEs this finding is slightly surprising, and provides a useful 
comparison for the current individual level analysis.  
 
The previous literature discussed above gives rise to interesting issues that 
can be studied with the individual level data at hand. The theory on M&A 
does not provide clear predictions regarding the employment effects of 
foreign acquisitions. However, previous empirical findings give us reason to 
expect that the probability of a job separation will go up following a foreign 
acquisition and that there may be different effects for different types of 
employees. In addition, analysis of the destinations of workers who leave a 
firm following a foreign acquisition should shed some light on the severity of 
employment changes at the individual level. 
3 Data 
This study is based on a data set from Statistics Finland that links 
information on employers, i.e. firms and plants, and their employees. The 
data set is a 1/3 sample of individuals that were 16 to 69 years old in 1990. 
They are followed to 2002 and the sample is extended each year by adding 
a 1/3 sample of 16 year old persons. The data set is formed by linking data 
from various Statistics Finland databases: Finnish Longitudinal Employer-
Employee Data, Business Register, Industrial Statistics and Financial 
Statements Statistics. Information on the employer is linked to each 
individual based on the employer at the end of the year. Because of 
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confidentiality, some of the firm level information is in the form of classified 
variables (firm size), ratios (value added per employee), growth rates 
(change in firm level employment), or binary variables (foreign ownership). 
These data are collected for all available years on all firms and plants that 
employ at least one individual in the sample. The plant and firm panels 
thus cover most of the business sector in Finland5.  
 
Information on foreign ownership is available from 1994 onwards, which is 
not a severe restriction considering that foreign ownership in Finland was 
scarce before this time due to strict regulations that were not abolished 
until 1992 (Golub, 2003). Foreign acquisitions can first be identified in 
1995, so when analysing the effects of foreign acquisition on subsequent 
employment status the analysis years are 1996 to 2002. Job spells for 
employees with a plant code are studied, which basically concentrates the 
analysis on the business sector. The data set consists of 508 788 individuals 
who work in 114 996 plants giving a total of 1 871 277 person year 
observations.  
 
Foreign ownership is defined on the basis of ultimate beneficiary owner 
(UBO) and a 20  per cent threshold is used in classifying a plant as foreign 
owned. Foreign acquisitions and foreign divestitures are identified on the 
basis of the ultimate beneficiary owner changing from domestic to foreign 
and vice versa. Many differences between foreign owned and domestic firms, 
such as the ability to shift production from one country to another, relate 
more to the multinationality of the firm than the actual nationality of 
ownership, and therefore it may be relevant to control for multinational 
status of the firm. I can identify domestic and foreign MNEs during the last 
years of our observation period, and use this information in robustness 
checks.  
 
Identifying purely domestic mergers and acquisitions is slightly more 
difficult than identifying foreign acquisitions due to the nature of the data 
set. Plant codes are very stable and remain the same regardless of the 
ownership of the plant. Firm codes, however, may change due to other 
reasons than acquisitions (e.g. change of legal status of the firm). However, 
there are cases in which changes in firm codes can reasonably 
unambiguously be identified as mergers6. These types of changes are:  
 
• The firm codes of two or more plants change to the same new firm 
code. Usually the old firm codes of these plants disappear, although 
it is possible that some part of one or both of the old firms remains 
outside the new entity. 
                                                            
5 The linking of the data set is described in detail in Ilmakunnas et al (2001). 
6 I wish to thank Valerie Smeets for suggesting this method of identifying mergers. 
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• The firm code of one or more existing plants changes to an existing 
firm code previously related to one or more other plants. In other 
words. plants join another firm and their old firm code usually 
disappears.  
 
This method is not completely flawless but should enable me to control for 
domestic mergers and acquisitions to a reasonable extent. As my primary 
focus is on the effects of foreign acquisitions, it is important to be able to 
control for effects of acquisitions in general, which this method can be 
argued to accomplish.  Table 1 shows the number employees affected by 
different types of ownership change during our observation period. The 
number of employees involved in foreign divestitures is low, which should 
be kept in mind when analysing the results.  
 
[Table 1] 
 
In this study I analyse transitions out of private sector plants by first 
examining job separations in general and then distinguishing between 
transitions based on destination state. The different destination states 
considered are unemployment, outside the labour force, employed without a 
plant code, and employed with a new employer with a plant code. 
Employers without plant codes consist of e.g. most of the public sector 
whereas employers with plant codes cover effectively the whole business 
sector. Changing to a new employer is defined as a simultaneous change in 
a worker’s plant code and the start of a new employment contract. In 
addition, if an employee’s firm code does not change, then he/she is 
classified as staying with the same employer, i.e. changing plants within the 
same firm is generally not regarded as a job change.   
 
The analysis includes a wide range of conditioning variables that previous 
studies have found to have an impact on employment transitions7. I include 
controls both at the individual and firm/plant level. The individual level 
variables include socioeconomic characteristics such as age, education, 
gender, marital status and under-aged children. The job specific control 
variables I use are measured in the year prior to the year in which labour 
market status is evaluated. Tenure is included in order to control for 
duration dependence8. In addition, the log of taxable earnings is included as 
this may control for individual heterogeneity. Firms may also use the wage 
to lower quit rates.  
 
                                                            
7 See e.g. Blau and Kahn (1981), Light and Ureta (1992), Lynch (1992), Royalty 
(1998), Anderson and Meyer (1994).  
8 The data are left censored, i.e. also job spells that begin before our observation 
period are included. The start date of each spell and thus tenure is, however, 
known also for those spells that begin prior to our observation period.  
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The firm and plant level control variables include firm size, value added per 
worker, industry dummies as well as an indicator for declining employment 
in the year prior to the year in which I determine whether a plant has been 
acquired. This is done in order to account for reductions in employment 
that can not be attributed to the change of ownership. In addition I control 
for exporter and importer status of the firm so as to not confuse effects of 
this type of internationalisation with the influence of a foreign acquisition.  
 
The ownership variables included in the analysis are used to distinguish 
between the impact of different types of acquisitions. I include separate 
indicators for whether the employer was involved in a domestic M&A 
transaction, was subject to a foreign acquisition or was divested by a 
foreign firm in the previous period. As discussed above, if there are 
differences in the motives for foreign and domestic acquisitions, the 
consequences for the workforce may be quite different. I also include 
indicators for whether one’s employer is in foreign ownership at some stage 
in the observation period or is involved in either a foreign or purely 
domestic M&A transaction at some point in the observation period. This 
enables me to control for persistent differences between these groups of 
firms.  
 
In order to determine whether the consequences of M&A transactions differ 
for different types of employees, I interact the indicators for ownership 
change with individual education and age. I also include interactions of 
sector with the ownership change variables to take into account potential 
differences in the service sector as opposed to the industrial sector as found 
by Böckerman and Lehto (2008). As motives for acquisition may differ 
depending also on more detailed industry characteristics, I also conduct 
robustness checks with more detailed industry splits.  
4 Empirical analysis 
In this section I first provide some descriptive statistics and then analyse 
the changes in the probability of separating from a job following foreign 
and domestic acquisitions. After this I disaggregate the job separations 
based on destination states in order to study the employment outcomes of 
workers involved in M&A transactions. Finally, I conduct robustness checks 
on the chosen specifications.   
 
Descriptive statistics of the control variables are displayed in Table 2 and 
Table 3. The individual characteristics of employees do not vary 
substantially between firms subject to different types of M&A transactions. 
Employees in firms subject to foreign acquisitions and foreign divestitures 
have on average marginally higher education than those in firms that are 
involved in domestic M&A or not involved in M&A. Average tenure and 
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earnings are somewhat higher in firms involved in M&A. Employees were 
more likely to have experienced declining employment in firms subsequently 
subject to foreign acquisitions and purely domestic mergers than in firms 
not involved in M&A or involved in a foreign divestiture. In addition, 
employees in firms involved in international trade are to a larger extent 
affected by any type of M&A transaction. Some of these differences are 
related to the employer size distribution shown in Table 3, which indicates 
that employees of large firms are more likely to be affected by M&A 
transactions. The fact that domestic mergers appear to involve larger firms 
may be related to the fact that large foreign owned multinationals may 
acquire Finnish firms with e.g. only one plant. The size of the foreign 
acquirer is not recorded in our data.  
 
[Table 2, Table 3] 
 
Table 4 presents a sectoral breakdown of employees affected by M&A. We 
can see that most of the employees affected by both purely domestic 
mergers and foreign acquisitions work in the sector consisting of wholesale, 
retail trade and hotels and restaurants. The share of workers involved in 
these transactions are, however, proportionate to the overall employment 
share of the sector. On the other hand, employees the food and beverage 
industry are disproportionately affected by both purely domestic mergers 
and foreign acquisitions. In the wood and paper industry the number of 
employees involved in purely domestic mergers is high relative to the 
sector’s employment share. In addition, employees in the manufacture of 
machinery and equipment n.e.c, electrical and optical equipment as well as 
those employed in financial intermediation are disproportionately affected 
by foreign acquisitions during our observation period.  
 
[Table 4] 
 
Table 5 shows job separation rates separately for employees in the 
industrial and service sectors following different types of M&A activity. 
Without controlling for any firm and worker characteristics it actually 
appears less likely that an employee will leave the current employer 
following an M&A transaction. Following a foreign acquisition in the 
industrial sector the frequency of job separation is slightly lower than in 
firms not involved in M&A, although the transition rates are almost 
identical.  
  
[Table 5] 
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4.1 Job separations following foreign acquisitions 
To analyse job separations following foreign acquisitions I estimate a 
duration model in order to take into account the differences in time in 
which workers are at risk of separating from their job. As I am using 
annual data, i.e. the data is grouped into intervals, I use a discrete time 
version of a proportional hazards model, the complementary log-log model. 
In this model the discrete time hazard of separating from a job can be 
expressed as: 
 [ ])'exp(exp1)( txth γβ +−−= ,    (1)              
 
where x is a 1 x K vector of characteristic of the individual, βj is K x 1, γ 
characterises duration dependence and t refers to the time period. As I am 
dealing with discrete time, this hazard is the probability of having spell 
length t, conditional on survival up to time t.9  I estimate the 
complementary log-log model assuming normally distributed unobserved 
heterogeneity at the plant level. It seems reasonable to assume that firm 
and plant level characteristics are the primary determinants of an 
acquisition. However, it should be noted that acquisitions may be correlated 
with unobservable individual characteristics, and due care needs to be taken 
when interpreting the results. As I am able to control for a variety of 
individual characteristics the problem may be less severe than in similar 
plant-level studies. I have also conducted the analysis controlling for 
individual level unobserved heterogeneity and experimented with different 
types of distributions for the individual heterogeneity10. These analyses were 
done on smaller sample due to computational issues, and the results 
assuming a normal distribution, gamma distribution (Meyer, 1990) and a 
discrete distribution (Heckman and Singer, 1984) are consistent with those 
presented here. Using indicators for whether a firm is involved in a 
domestic or foreign M&A transaction at some stage during the observation 
period should control for persistent differences between firms that are 
targeted by acquirers and others, and plant level controls such as value 
added per worker should also alleviate the potential endogeneity problem. 
These concerns should, however, be kept in mind when interpreting the 
findings11.   
 
Table 6 presents the results of estimation of different specifications of the 
complementary log-log model. Results are presented in the form of hazard 
ratios, with numbers greater than one indicating that the covariate has a 
positive proportional impact on the hazard and numbers less than one 
                                                            
9 See e.g. Jenkins (2005). 
10 Results not shown, available on request. 
11 Unfortunately, there are currently no convincing instruments available for the 
acquisition variable.  
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implying a negative proportional impact on the hazard. Column 1 of Table 
6 shows results from a complementary log-log model where we take into 
account whether the firm was involved in an M&A transaction in the 
previous period and interact this with indicator for the firm being in the 
industrial sector (as opposed to services)12. The upper part of Table 6 shows 
the effects of the individual and firm/plant level control variables we 
include in the analysis. I will briefly discuss these first.  
 
[Table 6] 
 
The effects of the control variables in column 1 are mostly as expected 
based on previous research. Females with young children are more likely to 
leave the firm, most likely reflecting transitions out of the labour force. 
This can be determined in more detail in the next section where flows are 
decomposed based on destination state. Employees with more tenure are 
slightly less likely to leave the firm which implies positive duration 
dependence. As discussed above, I include income to control for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity and the results show that individuals with higher 
earnings are less likely to separate from their job. This is consistent with 
search theory and findings in other empirical studies. Since earnings are 
potentially endogenous, I also ran the estimations without this variable, and 
my main results are robust to this change. 
 
The plant and firm level control variables in column 1 also have expected 
impacts. To control for reductions in employment that are not related to 
ownership change, I include an indicator for declining employment at the 
plant between years t-2 and t-1. Unsurprisingly, previous downsizing 
increases the hazard of job separation. Higher labour productivity as 
measured by value added per worker decreases the job separation hazard. 
Firm size also has a significant effect on the job separation hazard, with 
employees in larger firms less likely to leave their job. This most likely 
reflects a broader range of employment possibilities within the firm and can 
be examined more closely using disaggregated flows in the next section.  
 
To control for persistent differences between firms that are involved in 
foreign or domestic acquisitions and those that are not, I also include 
indicators for whether the firm in question is part of an M&A deal, be it 
foreign or domestic, at some point during our observation period and also 
an indicator for being foreign owned at some stage. These indicators 
therefore take the same value for a given firm during the whole observation 
period. We can see in column 1 in the first part of Table 6 that the hazard 
of job separation is higher in firms that at some point are foreign owned. 
                                                            
12 The industrial sector is defined as manufacturing, utilities, construction and 
mining and quarrying. 
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By contrast, firms targeted by acquirers, be they foreign or domestic, do 
not appear persistently different from other firms in terms of job separation 
probabilities.  
 
The primary variables of interest are those related to ownership change in 
the second part of Table 6. As discussed above, in the specification in 
column 1 I interact the indicators of ownership change with an indicator for 
the firm being in the industrial sector. The ownership variables without the 
interaction term therefore give the estimates for the service sector.13 In the 
service sector the job separation hazard actually decreases following a 
purely domestic merger and a foreign divestiture, and there is no significant 
change after a foreign acquisition. These results are at odds with the plant 
level results in Böckerman and Lehto (2008), who found that domestic 
mergers had a significantly negative effect on employment in the service 
sector. This difference may be related to the different definitions used for 
defining domestic mergers. However, our results for later years after the 
transaction reported below are in line with the aggregate level findings of 
Böckerman and Lehto (2008). With respect to foreign divestitures, it should 
be noted that the number of employees involved in these transactions is 
limited, as seen in Table 1, so the economic significance of the results 
concerning them is not substantial. I will therefore not concentrate on the 
impact of foreign divestitures in our analysis of the results. 
 
By contrast, in the industrial sector the hazard of job separation increases 
following both domestic mergers and foreign acquisitions. For employees in 
industrial firms that are involved in a domestic merger, the hazard of 
exiting the job rises by approximately 12 per cent14  and for employees in 
firms subject to a foreign acquisition the increase is as high as 24 per cent. 
In the industrial sector there does, therefore, appear to be restructuring 
taking place after both domestic and foreign M&A deals. This is consistent 
with the more aggregate level findings of Böckerman and Lehto (2008). The 
difference between the change in the job separation hazard following M&A 
transactions in services and the industrial sector may be related to e.g. 
requirements of a customer interface in certain service sector firms. In such 
cases, restructuring the workforce within a short time horizon may not be 
possible.  
 
Since the potential impact of ownership change may take some time to 
materialize as implied by Huttunen’s (2007) study, I also consider the 
                                                            
13 I have also conducted the estimations separately for the industrial sector and 
services. The results (not reported, available on request) are consistent with those 
presented here. 
14 The overall estimated impact of a domestic merger on the job separation hazard 
in the industrial sector is given by the hazard ratio for the indicator of a domestic 
merger (i.e. the impact in the service sector)  multiplied by the hazard ratio of the 
interaction term of the domestic merger and the industrial sector dummy.  
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effects of M&A deals two and three years after the transaction. The 
specification is otherwise similar to that in column 1 of Table 6. It should 
be noted, that as all individuals included in the estimation need to be 
observed for at least four periods, the number of observations available for 
estimation drops and the structure of the estimation sample also changes. 
The results are shown in column 2 of Table 6.  
 
The results show that in the service sector there is a significant increase in 
the job separation hazard in the second and third years following both a 
purely domestic merger and a foreign acquisition. Employees in firms 
subject to a domestic merger experience a 10 per cent increase in the job 
separation hazard in both the second and third years after the transaction. 
Workers in the service sector whose employer was subject to a foreign 
acquisition two to three years earlier have a job separation hazard that is 
25 per cent to 30 per cent higher than the hazard for employees in firms not 
involved in such a transaction. As discussed above, the finding that there is 
no change in the service sector job separation hazard in the first year after 
an M&A transaction but an increase is observed in the following years may 
be related to the structure of some service businesses requiring a continuing 
customer interface.  
 
In the industrial sector, on the other hand, following the first year increase 
in the job separation hazard that was found above to be related to both 
domestic and foreign acquisitions, there is actually a decrease in the job 
separation hazard in the second and third years following both domestic 
and foreign acquisitions. Taking into account the total change, i.e. the 
combination of the impact on the reference group of service sector 
employees and the interaction term, indicates that the decreases in the job 
separation hazard in the industrial sector are 3 per cent and 6 per cent in 
the second year after domestic and foreign acquisitions respectively and 15 
per cent and 10 per cent in the third year. In this specification, the first 
year increase in the hazard appears slightly stronger following domestic 
mergers.  These results indicate that in the industrial sector there is 
restructuring taking place in the first year following the transaction, but 
following these initial changes, the job separation hazard of remaining 
employees actually decreases compared to their colleagues in other firms.  
 
As I am using individual level data I am also able to examine the impact 
that different types of M&A have on particular groups of employees. The 
results in column 3 of Table 6 show estimation of the same specification as 
in column 1, but with the ownership change variables additionally 
interacted with the education and age of the individual. As should be 
expected, the impacts of the individual level control variables in the first 
part of Table 6 are the same for the extended specification in column 3 as 
for the estimation shown in column 1.  
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Turning to the variables indicating ownership change in the lower part of 
Table 6, the interaction terms with the individual level characteristics now 
indicate differences in the consequences of M&A transactions for different 
types of employees. The results indicate that the increase in the job 
separation hazard following a domestic merger that was found above is 
driven by older employees. Comparing employees of similar age, there is 
actually a slight decrease in the job separation hazard following a domestic 
merger. However, the job separation hazard after a domestic merger 
increases with age, with the hazard ratio indicating a 0.4 per cent increase 
per additional year of age. Following a foreign acquisition, there do not 
appear to be differences in job separation hazards between employees of 
different age. 
 
Education also appears to make a difference for job separation probabilities 
following a domestic merger. Having a university education increases the 
job separation hazard by 15 per cent compared to colleagues of similar age 
following a domestic merger.  This would indicate restructuring at more 
skill intensive levels of the organisation. This is in line with the findings of 
Margolis (2003) who notes that workers with characteristics typically 
associated with the fastest subsequent job finding are overrepresented 
among those leaving a firm following a takeover. In contrast, education 
does not appear to affect the job separation hazard following a foreign 
acquisition. There may, of course, be a longer term effect as found in 
Huttunen (2007).  
4.2 Exits to different labour market states following foreign 
acquisitions 
The single risk model discussed in the previous section indicated that e.g. in 
the industrial sector, the job separation hazard increased following both 
domestic and foreign acquisitions. However, this does not shed light on how 
adverse the effect of such an increase is for the employees in question. If 
most of the separations are due to transitions to other jobs, the individual 
level costs may not be substantial15. In addition, if job separations are 
mostly due to transitions to unemployment, this is most likely not 
voluntary and can be related to significant adjustment costs at the 
individual level. In order to study this issue, I next estimate a multinomial 
logit model to analyse the effect that a foreign acquisition has on the 
probability of exiting a job to different labour market states compared to 
staying with the same employer. This estimation method is essentially a 
competing risks duration model for discrete time data with the somewhat 
                                                            
15 These individuals may, of course, earn a lower wage even if they do change to 
another employer.  
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restrictive assumption that spell length is intrinsically discrete rather than 
continuous but grouped into intervals16.  
 
The alternative destination states are those described above, i.e. 
unemployment, outside the labour force, employed outside the business 
sector, employed with a new business sector employer and employed with 
the same employer17. The destination-specific hazards are:  
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where x is a 1 x K vector, βj is K x 1, j=1, ... , J.  To identify the model, I 
set the parameter vector related to the outcome “Same employer” to 0, i.e.  
β1 = 0 . Thus the remaining coefficients will measure the change relative to 
the group who stay with the same employer. I will discuss the results in the 
form of the relative probability of a certain transition to the probability of 
staying at the same firm, i.e. odds ratios (or ratios of relative risk). These 
are defined as: 
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 and subsequently the ratio of relative risk for one unit changes in two 
variables is obtained by multiplying the exponentiated coefficients for these 
variables.  
 
Table 7 presents the results from the estimation of the multinomial logit 
model comparing the probability of exiting to different destination states 
                                                            
16 See Jenkins (2005) for a discussion. An alternative approach would be to 
explicitly take into account the interval censored data as in e.g. Sueyoshi (1992).  
17 Transitions into self-employment are excluded from the current analysis. 
Observations on these are very infrequent and do not affect the results.  
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vs. staying with the same employer. The results are presented in the form 
of odds ratios as described above18. I include interactions with individual 
characteristics, i.e. in terms of covariates the specification corresponds to 
that in column 3 of Table 6.  
 
[Table 7] 
 
The main variables of interest are those related to ownership change in the 
second part of Table 7. Similar to the estimations above, to control for 
persistent differences between firms that at some point are foreign owned or 
subject to an acquisition, I include an indicator for both of these groups. 
Employees in firms that are involved in an M&A transaction do not differ 
to a large extent in terms of their likelihood to leave their job rather than 
stay at their current job. They appear about 6  per cent less likely to 
change to a job outside the business sector than to stay with the same 
employer. However, being employed in a firm that at some point is foreign 
owned has quite a large impact on the relative risk of exiting a job to 
several different destination states, with an increase of 21 per cent to 40 per 
cent in the likelihood of changing jobs and an increase of 16 per cent in the 
likelihood of becoming unemployed compared to staying with their current 
employer. Consistent with the results above, these findings imply that 
worker mobility from firms that become foreign owned is different from 
mobility from other firms in addition to the possible one-off effect of the 
actual acquisition. The fact that there is a difference in both transitions to 
unemployment and new jobs indicates that these findings are not driven 
only by differences in voluntary turnover. 
 
Looking at the results on transitions to different states following M&A 
transactions we first compare employees of similar age and education and 
then turn to the effects of individual characteristics. The results show that 
in the service sector there is a decrease in the probability of changing jobs 
compared to staying at the same firm after both domestic and foreign 
acquisitions. There is also a decrease in the probability of moving into 
unemployment following a purely domestic merger, although the estimate is 
not as precise. For employees in the industrial sector, there is again a slight 
decrease in the job separation hazard following domestic mergers when 
comparing employees of similar age as was found in column 3 of Table 6 
and this appears to be due to a decreased likelihood of transitions to 
employment outside the business sector19. Following foreign acquisitions the 
increase in the job separation hazard found above consists of increased 
                                                            
18 The standard errors are corrected for clustering at the individual level. 
19 As we are studying ratios of relative risk, the combined effect of two control 
variables is obtained by multiplying the two ratios. So the total impact for 
industrial sector employees is the odds ratio for ownership change in the service 
sector times the odds ratio for the industrial sector interaction.  
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probabilities of exit to both other jobs, unemployment and out of the 
labour force. However, when using different reference outcomes20, I find that 
the likelihood of changing jobs either within the business sector or to an 
employer outside the business sector increases more than the likelihood of 
non-employment. These findings indicate that the increased hazard of job 
separations following foreign acquisitions found also in the single risk model 
is not due merely to voluntary job mobility, but the higher likelihood of 
changing jobs compared to transitions to non-employment may attenuate 
the individual level costs of the adjustment. 
 
In considering next the influence of individual characteristics on the impact 
that M&A transactions have, I find that the increase in the job separation 
hazard of university educated employees following a domestic merger is 
related to an increased likelihood of changing to other jobs. The likelihood 
of becoming unemployed or moving out of the labour force compared to the 
likelihood of staying at the same firm does not change significantly. This 
finding is consistent with previous research showing that educated workers 
have higher job finding rates and would indicate that despite the increased 
job separation hazard, educated employees are not too adversely affected by 
the transaction. Consistent with the findings above, education does not 
have much influence on labour market transitions following a foreign 
acquisition. The only change shows up in a decreased likelihood of 
becoming unemployed, which would indicate that, if anything, layoffs of 
skilled employees are less likely following foreign acquisitions.  
 
The increased job separation hazard following domestic mergers that was 
found above for older workers in the single risk model also shows up in this 
estimation. The increase is driven by higher probabilities of both changing 
jobs and becoming unemployed. As discussed above, this type of finding is 
consistent with increased involuntary job turnover implying adjustment 
costs at the individual level. Transitions out of the labour force do not 
change significantly indicating that the increased job separation hazard is 
not to a great extent related to the oldest employees moving into early 
retirement. In line with the results above, age does not have a significant 
impact on transitions following foreign acquisitions, with only marginally 
significant changes in exit probabilities.  
 
The effects of the other covariates can also be interpreted in more detail 
when considering various destination states. The results in the first part of 
Table 7 show that e.g. older employees are slightly less likely to change jobs 
than to stay at the same firm. They are, however, more likely to become 
unemployed than to remain with the same employer. Also, compared to 
their male colleagues, women are more likely to become unemployed and 
                                                            
20 Results not shown, available on request.  
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change to a firm outside the business sector, but less likely to change to 
other business sector jobs. Women on average are also less likely to move 
out of the labour force, but this effect changes drastically when interacted 
with an indicator for having children under the age of 7. These women are 
unsurprisingly much more likely to move out of the labour force than to 
stay at the same firm compared to their colleagues.   
 
More educated employees are more likely to change jobs and less likely to 
become unemployed or move out of the labour force than stay at their 
existing job. Employees with higher tenure are less likely to exit a firm to 
any destination state, implying positive duration dependence. Higher 
earnings also reduce the likelihood of exiting a firm. Again, since earnings 
are likely to be endogenous, the model was also estimated without this 
variable. The effects of interest were robust to this change. Compared to 
employees in small firms, employees of larger firms are less likely to change 
jobs, which provides support to the hypothesis that the lower separation 
hazard in larger firms that was found in the single risk model reflects a 
broader range of job opportunities within large firms. As found above, 
declining employment implies that also in the following year employees are 
more likely to exit than stay in the same firm and this effect extends to all 
the different destinations considered.  
4.3 Robustness checks 
In this section I consider some alternative specifications and extensions to 
the analysis. First, I analyse the effects of a different sectoral division on 
the results. Since my main results differ depending on whether a firm is in 
the service or industrial sector, I attempt to deepen the analysis by splitting 
the firms into narrower sectors and then interacting these with the 
variables indicating ownership change. As argued above, it could be that 
certain service sector firms need to maintain a customer interface, which 
could influence the ability of the firm to restructure its workforce in the 
short run. In addition, in the industrial sector, there may be differences in 
the motives of acquisitions in different sectors, as e.g. Ali-Yrkkö et al. 
(2004) report survey evidence indicating that technological know-how is an 
important reason for foreign acquisitions in some sectors. I use alternative 
sectoral divisions attempting to capture differences in the need for a 
customer interface in services on the one hand and importance of 
technological know-how in the industrial sector on the other (see Table 4).  
 
The results show21 that the impact of M&A transactions is similar in 
different service sectors, which may indicate that if the results reported 
above are driven by time needed to cope with the need for a customer 
interface, then this is true on a broad scale in the service sector. It should 
                                                            
21 Results not shown, available on request. 
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be noted, that the information on sectors is not very detailed (see Table 4) 
which may also influence the results. By contrast, when studying differences 
in the impact that foreign acquisitions have in different sectors in industry, 
I find that in sectors Manufacturing of machinery and equipment n.e.c and 
Manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment, the increase in the job 
separation hazard found in the rest of industry is absent22. No such 
difference between industrial sectors is found following domestic mergers. 
This finding indicates that the motives for foreign acquisitions in these 
sectors may differ from motives in other sectors, e.g. by having to do with 
access to technological know-how. This in turn is likely to influence the 
impact that foreign acquisitions have on employment outcomes in these 
sectors.   
 
Next, I consider the possibility that foreign acquisitions may have a 
different impact in cases where the acquired firm is already a multinational. 
This is related to the discussion that it is primarily differences between 
multinational and purely domestic firms rather than foreign and domestic 
firms that are relevant. In the context of foreign and domestic acquisitions 
this may not be as important, as many potential differences in the impacts 
of these transactions may be argued to mostly be related to whether the 
acquisition takes place in the local or foreign market. In any case, I run a 
similar estimation as that presented in column 3 of Table 6 but including 
interactions of the indicator for a foreign acquisition with an indicator for 
whether the firm is a multinational. Information on multinational status is 
only available for the last years of our observation period, so this analysis 
includes data from 1999 onwards. The results show23 that in industrial 
sector firms that are already multinational, the job separation hazard of 
employees increases by slightly less than in purely domestic firms. This may 
obviously also be related to the prevalence of multinationals in the 
technologically intensive sectors discussed above. I also consider the 
possibility that the influence that an acquisition has on job separations may 
be related to the size of the acquired firm. This is related to multinational 
status in that multinationals are typically larger. The results show that in 
the largest firms the job separation hazard actually increases more than in 
smaller firms following a foreign acquisition. There is no difference following 
a domestic merger.  
 
Finally, I also conduct a robustness check using a linear probability model 
to describe job separations as opposed to the duration model I have 
discussed above. I run an OLS specification with covariates similar to those 
                                                            
22 In this specification, the industrial sectors are split in two: Manufacturing of 
machinery and equipment n.e.c and Manufacturing of electrical and optical 
equipment form one group and the rest of the industrial sectors form the other. A 
further division becomes problematic due to limited numbers of observations. 
23 Results not shown, available on request. 
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in the specification presented in column 3 of Table 6. I include plant fixed 
effects which may to some extent also alleviate the problem of the 
endogeneity of acquisitions. The results from this specification are 
qualitatively similar to the results obtained using the duration model24, and 
thereby support our earlier findings.  
5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to examine the individual level employment 
effects of foreign acquisitions. The analysis shows that firms that become 
foreign owned are persistently different from firms that are continuously in 
domestic ownership, and employees in the firms that are, were previously, 
or will later be foreign owned are more likely to separate from their job. In 
the industrial sector, the job separation hazard increases in the year 
following a foreign or domestic acquisition. In the case of foreign 
acquisitions exits to both other jobs and non-employment become more 
likely with the probability of changing jobs increasing more than the 
probability of moving to non-employment. This difference can attenuate the 
individual level adjustment costs of the increased separation hazard. In 
certain industrial sectors, where technological know-how may be argued to 
be important, the job separation hazard does not increase following foreign 
acquisitions. There is no such difference between different types of 
industrial sectors following domestic mergers. M&A transactions do not 
appear to influence the job separation hazard of service sector employees in 
the first year following the acquisition, but in the second and third years 
after the transaction the job separation hazard increases with a larger 
change following foreign than domestic acquisitions. In the industrial sector 
the job separation hazard decreases in the second and third years following 
both foreign and domestic acquisitions, implying a one-off restructuring.  
 
The impact of a foreign acquisition does not vary by individual 
characteristics in either sector, whereas following a domestic merger there is 
an increase in the job separation hazard of university educated employees. 
However, this increase is driven by job-to-job transitions implying that the 
individual level costs may not be severe. Also older workers experience an 
increase in their job separation hazard following a domestic merger, but in 
their case the increase is related to both transitions to other jobs as well as 
unemployment. All in all, the largest differences between changes in job 
separation hazards after M&A transactions appear to be related to sectoral 
differences. The changes observed following domestic and foreign 
acquisitions indicate similar types of restructuring, but the magnitudes of 
                                                            
24 Results not shown, available on request. 
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the changes are somewhat larger in the case of foreign acquisitions. The 
finding that the job separation hazard does not increase following foreign 
acquisitions in certain industrial sectors that may be considered knowledge 
intensive may well be indicative of different motives for these transactions 
compared to purely domestic mergers. In addition, the fact that the 
development of job separation hazards varies based on individual 
characteristics following domestic mergers but no such difference is found 
following foreign acquisitions, may be indicative of slightly different motives 
behind the transactions. Contrary to commonly expressed views in the 
public debate, the consequences of foreign acquisitions do not appear 
strictly more adverse than the consequences of purely domestic acquisitions.  
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Table 1 Employees affected by M&A 
   Employees % 
Employer not involved in 
M&A in previous year 1 773 439 94.8 % 
Employer involved in 
domestic merger in previous 
year 58 981 3.2 % 
Employer subject to foreign 
acquisition in previous year 31 926 1.7 % 
Employer subject to foreign 
divestiture in previous year 6 931 0.4 % 
Total 1 871 277 100 %
 
 
27
 
 T
ab
le
 2
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
 
Va
ria
bl
e
M
ea
n
St
d.
 D
ev
M
ea
n
St
d.
 D
ev
M
ea
n
St
d.
 D
ev
M
ea
n
St
d.
 D
ev
A
ge
39
.7
9
11
.1
5
40
.7
8
10
.8
0
40
.7
9
10
.6
8
39
.7
0
10
.7
5
Fe
m
al
e
0.
36
0.
48
0.
38
0.
49
0.
43
0.
50
0.
42
0.
49
M
ar
rie
d
0.
36
0.
48
0.
34
0.
47
0.
33
0.
47
0.
36
0.
48
Ch
ild
re
n 
un
de
r a
ge
 7
0.
20
0.
40
0.
19
0.
39
0.
19
0.
40
0.
20
0.
40
Fe
m
al
e*
 C
hi
ld
re
n 
un
de
r a
ge
 7
0.
06
0.
24
0.
06
0.
24
0.
08
0.
26
0.
07
0.
26
Sc
ho
ol
in
g 
ye
ar
s
11
.3
6
2.
14
11
.3
1
2.
08
11
.5
7
2.
20
11
.5
6
2.
12
Te
nu
re
 (m
on
th
s)
96
.2
7
10
7.
04
14
0.
42
12
3.
27
12
7.
17
12
1.
36
11
1.
88
11
4.
49
Lo
g 
of
 ta
xa
bl
e 
in
co
m
e
9.
99
0.
65
10
.1
5
0.
54
10
.1
4
0.
55
10
.1
1
0.
55
D
ec
lin
in
g 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
0.
36
0.
48
0.
45
0.
50
0.
42
0.
49
0.
35
0.
48
Lo
g 
of
 fi
rm
 la
bo
ur
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
10
.6
2
0.
63
10
.8
1
0.
56
10
.7
8
0.
62
10
.6
6
0.
47
Ex
po
rti
ng
 fi
rm
0.
49
0.
50
0.
76
0.
43
0.
62
0.
49
0.
66
0.
47
Im
po
rti
ng
 fi
rm
0.
56
0.
50
0.
83
0.
38
0.
73
0.
44
0.
76
0.
43
Em
pl
oy
er
 fo
re
ig
n 
ow
ne
d 
at
 s
om
e 
po
in
t
0.
17
0.
37
0.
28
0.
45
1.
00
0.
00
1.
00
0.
00
Em
pl
oy
er
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 M
&
A
 d
ea
l a
t s
om
e 
po
in
t
0.
32
0.
47
1.
00
0.
00
1.
00
0.
00
1.
00
0.
00
Em
pl
oy
er
 in
 in
du
st
ria
l s
ec
to
r 
0.
49
0.
50
0.
67
0.
47
0.
55
0.
50
0.
62
0.
49
# 
of
 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
1 
77
3 
43
9
58
 9
81
31
 9
26
6 
93
1
Em
pl
oy
er
 n
ot
 in
vo
lv
ed
 
in
 M
&
A
 in
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
pe
rio
d
Em
pl
oy
er
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
do
m
es
tic
 m
er
ge
r i
n 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r
Em
pl
oy
er
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 
fo
re
ig
n 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 in
 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r
Em
pl
oy
er
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 
fo
re
ig
n 
di
ve
st
itu
re
 in
 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r
28
 
 T
ab
le
 3
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s:
 f
ir
m
 s
iz
e 
 
 
Si
ze
 o
f f
irm
Em
pl
oy
ee
s
%
Em
pl
oy
ee
s
%
Em
pl
oy
ee
s
%
Em
pl
oy
ee
s
%
U
nd
er
 5
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s
24
0 
27
6
13
.6
51
0.
1
12
3
0.
4
48
0.
7
5-
9 
em
pl
oy
ee
s
14
2 
92
2
8.
1
22
7
0.
4
41
2
1.
3
67
1.
0
10
-1
9 
em
pl
oy
ee
s
15
4 
72
9
8.
7
61
4
1.
0
71
4
2.
2
21
7
3.
1
20
-4
9 
em
pl
oy
ee
s
19
8 
08
8
11
.2
1 
50
3
2.
6
2 
16
0
6.
8
56
1
8.
1
50
-9
9 
em
pl
oy
ee
s
13
6 
53
1
7.
7
2 
44
4
4.
1
2 
38
1
7.
5
54
2
7.
8
10
0-
29
9 
em
pl
oy
ee
s
21
6 
79
6
12
.2
7 
10
3
12
.0
6 
75
8
21
.2
1 
91
3
27
.6
O
ve
r 3
00
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s
68
4 
09
7
38
.6
47
 0
39
79
.8
19
 3
78
60
.7
3 
58
3
51
.7
To
ta
l
1 
77
3 
43
9
10
0
58
 9
81
10
0
31
 9
26
10
0
6 
93
1
10
0
Em
pl
oy
er
 n
ot
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
M
&
A
 in
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
ye
ar
Em
pl
oy
er
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
do
m
es
tic
 m
er
ge
r i
n 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r
Em
pl
oy
er
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 
fo
re
ig
n 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 in
 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r
Em
pl
oy
er
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 
fo
re
ig
n 
di
ve
st
itu
re
 in
 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r
29
 
 T
ab
le
 4
 F
ir
m
s 
in
vo
lv
ed
 i
n 
M
&
A
 b
y 
se
ct
or
 
In
du
st
ry
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Pe
rc
en
t
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Pe
rc
en
t
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Pe
rc
en
t
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Pe
rc
en
t
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Pe
rc
en
t
M
in
in
g 
an
d 
Q
ua
rr
yi
ng
3 
90
1
0.
33
20
6
0.
35
72
 
0.
23
7
0.
10
4 
18
6
0.
3 
%
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f f
oo
d 
pr
od
uc
ts
, b
ev
er
ag
es
 a
nd
to
ba
cc
o 
26
 2
40
2.
19
7 
82
9
13
.2
7
3 
21
5 
10
.0
7
74
5
10
.7
5
38
 0
29
2.
9 
%
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f t
ex
til
es
8 
35
1
0.
70
31
6
0.
54
29
9  
0.
94
52
0.
75
9 
01
8
0.
7 
%
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f w
ea
rin
g 
ap
pa
re
l, 
le
at
he
r a
nd
 le
at
he
r
pr
od
uc
ts
13
 7
95
1.
15
15
7
0.
27
27
3 
0.
86
0
0.
00
14
 2
25
1.
1 
%
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f w
oo
d,
 w
oo
d 
pr
od
uc
ts
, p
ul
p,
 p
ap
er
 
an
d 
pa
pe
r p
ro
du
ct
s
37
 4
41
3.
12
12
 1
52
20
.6
0
81
6  
2.
56
12
6
1.
82
50
 5
35
3.
9 
%
Pu
bl
is
hi
ng
, p
rin
tin
g
38
 3
90
3.
20
1 
85
0
3.
14
1 
03
1  
3.
23
24
0.
35
41
 2
95
3.
2 
%
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f c
ok
e,
 re
fin
ed
 p
et
ro
le
um
 p
ro
du
ct
s, 
nu
cl
ea
r f
ue
l, 
ch
em
ic
al
s, 
ch
em
ic
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s a
nd
 m
an
-
m
ad
e 
fib
re
s
12
 0
15
1.
00
2 
47
5
4.
20
69
6  
2.
18
11
2
1.
62
15
 2
98
1.
2 
%
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f r
ub
be
r a
nd
 p
la
st
ic
 p
ro
du
ct
s
14
 9
28
1.
24
60
6
1.
03
81
6  
2.
56
74
2
10
.7
1
17
 0
92
1.
3 
%
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f o
th
er
 n
on
-m
et
al
lic
 m
in
er
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s
10
 0
24
0.
84
2 
12
2
3.
60
63
9 
2.
00
37
4
5.
40
13
 1
59
1.
0 
%
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f b
as
ic
 m
et
al
s 
12
 9
25
1.
08
16
7
0.
28
62
5  
1.
96
0
0.
00
13
 7
17
1.
1 
%
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f f
ab
ric
at
ed
 m
et
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s
44
 0
43
3.
67
1 
52
6
2.
59
74
1 
2.
32
29
4
4.
24
46
 6
04
3.
6 
%
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t n
.e
.c
, 
el
ec
tri
ca
l a
nd
 o
pt
ic
al
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t
10
1 
36
3
8.
45
5 
36
3
9.
10
5 
42
4 
16
.9
8
1 
36
5
19
.6
9
11
3 
51
5
8.
7 
%
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f t
ra
ns
po
rt 
eq
ui
pm
en
t 
22
 8
64
1.
91
40
9
0.
69
1 
26
0 
3.
95
16
1
2.
32
24
 6
94
1.
9 
%
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
n.
e.
c.
20
 4
87
1.
71
59
9
1.
02
29
2  
0.
91
10
1
1.
46
21
 4
79
1.
7 
%
El
ec
tri
ci
ty
, g
as
 a
nd
 w
at
er
 su
pp
ly
, C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
14
8 
06
8
12
.3
4
3 
77
3
6.
40
1 
41
1 
4.
42
18
3
2.
64
15
3 
43
5
11
.8
 %
W
ho
le
sa
le
 a
nd
 re
ta
il 
tra
de
; r
ep
ai
r o
f m
ot
or
 
ve
hi
cl
es
, m
ot
or
cy
cl
es
 a
nd
 p
er
so
na
l a
nd
 h
ou
se
ho
l d
 
go
od
s, 
H
ot
el
s a
nd
 re
st
au
ra
nt
s  
30
7 
37
3
25
.6
2
13
 2
80
22
.5
2
6 
10
6 
19
.1
2
1 
86
9
26
.9
6
32
8 
62
8
25
.3
 %
Tr
an
sp
or
t, 
st
or
ag
e 
an
d 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
18
9 
14
6
15
.7
7
3 
05
4
5.
18
1 
45
0 
4.
54
92
1.
33
19
3 
74
2
14
.9
 %
Fi
na
nc
ia
l i
nt
er
m
ed
ia
tio
n
11
 1
43
0.
93
34
0.
06
2 
57
9 
8.
08
30
0.
43
13
 7
86
1.
1 
%
R
ea
l e
st
at
e,
 re
nt
in
g 
an
d 
bu
si
ne
ss
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 
17
7 
27
0
14
.7
7
3 
06
3
5.
20
4 
18
1 
13
.1
0
65
4
9.
44
18
5 
16
8
14
.3
 %
To
ta
l
1 
19
9 
76
7
10
0
58
 9
81
10
0
31
 9
26
 
10
0
6 
93
1
10
0
1 
29
7 
60
5
10
0 
%
T
ot
al
E
m
pl
oy
er
 N
O
T 
in
vo
lv
ed
 
in
 M
&
A
 d
ea
l d
ur
in
g 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n 
pe
ri
od
Em
pl
oy
er
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
do
m
es
tic
 m
er
ge
r 
in
 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r
Em
pl
oy
er
 su
bj
ec
t t
o 
fo
re
ig
n 
di
ve
st
itu
re
 in
 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r
Em
pl
oy
er
 su
bj
ec
t t
o
fo
re
ig
n 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 in
 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r
30
 
 T
ab
le
 5
 J
ob
 s
ep
ar
at
io
ns
 f
ol
lo
w
in
g 
M
&
A
 a
ct
iv
it
y 
 
Em
pl
oy
er
's 
M
&
A
 a
ct
iv
ity
 in
 p
re
vi
ou
s p
er
io
d
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t s
ta
tu
s
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
%
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
%
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
%
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
%
Sa
m
e 
em
pl
oy
er
74
2,
76
3
85
.9
35
,4
61
89
.7
14
,9
70
85
.0
3,
80
6
88
.8
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
38
,9
38
4.
5
1,
34
4
3.
4
84
2
4.
8
13
6
3.
2
O
ut
 o
f t
he
 la
bo
ur
 fo
rc
e
24
,4
38
2.
8
90
5
2.
3
49
0
2.
8
11
0
2.
6
N
ew
 e
m
pl
oy
er
 o
ut
si
de
 b
us
in
es
s s
ec
to
r
18
,3
54
2.
1
81
1
2.
1
49
4
2.
8
93
2.
2
Se
lf-
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
3,
22
1
0.
4
63
0.
2
24
0.
1
9
0.
2
N
ew
 b
us
in
es
s s
ec
to
r e
m
pl
oy
er
37
,0
05
4.
3
96
6
2.
4
79
0
4.
5
13
2
3.
1
To
ta
l
86
4,
71
9
10
0
39
,5
50
10
0
17
,6
10
10
0
4,
28
6
10
0
Em
pl
oy
er
's 
M
&
A
 a
ct
iv
ity
 in
 p
re
vi
ou
s p
er
io
d
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t s
ta
tu
s
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
%
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
%
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
%
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
%
Sa
m
e 
em
pl
oy
er
72
5,
96
0
79
.9
16
,0
39
82
.5
11
,8
95
83
.1
2,
19
0
82
.8
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
31
,4
90
3.
5
56
1
2.
9
37
4
2.
6
70
2.
7
O
ut
 o
f t
he
 la
bo
ur
 fo
rc
e
43
,5
53
4.
8
87
6
4.
5
51
9
3.
6
10
6
4.
0
N
ew
 e
m
pl
oy
er
 o
ut
si
de
 b
us
in
es
s s
ec
to
r
39
,3
46
4.
3
71
4
3.
7
65
5
4.
6
90
3.
4
Se
lf-
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
5,
41
3
0.
6
83
0.
4
36
0.
3
13
0.
5
N
ew
 b
us
in
es
s s
ec
to
r e
m
pl
oy
er
62
,9
58
6.
9
1,
15
8
6.
0
83
7
5.
9
17
6
6.
7
To
ta
l
90
8,
72
0
10
0
19
,4
31
10
0
14
,3
16
10
0
2,
64
5
10
0
In
du
st
ria
l s
ec
to
r
Se
rv
ic
es
Em
pl
oy
er
 n
ot
 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 M
&
A
Em
pl
oy
er
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
do
m
es
tic
 M
&
A
 
Em
pl
oy
er
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
fo
re
ig
n 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
Em
pl
oy
er
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
fo
re
ig
n 
di
ve
st
itu
re
Em
pl
oy
er
 n
ot
 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 M
&
A
Em
pl
oy
er
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
do
m
es
tic
 M
&
A
 
Em
pl
oy
er
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
fo
re
ig
n 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
Em
pl
oy
er
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
fo
re
ig
n 
di
ve
st
itu
re
31 
 
Table 6 Estimation results: single risk duration model  
Hazard ratio estimates (1) (2) (3)
Age 0.996*** 0.999*** 0.996***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.939*** 0.920*** 0.939***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Married 1.081*** 1.068*** 1.081***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
Children under age 7 0.920*** 0.968*** 0.920***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
Female* Children under age 7 1.141*** 1.276*** 1.141***
(0.011) (0.023) (0.011)
Schooling years 1.021*** 1.018*** 1.020***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Tenure 0.987*** 0.989*** 0.987***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure squared 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of taxable income 0.646*** 0.604*** 0.646***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Declining employment 1.053*** 1.078*** 1.053***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
Log of firm labour productivity 0.932*** 0.886*** 0.931***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Exporting firm 1.008 0.928*** 1.008
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009)
Importing firm 0.946*** 0.894*** 0.946***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.007)
Firm size 5-9 employees 1.027*** 1.038** 1.027***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.009)
Firm size 10-19 employees 0.999 1.018 0.999
(0.010) (0.017) (0.010)
Firm size 20-49 employees 0.980* 0.981 0.980*
(0.010) (0.018) (0.010)
Firm size 50-99 employees 0.934*** 0.928*** 0.934***
(0.012) (0.021) (0.012)
Firm size 100-299 employees 0.860*** 0.834*** 0.861***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.012)
Firm size over 300 employees 0.811*** 0.755*** 0.812***
(0.010) (0.016) (0.010)
1.061*** 1.127*** 1.061***
(0.016) (0.027) (0.016)
1.02 1.01 1.021
(0.013) (0.020) (0.013)
Table continues on next page
Employer foreign owned at some point
Employer involved in M&A deal at some point
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Table 6 continued
 
Hazard ratio estimates
Employer involved in domestic M&A deal
0.945*** 1.056 0.815***
(0.019) (0.040) (0.034)
1.096**
(0.050)
1.100*
(0.055)
Employer involved in foreign acquisition
0.971 0.924* 0.895**
(0.023) (0.044) (0.047)
1.259***
(0.060)
1.317***
(0.068)
Employer involved in foreign divestiture
0.902* 0.759*** 0.992
(0.047) (0.069) (0.120)
0.894
(0.091)
1.08
(0.103)
Employer in industrial sector 
* employer involved in domestic M&A deal
1.182*** 1.225*** 1.161***
(0.033) (0.065) (0.032)
0.887*
(0.055)
0.766***
(0.049)
* employer involved in foreign acquisition 
1.245*** 1.223*** 1.240***
(0.041) (0.078) (0.041)
0.745***
(0.051)
0.688***
(0.050)
* employer involved in foreign divestiture
1.044 1.124 1.044
(0.076) (0.148) (0.076)
1.404**
(0.206)
0.865
(0.133)
University education
1.153***
(0.045)
1.045
(0.047)
1.049
(0.105)
Age
1.004***
(0.001)
1.002
(0.001)
0.997
(0.003)
Observations 1871277 725386 1871277
Sectors All All All
Unobserved heterogeneity Gaussian Gaussian Gaussian
* employer involved in foreign divestiture 1 
year ago
Notes
1. Reference category for firm size is under 5 employees
2. Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
* employer involved in foreign acquisition 1 
year ago
* employer involved in foreign divestiture 1 
year ago
* employer involved in domestic M&A deal 1 
year ago
* employer involved in foreign acquisition 1 
year ago
1 year ago
2 years ago
3 years ago
* employer involved in domestic M&A deal 1 
year ago
3 years ago
1 year ago
2 years ago
3 years ago
1 year ago
2 years ago
1 year ago
2 years ago
3 years ago
3. Coefficients for industry, region and year dummies  as well as 2nd and 3rd lags of labour productivity, export 
and import status in model (2) not reported
1 year ago
2 years ago
3 years ago
1 year ago
2 years ago
3 years ago
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Table 7 Estimation results: multinomial logit model  
 
 
Odds ratio estimates with                   
reference category                      
"Same employer"
Unemployment Out of the labour 
force
New employer 
outside business 
sector
New business 
sector employer
Age 1.0321*** 0.9982** 0.9906*** 0.9674***
(63.31) (-2.65) (-16.65) (-68.94)
Female 1.0351*** 0.8613*** 1.1029*** 0.8664***
(3.37) (-14.02) (9.29) (-16.16)
Married 1.3567*** 1.4070*** 0.9315*** 0.9179***
(28.43) (32.39) (-6.33) (-9.14)
Children under age 7 0.8600*** 0.4507*** 0.9777 1.0390***
(-10.30) (-38.74) (-1.56) (3.61)
Female* Children under age 7 1.0459 5.3053*** 0.8308*** 0.6497***
(1.95) (68.85) (-8.55) (-23.54)
Schooling years 0.9102*** 0.9731*** 1.0950*** 1.0497***
(-37.43) (-10.83) (40.45) (26.58)
Tenure 0.9841*** 0.9838*** 0.9914*** 0.9836***
(-121.13) (-104.02) (-57.12) (-109.06)
Tenure squared 1.0000*** 1.0000*** 1.0000*** 1.0000***
(107.05) (109.51) (45.47) (69.57)
Log of taxable income 0.5725*** 0.3273*** 0.6258*** 0.7531***
(-78.44) (-154.03) (-57.09) (-42.25)
Declining employment 1.1054*** 1.1039*** 1.1148*** 1.1382***
(12.45) (11.27) (12.37) (18.31)
Log of firm labour productivity 0.7744*** 0.9431*** 0.8782*** 0.8175***
(-38.05) (-7.60) (-17.83) (-36.81)
Exporting firm 1.0520*** 1.0472*** 0.9245*** 0.9264***
(3.75) (3.31) (-5.50) (-6.64)
Importing firm 0.8957*** 0.9898 0.9031*** 0.8700***
(-8.42) (-0.77) (-7.38) (-12.80)
Firm size 5-9 employees 1.1883*** 1.0995*** 0.8886*** 1.0908***
(10.93) (5.47) (-6.63) (6.78)
Firm size 10-19 employees 1.0932*** 1.1040*** 0.8826*** 1.0723***
(5.49) (5.69) (-7.02) (5.40)
Firm size 20-49 employees 1.1241*** 1.1398*** 0.9331*** 1.0284*
(7.41) (7.83) (-4.12) (2.21)
Firm size 50-99 employees 1.0885*** 1.1617*** 0.9580* 1.0328*
(4.51) (7.61) (-2.18) (2.14)
Firm size 100-299 employees 1.0085 1.0535** 0.8844*** 0.8605***
(0.46) (2.73) (-6.59) (-10.03)
Firm size over 300 employees 0.8687*** 1.0816*** 0.8874*** 0.6641***
(-7.98) (4.45) (-6.82) (-28.39)
Table continues on next page
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Table 7 continued  
 
 
 
 
 
Odds ratio estimates with                   
reference category                      "Same 
employer"
Unemployment Out of the labour 
force
New employer 
outside business 
sector
New business 
sector employer
1.1601*** 1.0261 1.3960*** 1.2066***
(9.88) (1.67) (21.44) (14.51)
1.0145 1.0075 0.9583** 1.0246*
(1.10) (0.57) (-3.01) (2.11)
0.8339* 0.9428 0.7080*** 0.8944
(-1.99) (-0.62) (-3.56) (-1.42)
0.8782 1.2528 0.8792 0.7007***
(-1.12) (1.72) (-1.17) (-3.72)
0.4824* 1.2497 1.1915 0.7792
(-2.40) (0.77) (0.62) (-1.12)
Employer in industrial sector 
1.0770 0.9729 1.3409*** 0.9869
(1.37) (-0.49) (5.43) (-0.28)
1.3196*** 1.1998** 1.4186*** 1.6308***
(4.18) (2.59) (5.53) (9.06)
0.8205 0.9992 1.6959*** 0.9463
(-1.29) (-0.01) (3.48) (-0.45)
University education
1.0083 1.0924 1.1747* 1.3736***
(0.08) (0.86) (2.21) (5.02)
0.6769** 1.2220 0.9127 1.0727
(-2.73) (1.69) (-1.09) (0.98)
0.9373 1.1928 0.9540 1.2283
(-0.21) (0.67) (-0.23) (1.32)
Age
1.0047* 1.0025 1.0066** 1.0055*
(2.23) (0.94) (2.77) (2.55)
1.0048 0.9921* 1.0021 1.0061*
(1.81) (-2.20) (0.79) (2.40)
1.0179** 0.9919 0.9805** 1.0015
(2.62) (-0.99) (-2.69) (0.24)
Observations 1871277
Pseudo R-Square 0.1232
Employer foreign owned at some point
Employer involved in M&A deal at 
some point
Employer involved in domestic M&A 
deal in previous year
Employer involved in foreign 
acquisition in previous year
Employer involved in foreign 
divestiture in previous year
* employer involved in domestic 
M&A deal in previous year
* employer involved in foreign 
acquisition in previous year
* employer involved in foreign 
divestiture in previous year
* employer involved in domestic 
M&A deal in previous year
* employer involved in foreign 
acquisition in previous year
* employer involved in foreign 
divestiture in previous year
* employer involved in domestic 
M&A deal in previous year
2. Reference category for firm size is under 5 employees
3. Cluster robust (by individual) t-statistics in parentheses: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, *** significant at 0.1%.
4. Coefficients for industry, region and year dummies not reported
* employer involved in foreign 
acquisition in previous year
* employer involved in foreign 
divestiture in previous year
Notes
1. The reference category is "Same employer"
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1 Introduction 
 
Spillovers from foreign to domestic firms are commonly cited as an argument in 
favour of policies to promote FDI in both developing and developed countries. 
These spillovers are expected to arise due to productivity advantages that 
multinational firms have over domestic firms. Such productivity advantages 
have been documented in several empirical studies (see Barba Navaretti and 
Venables, 2004). Theories of multinational firms imply that productivity 
advantages are due to the fact that these firms require some type of specific 
advantage to be able to profitably establish themselves in foreign markets 
(Dunning 1988, Markusen 2002). Such an advantage can arise from superior 
technological know-how, managerial knowledge, brand names etc. Recent 
theoretical work on heterogeneous firms also implies that only the most 
productive firms have the resources to set up their business in foreign countries 
(Helpman et al. 2004). To the extent that multinational firms are more 
productive due to knowledge that is implementable within other firms, there is 
a potential of spillover effects from multinational to domestic firms. If 
multinational firms are not able to capture the full return to such knowledge, it 
may be beneficial for the host country to promote FDI.  
 
Potential channels for spillovers from multinational to domestic firms include: 
1) backward and forward linkages between foreign owned and domestic firms, 
2) demonstration effects and 3) labour mobility (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). 
Spillovers from foreign owned to domestic firms have mostly been studied by 
examining the effect of the presence of a multinational company in an industry 
on the productivity of domestic firms.  The  channels for these spillovers are 
more rarely considered, and the evidence on the productivity effects of the 
presence of a multinational company is not conclusive (Barba Navaretti and 
Venables, 2004). The studies that do consider the mechanisms through which 
spillovers occur, focus mainly on backward and forward linkages between firms 
(e.g. Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004; Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Also in these 
studies the evidence on productivity spillovers is mixed. Labour mobility as a 
channel for spillovers has been studied in papers by Görg and Strobl (2005) 
and Balsvik (2009) using data from Ghana and Norway respectively. Both find 
2 
 
positive productivity effects when employees move from multinational firms to 
domestic firms in the same industry1.  
 
This study searches for evidence of spillovers from multinational to domestic 
firms by examining hiring and separation of employees and the impact these 
have on firms’ performance. It is important to note that the theoretical work 
on multinationals discussed above does not assume that multinationals are 
foreign owned, i.e. also domestically owned multinational companies may 
potentially be a source for spillovers. That is, the important difference is not 
between foreign and domestic ownership, but rather between multinationals 
and purely domestic firms, as emphasised e.g. by Bellak (2004). We decompose 
firm-level productivity change into the effects of hiring from foreign owned 
multinationals, domestic multinationals and purely domestic firms as well as 
the effects of separating workers and those who stay at the same firm. This 
bears a resemblance to the kind of decomposition used frequently to decompose 
industry level productivity change into the impacts of entry and exit of firms, 
and productivity growth in continuing firms. These kinds of methods have 
been popularised by e.g. Foster et al. (2001), but the decomposition we use is 
more closely related to formulas proposed by Maliranta (1997), Vainiomäki 
(1999) and Diewert and Fox (2007). A difference between the method we use 
and the earlier productivity decompositions is that while individual 
productivity cannot be directly observed, the decomposition forms the basis for 
an equation from which the relative productivities of the different employee 
groups can be estimated. A similar decomposition can be made for firm wage 
growth, and combining the productivity and wage growth decompositions 
provides us with an equation for firm profitability growth. This is particularly 
important when analysing knowledge transfer, since any potential externality 
may be internalised in the labour market. If hired workers are fully 
compensated for their contribution to productivity, there is no scope for 
profitability effects.  
 
                                                            
1 Görg and Strobl (2005) only consider employees who set up their own firm after 
leaving the multinational. 
3 
 
Our analysis is based on a detailed and comprehensive linked employer-
employee panel data set from Statistics Finland. The data set covers basically 
all firms in all sectors in Finland and all of their employees. We analyse 
performance changes in the two-year intervals 1997-1999, 1999-2001 and 2001-
2003. Our approach contributes to the literature on  spillovers from foreign 
owned to domestic firms through labour mobility in a number of ways. Firstly, 
we utilise data on both the industrial and service sectors and, given the current 
importance of the service sector, are therefore able to provide a more complete 
picture of potential spillover effects. Secondly, we explicitly consider how the 
structure of the workforce is determined by studying both hiring and 
separation flows. By comparing productivity and wage effects, we are able to 
assess whether any potential productivity effect is an actual externality or 
whether spillovers are internalised in the labour market. Balsvik (2009) also 
studies both productivity and wage effects. However, in that study wage effects 
are examined at the individual level by comparing recent hires from 
multinationals to stayers in domestic firms. If the share of workers with 
experience in multinational firms increases the wage level of incumbent workers 
as in Poole (2010), the individual level wage premium will not be comparable 
to the productivity effect at the establishment level and will, therefore, not 
reveal the extent of the externality.  
 
Our results show that hiring workers from foreign multinationals has a positive 
effect on both productivity and wages in local domestic firms. These effects 
cancel each other out, leading to no significant net effect on profitability. More 
detailed analysis of the labour flows indicates that these effects are driven by 
hiring of relatively young workers. By contrast, separation of this group of 
relatively young employees from foreign MNEs leads to a negative profitability 
effect on these firms due to their higher than average influence on productivity 
and lower than average wages compared to staying workers. The results 
indicate that these workers are able to internalise the returns to productivity 
enhancing knowledge when moving from foreign MNEs to domestic firms. A 
similar effect is observed for low tenured older workers who move from 
domestic multinationals to local domestic firms. Hiring of workers from 
domestic multinationals to foreign multinationals has a negative effect on 
profitability due to these workers’ productivity being lower than that of the 
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existing employees of foreign multinationals. This indicates that there are 
meaningful differences also between foreign and domestic multinationals.  
 
The next section briefly reviews previous research related to this study, section 
3 describes the empirical methodology and section 4 describes the data. Section 
5 presents the results of our econometric analysis and section 6 concludes.  
 
2 Previous research 
 
Spillovers through labour mobility between multinational and domestic firms 
have been explicitly modelled in some recent theoretical contributions, but 
knowledge transfer related to FDI can also be thought of in the context of 
models of R&D spillovers.   
 
Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002) develop models of spillovers 
from multinationals to domestic firms through labour mobility. The models 
imply a trade-off between technological and pecuniary spillovers to the local 
economy. The trade-off arises through the multinational firm’s choice between 
allowing technology transfer and preventing it by paying the worker a 
premium. Models of R&D spillovers through worker mobility, such as those of 
Pakes and Nitzan (1983), Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003) and Franco and 
Filson (2006), are similar in spirit and also provide a framework for thinking of 
spillovers from foreign owned to domestic firms. These models incorporate the 
fact that employees gain access to valuable knowledge, which may benefit them 
later in their career.  
 
The theoretical framework described above is based on workers moving from a 
firm with better possibilities for knowledge accumulation to firms where this 
knowledge is not available. If knowledge diffusion actually takes place from 
domestic to foreign firms, which could be the case e.g. if FDI were technology 
sourcing2, workers would be expected to benefit from mobility in this direction.  
                                                            
2 Driffield and Love (2003) study panel data on UK industries and find that such 
“reverse spillovers” exist. They do not, however, consider the mechanisms through 
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Empirical evidence on knowledge spillovers from foreign to domestic firms 
through worker mobility is scarce. Using manufacturing data from Ghana, 
Görg and Strobl (2005) study productivity of firms run by owners who 
previously worked at multinational companies. As mentioned above, they find 
that companies managed by entrepreneurs with experience from a 
multinational in the same industry are more productive than other domestic 
companies. In the context of this study, the most relevant piece of prior 
evidence is provided by Balsvik (2009) who studies Norwegian manufacturing 
firms, and finds that a higher share of employees with experience in a 
multinational firm increases total factor productivity. Employees with 
experience in multinational firms also earn higher wages than their co-workers, 
but the wage premium received by these employees is lower than the effect 
that their employment share has on plant level productivity. As noted above, 
the productivity effect and wage effect in Balsvik (2009) are, however, not 
completely informative as to the extent of the possible externality. If the share 
of employees with experience from multinational firms also affects the wages of 
their co-workers in domestic firms as observed by Poole (2010), the observed 
contribution to establishment level productivity can be higher than the 
individual level wage difference even though their impact on the 
establishment’s overall wage level may be closer to the productivity effect.3 
Previous empirical research on productivity spillovers from multinational firms 
has not included the service sector, which is arguably increasingly important.  
 
In the general context of knowledge transfers, spillovers from foreign owned to 
domestic firms are also related to R&D spillovers. Empirical evidence on R&D 
                                                                                                                                                             
which these spillovers arise. Ali-Yrkkö (2006) uses Finnish firm level data to study the 
effect of patents on the likelihood of being acquired by a foreign firm. He finds that 
owning patents correlates with becoming a target for a foreign firm, implying that 
technology sourcing also through labour mobility may be relevant. 
 
3 Poole (2010) studies knowledge spillovers indirectly by examining how wages of 
incumbent domestic-establishment workers increase as a function of the proportion of 
workers employed at the domestic establishment with some multinational experience. 
There are also some recent studies that analyse knowledge spillovers indirectly by 
looking at the effect of experience in foreign owned firms on individual employees’ 
earnings at subsequent jobs. These are similar to the wage analysis in Balsvik (2009). 
These studies include Martins (2005) for Portugal, Pesola (2010) for Finland and 
Malchow- Møller et al. (2007) for Denmark. 
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spillovers through labour mobility is provided by, among others, Almeida and 
Kogut (1999) who study the mobility of patent holders between firms. They 
find that labour mobility does influence the transfer of knowledge and that the 
flow of knowledge seems to be embedded in regional labour networks. Møen 
(2005) studies R&D spillovers empirically in a human capital framework. He 
shows that workers pay for the possibility to accumulate knowledge in R&D 
intensive firms by accepting lower wages early in their career. The return to 
these implicit investments is obtained later on, when wage increases reflect the 
increased value of their knowledge. Maliranta et al. (2009) use a similar 
decomposition as the current study to track knowledge spillovers through 
mobility of workers with R&D experience and find that hiring workers 
previously engaged in R&D into non-R&D activities increases both 
productivity and profitability. 
 
3 Empirical methodology 
 
In order to estimate the productivity and profitability effects of labour flows 
between foreign owned and domestic firms, we employ a variant of a micro-
level productivity decomposition method, presented by Maliranta (1997), 
Vainiomäki (1999), Maliranta et al. (2009) as well as Diewert and Fox (2007). 
These authors have discussed the role of entry and exit of firms for 
productivity change, whereas Maliranta and Ilmakunnas (2005) and 
Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2007) have developed this kind of decomposition to 
include entry and exit of employees, i.e. labour flows. 
 
Our decomposition of firm level productivity change assumes that a firm’s 
labour force in period 1 can be divided into workers  who were employed by 
the firm in the previous period 0 and are still working at the firm, i.e., stayers 
(stay), and those who were not, i.e., were hired after 0 (hire). We assume that 
the firm’s output (value added) in period 1 can be defined as the sum of 
outputs of staying and hired workers: 
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hirestay YYY ,1,11 +=         (1)
  
 
The firm’s labour productivity is the average of labour productivities of the 
staying and hired workers, weighted by labour shares: 
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where L1 = L1,stay + L1,hire and the error term εY/L,1 has been included to reflect 
approximation errors and unobservable factors in our formulation. The group 
of hired workers can further be divided into subgroups depending on what type 
of firm they were previously employed by (e.g. multinational/non-
multinational).   The firm’s labour productivity level can then be expressed as 
follows: 
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where e denotes type of previous employer. Because the shares of stayers and 
hired workers add up to one, 
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(3) can be written as follows: 
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Similarly, in period 0 the firm’s work force consists of those workers who will 
stay in the firm at least up to period 1, i.e., stayers, and workers who will leave 
the firm before period 1 (sepa). Of course it holds that  
 
staystay LL ,1,0 =  . 
 . 
The labour productivity level of the firm in period 0 can then be written in an 
analogous way: 
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Equation (5) is simpler than (4), since the destination of the separating 
employees has no influence on productivity. We are interested in labour 
productivity growth, i.e., the difference in productivity level between periods 0 
and 1, i.e. 
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The first term on the right-hand side of the equation shows productivity 
growth attributable to staying workers. It can be thought of as accumulation of 
human capital through experience. A firm has a rapid productivity growth 
when a large proportion of workers have a high productivity growth. These 
workers may have human capital that enables them to adopt or develop more 
productive techniques4.  
 
The second set of terms indicates productivity effects of hiring workers from 
different types of firms. As can be seen from (7), hiring of workers from type e 
employers has a positive impact on productivity when these hired workers have 
a higher productivity level than the average staying workers. Newly hired 
workers may be more productive e.g. because they have acquired knowledge or 
skills when working for their previous employer. Adjustment costs related to 
hiring are implicitly included in our formulation. The relative productivity of 
the hired workers should therefore be understood as productivity net of 
adjustment costs.  
 
Finally, the third term indicates productivity effects of employees that leave 
the firm between periods 0 and 1. Quite analogously to the hiring effect, 
separation of workers has a positive effect of productivity change when the 
average productivity level of these workers is lower than the average 
productivity level of stayers in period 0.  
 
The terms of (7) can be turned into growth rates by dividing them by the 
average productivity level in the periods 0 and 1. The growth rate is then a 
close approximation of a more common log-difference, i.e., 
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4 This effect can be called the Nelson-Phelps effect according to the seminal work by 
Nelson and Phelps (1966).  
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Besides labour productivity, we can use a similar decomposition for the average 
wage level in the firm by just replacing Y in the equations above with W. 
 
In this paper we are particularly interested in profitability effects. Profitability 
is measured as follows: 
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where OPM denotes operating margin OPM=Y-W(1+a) where a is the ratio of 
payroll taxes to wages assumed to be constant over time and across worker 
groups. The growth rate of profitability is thus simply the difference between 
the growth rates of productivity and wages, which is approximated by  
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  ,            (10) 
where [ ]105.0)( Π+Π=Π . 
 
Without the error terms, equations (7) and (8), and corresponding equations 
for wage growth are in principle identities. We can observe the labour flows, 
but we do not know the productivities, so the equations cannot be used 
directly for assessing productivity differences between workers hired from 
different types of firms. There are some influences, however, that have not 
been taken into account that allow us to use the equations as a basis for 
estimating the productivities. First of all, there are likely to be differences 
across firms in the productivities of different worker groups. If we use (7) as a 
model for estimating parameters that correspond to the group specific 
productivities, we will estimate average productivities. Any firm differences will 
therefore be included in an error term. Secondly, so far we have not taken into 
account other inputs, especially capital that affect productivity. We will 
therefore include control variables Z to account for other exogenous influences 
on firm productivity, wage, and profits. Inclusion of a constant term takes into 
account productivity growth trend. After these observable influences are taken 
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into account, the error accounts for all unobservables. We obtain the following 
estimation models: 
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where [ ])/()/(5.0)/( 1100 LYLYLY +=  and [ ])/()/(5.0)/( 1100 LWLWLW +=  
 
are the average productivity and wage levels, 
1
,1
L
L
HR hireee =  and 
0
,0
L
L
SR sepa= are the hiring and separation rates. In the estimations, we use firm 
panel data, so the equations to be estimated will be indexed with i (firm) and t 
(period), which are not shown in (11)-(12).  
 
The productivity and wage gaps between workers hired from different types of 
previous employment can then be interpreted from equations (11) and (12) as 
being:  
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i.e. they measure the relative productivity and wage, respectively, of workers 
hired from type e firms compared to all staying workers. On the separation 
side, the estimable coefficients have similar interpretations: 
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The intercept α indicates the growth rate among staying workers.  
 
We also have the profitability change equation 
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which shows that the parameter of the hiring variable for workers hired from 
firm type e in the profit equation (17) can be interpreted as a measure of the 
profitability level of the these workers relative to stayers in period 1.  
 
Analogously we obtain that 
stay
sepa
sepa
,1
,1
, ln Π
Π≈Πβ ,        (23) 
 
which provides us a measure of the relative profitability level of the separated 
workers before they leave.  
 
It is straightforward to show that hired, staying and separating workers can be 
further divided into various subgroups by worker type. This is of interest when 
considering productivity and wage gaps not only based on type of previous 
employer but also on certain individual characteristics such as age and 
experience. Derivations for estimation equations with worker subgroups are 
provided in the appendix.  
 
There are possible sources of bias when estimating the above model. First, 
there can be unobservable firm heterogeneity both in productivity and wage 
levels, which is correlated with employee characteristics (productivities and 
shares of different types of employees). For example, new firms often start with 
a new work force which only slowly evolves over time (Haltiwanger et al., 1999, 
2007). Therefore, firm vintage and worker cohorts tend to be tied together. 
Since we are using growth rates as the dependent variables, this is not an issue 
of great concern here. Assume that the error term in the productivity level for 
firm i in period t can be written as  itLYiLYitLY ,/,/,/ νμε += , where / ,Y L iμ  is the 
firm-specific, time-invariant unobservable that is correlated with the employee 
characteristics. When productivity growth is investigated, this component is 
eliminated in differencing, i.e. / , / ,Y L it Y L itε νΔ = Δ . A similar argument applies to 
the wage growth equation. Our approach is related to the use of long 
differences in fixed effects models (e.g. Griliches & Hausman, 1986). We define 
the growth rates and labour flows in three different two-year periods and pool 
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them in estimation. We also control for some observable firm characteristics, 
included in Z.  
 
Second, if there are time-varying unobservable firm differences in productivity 
and wage levels, they will show up in the growth rates. I.e., if the error is 
itLYitLYitLY ,/,/,/ νμε += , the unobservables are not eliminated in differencing: 
itLYitLYitLY ,/,/,/ νμε Δ+Δ=Δ . However, they are eliminated in the analysis of 
profitability change to the extent that the effects Δμ are equal in the 
productivity change and wage change equations. It seems reasonable to assume 
that high productivity growth firms are also high wage growth firms. In this 
case, 
itLWitLYitLWitLWitLYitLYitLWitLY ,/,/,/,/,/,/,/,/ νννμνμεε Δ−Δ=Δ−Δ−Δ+Δ=Δ−Δ . 
This is also related to the issue of hiring and separation rates being based on 
firms’ decisions and therefore possibly correlated with the error terms. For 
example, positive productivity shocks may lead to the hiring of new workers, 
which then causes an overestimate of their productivity effect (see Olley & 
Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn & Petrin, 2003). As we are examining hiring flows from 
different types of firms, shocks that change the propensity to hire new 
employees in general will not be a problem for interpreting the differences in 
the impact of hiring flows from various sources. However, if there is a 
productivity shock that only affects the probability of hiring workers from 
MNEs, this will bias the difference in the effects of the hiring flows. We have 
attempted to address this issue by using instrumental variables that take into 
account exogenous variations in labour supply in the local labour market. To 
instrument for hiring from foreign MNEs we use job destruction in foreign 
MNEs in the area the hiring firm is located in, and similarly for hirings from 
domestic MNEs and purely domestic firms, we use job destruction in these 
types of firms in the vicinity of the hiring firm. While the instruments are 
somewhat correlated with the respective flows, they are very weak and our 
subsequent estimation results are not significant. It should, therefore, be kept 
in mind that the results can not straightforwardly be interpreted as causal 
effects.  
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Third, there is heterogeneity across workers. This would not be an issue if the 
firms randomly chose new employees from the pool of applicants or randomly 
picked those who are laid off. This is not likely to be the case, however, since 
the firms look to hire the best applicants and lay off poor performers. Our 
hiring and separation flows may therefore be unrepresentative. However, the 
selection bias should affect productivity growth and wage growth in the same 
way if wage setting is based on productivity (see Hellerstein & Neumark, 2007) 
and therefore be eliminated when we examine their difference, i.e. the 
productivity wage gaps which directly relate to our measure of firm 
performance. In addition, as we are primarily interested in potential spillovers, 
and domestic firms can be expected to poach workers from multinational firms 
on purpose to gain access to their knowledge, we are not particularly interested 
in the impact of moving some random worker. Our results on productivity and 
wage effects should, therefore, not be interpreted as the effects of moving a 
random worker but can still be interesting in the context of spillovers.  
 
Fourth, there can be productivity differences across firms in the productivity of 
a certain employee group. This can arise from decreasing returns. For example, 
extensive use of employees with multinational experience in a firm lowers their 
marginal productivity. There may also be genuine technological differences 
between firms or industries. These factors would imply that the coefficients 
vary across firms. We can still obtain an unbiased estimate of the mean 
coefficient and account for the firm differences by correcting standard errors for 
clustering within firms.  
 
Finally, price differences across firms may cause biases when a common 
deflator is used for all firms in an industry (see e.g. Foster et al., 2008). For 
example, the profitability level of a low-price firm will be underestimated and 
that of a high-price firm underestimated. However, to the extent that there are 
firm differences in price levels (but not in price growth), they are eliminated 
when profitability changes are examined. 
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4 Data  
 
The unique identification codes for persons, companies and plants used in the 
different registers forms the backbone of the Finnish administrative register 
network and the Finnish statistical system. This provides an excellent 
opportunity to construct cross-sectionally and dynamically representative data 
for various research purposes by linking different administrative data sources 
(see Abowd & Kramarz, 1999). 
 
The data for this study are drawn from the Finnish Longitudinal Employer—
Employee Data (FLEED). The data set merges comprehensive administrative 
records of all labour force members as well as all employers/enterprises 
(including information also on their establishments) subject to value added tax 
(VAT). It can be complemented by a range of additional information from 
both private and public sources. FLEED currently covers the years 1990—2002 
with near-perfect traceability of employers and employees across time. The 
employment statistics, educational statistics, taxation records, business 
register, financial statement statistics, manufacturing census as well as various 
surveys are among the original sources of the FLEED variables. To define the 
labour flows and changes in productivity, wage, and profitability, we use 2-year 
windows. The flows and changes are defined for the three periods 1997-99, 
1999-2001 and 2001-2003. The observation period is restricted by the fact that 
information on foreign ownership is available from 1994 onwards. However, 
before this foreign ownership in Finland was scarce in any case due to strict 
regulations that were not abolished until 1992 (Golub, 2003). We restrict our 
observation period to start in 1997 in order to allow for the possibility of some 
years of work experience in foreign owned firms before the observation period.  
 
The observation unit is a firm. In principle we also have data on 
establishments, but information on value added, our preferred measure of 
output, and some other relevant variables, like capital intensity, about 
establishments are lacking beyond the manufacturing sector. Further, the links 
between employees and firms are more reliable than those between employees 
and establishments, especially in multi-unit firms. 
17 
 
 
Our estimation sample covers the industry sector and service sector. The 
industry sector 
consists of mining, manufacturing, public utilities and construction. The service 
sector comprises retail and wholesale trade, business services and personal 
services. Real estate and financial intermediation are excluded due to problems 
in measuring output in a reliable manner.  
 
The dependent variables are defined as follows. Labour productivity growth is 
measured as a two-year rate of change in value added per employee, average 
wage growth is correspondingly a two-year rate of change in wage sum per 
employee, and change in profitability is a two-year relative change in value 
added per labour costs (wages and social security payments). These variables 
are measured in nominal terms, and price changes (and other industry-specific 
effects) are controlled by a set of industry dummies that are interacted with 
the period dummies. 
 
The labour flows are based on comparisons of employees in the firms in two 
time periods, t-1 and t+1, where t is 1998, 2000 or 2002. In our analysis, the 
hiring flows will be divided into groups according to the nationality of the 
hired worker’s employer in t-1. The groups considered are 1) hires from foreign 
owned multinationals, 2) hires from domestically owned multinationals, 3) 
hires from local domestic firms, 4) hires from other employment and 5) hires 
from non-employment. Foreign owned multinationals are defined as firms that 
are at least 50 per cent owned by a foreign firm, domestically owned 
multinationals are Finnish firms that have majority owned subsidiaries abroad 
and local domestic firms are firms that are neither foreign owned nor owners of 
foreign firms. We have excluded firms that experience a change in 
multinational status between years t-1 and t+1. Appendix Table 1 shows the 
number of firms that undergo such changes during our observation period.  
Hires from other employment consist e.g. of employees hired from the public 
sector, and hires from non-employment include e.g. those hired following full-
time studies or unemployment.  
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The staying and separating employees in a firm are, of course, by definition all 
related to an employer of the same nationality, but we run the estimations 
separately for local domestic firms, domestic multinationals and foreign 
multinationals to see if there are differences in the profitability, productivity 
and wage effects of different labour flows between different types of firms. We 
also conduct analyses in which we further split the labour flows according to a 
combination of age and tenure: 1) age max. 35 in t-1, 2) age over 35 in t-1 and 
not employed in the same firm in t-5, 3) age over 35 in t-1 and employed in the 
same firm in t-5.  
 
The hiring rate HRejit for group ej is the number of new employees in firm i in 
the group (those in the firm in t+1, but not in t-1) divided by the number of 
all employees of the firm in t+1. The separation rate SRjit is correspondingly 
the number of exited employees of firm i in group j (those in the firm in t-1, 
but no longer in t+1), divided by the number of all employees in the firm in t-
1. When only considering differences amongst workers based on type of 
previous employment, i.e. when not dividing workers based on individual 
characteristics, the separation rate is obviously just the total number of exited 
employees in the firm divided by all employees in the firm in t-1. The share of 
stayers, STAYSHjit, is the number of staying employees of firm i in group j 
(those in the firm both in t-1 and t+1), divided by all stayers of the firm in t-
1. The sum of these stayer shares is therefore one, so one of the groups is left 
out of the estimation. This also implies that when not dividing staying 
employees into groups, the stayer share is always one and is left out of the 
estimation.   
  
As controls we use the various characteristics of the plants. We control for the 
log of capital per employee, which is entered in difference form to be consistent 
with the form of the dependent variables. The initial levels (in t-1) of log of 
value added per worker and log of average wage account for catching-up effect. 
We also control for the log of firm age. Finally, we include interacted industry 
and period dummies (35 industries) to account for, besides price changes, also 
the effects of idiosyncratic industry shocks, and likewise a set of dummies as 
controls for regional effects (20 regions).  
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Before conducting the econometric analysis we leave out some potentially 
erroneous observations that may distort our results. First, we remove those 
observations where the number of linked employees differs more than 10 per 
cent from the number of employees in the company data. This indicates that 
the linking of the individual and firm data is incomplete. Second, we remove 
some potentially influential outliers that we detect by using the method 
proposed by Hadi (1992; 1994). The method is useful for detecting multiple 
outliers in multivariate data. Identification of outliers is made on the basis of 
four variables: 1) the productivity growth rate, 2) the growth rate of average 
wage calculated from the company data, 3) the growth rate of employment 
according to company data and 4) the growth rate of employment according to 
individual data (the Employment Statistics). Wage growth is usually correlated 
with productivity growth, but sometimes they may be very different because of 
measurement errors in output and/or wages. The last two variables should be 
highly correlated with each other because they are essentially gauging the same 
thing, but may sometimes differ due to possible inaccuracies in the links 
between employees and their employers. The identified outliers (735 out of 17 
694 firm-period observations at this stage) are removed from all estimations. In 
the baseline estimations we include firms that employ at least 20 persons. The 
main reason for leaving out the smaller firms is that their employment 
numbers are sometimes imputed on the basis of wages, which could badly 
distort the analysis in our setting. As discussed above, we conduct the 
estimations separately for local domestic firms, domestic MNEs and foreign 
MNEs. Our baseline estimations for domestic firms, domestic MNEs and 
foreign MNEs include 6350, 1390 and 1279 observations respectively.  
5 Empirical analysis  
5.1 Basic estimation results 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our basic estimation sample split by the 
type of firm. The total number of observations including domestic firms, 
domestic MNEs and foreign MNEs is 9019. Average end-year employment is 
highest in domestic MNEs, which can be related to the fact that foreign MNEs 
may only have one plant in Finland, whereas domestic MNEs often have 
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several5. Both average labour productivity and earnings are highest in foreign 
multinationals and also higher in domestic multinationals than in local 
domestic firms. This is in line with previous research. Table 2 shows statistics 
regarding labour mobility in our estimation sample. We observe just under 
5000 new hires by domestic firms from foreign MNEs and approximately 9000 
hires by domestic firms from domestic MNEs. The average hiring rate is 29.2 
per cent in domestic firms, 22.2 per cent in domestic MNEs and 24.6 per cent 
in foreign MNEs. As we discuss below, we use employment weights in 
estimation to account for the fact that small firms will have high flow rates 
and large firms will have low flow rates. The largest shares of hiring in all three 
types of firms come from domestic firms and non-employment. Most hires from 
non-employment are included in the group of young workers which implies that 
they are likely to be recent graduates. The shares of hiring from foreign and 
domestic MNEs are highest for foreign MNEs. The average separation rate is 
25.5 per cent for domestic firms, 20.8 per cent for domestic MNEs and 23.1 per 
cent for foreign MNEs6. 
 
[Table 1 and Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics separately for domestic firms that hire and 
do not hire employees from multinational firms. Firms with hiring flows from 
multinational firms are on average larger and have slightly higher average 
labour productivity and earnings. The differences are, however, much smaller 
than those shown in Table 1 between domestic firms and multinational firms. 
For firms that hire from multinationals, the average number of hired workers is 
1.3 from foreign MNEs and 2.4 from domestic MNEs. Conditional on positive 
hiring from foreign MNEs, domestic firms hire on average 2.3 workers from 
these firms and conditional on positive hiring from domestic MNEs, domestic 
firms hire on average 3.0 workers from them.  
 
                                                            
5 The 20 person threshold used in the estimations refers to the average of start and end 
year employment in each period, whereas the figures in Table 1 refer to end year 
employment. This accounts for the 1st percentile for domestic firms being under 20.  
6 Note that hiring and separation figures underestimate total turnover, since e.g. hiring 
of an employee after the start of a two-year period and subsequent separation of the 
same employee before the end of the period is not included in the turnover rates.  
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[Table 3 here] 
 
Based on previous literature on spillovers from multinational firms to local 
firms discussed above, our main interest lies in analysing labour flows from 
multinationals, both foreign and domestically owned, to local domestic firms. 
However, there may also be potential for reverse spillovers, e.g. if FDI is 
technology sourcing, so we conduct the estimations separately for local 
domestic firms, domestic multinationals and foreign multinationals. We have 
also done the analysis using pooled data on all the firms with interactions for 
multinational status. The results are in line with those presented here, and 
therefore we use the current set up for ease of exposition. All the estimations 
we analyse here are weighted using firm employment (the average of the initial 
and the last year’s employment). A justification for using weighting comes 
from the fact that we are interested in the profitability and productivity effects 
of the employment flows. Unweighted estimation gives equal weight to large 
firms with low flow rates and small firms that have high flow rates but account 
for a small share of employment. 
 
Table 4 shows the results for our basic estimations of profitability, productivity 
and wage equations for local domestic firms. Here we split hiring flows based 
on type of previous employment, i.e. we do not yet take individual 
characteristics into account. The results show that employees hired from 
foreign multinationals are indeed relatively more productive than continuing 
workers, which is in line with e.g. Balsvik’s (2009) previous findings. However, 
when examining the related wage changes we find that these workers are also 
paid more than staying workers, and thus explicitly comparing these two 
results leads to an insignificant difference in their impacts on profitability. 
When comparing the coefficients for different types of hiring flows7, we note 
that employees hired from foreign MNEs have a statistically significantly 
higher impact on productivity than e.g. hiring from domestic firms. The 
difference between the productivity effects of hiring from foreign and domestic 
MNEs are not significant, with the coefficient on flows from domestic MNEs 
imprecisely estimated.  
                                                            
7 See Appendix Table 2 
22 
 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The results in Table 4 also show that employees hired from all other types of 
employment be it in or outside the business sector are paid more than stayers, 
but their productivity effects are not significant. Higher wages for recruits from 
other purely domestic firms and outside the business sector with no 
compensating productivity effect lead to negative effects on profitability. Hires 
from non-employment, e.g. full-time studies and unemployment have a 
negative effect on productivity, but these workers also earn lower wages and 
thus there is no adverse profitability effect. On the separation side we may 
note that exiting workers have on average higher productivity than stayers, i.e. 
the productivity effect of them leaving is negative, but these workers were also 
earning more than the average stayer, so their effect on profitability is not 
significant.  
 
Table 5 presents the results of the same estimations for domestically owned 
multinational firms. The signs on different hiring flows are similar to those in 
local domestic firms, but the effects are not statistically significant. 
Interestingly, domestic multinationals appear to be able to achieve productivity 
and profitability gains through separation of workers. Separating workers are 
on average less productive than stayers and with no wage effect this leads 
directly to a profitability increase when they leave. We also run our basic 
estimations separately for foreign MNEs. The results are reported in Table 6 
where we can observe indications of the productivity advantages of foreign 
firms documented in previous literature. Hiring from domestic MNEs has a 
negative effect on both productivity and profitability of foreign MNEs which 
would be expected if foreign firms are more productive, i.e. if the advantage is 
not multinationality, but being foreign owned.  
 
[Table 5 and Table 6 here] 
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5.2 Results for disaggregated labour flows 
In this section we discuss estimations of profitability, productivity and wage 
equations where labour flows are further divided based on age and/or tenure of 
the workers. As discussed in section 4, we split workers into three categories: 
“Young”, i.e. at most 35 years old in t-1, “Old with low tenure”, i.e. over 35 in 
t-1 and not employed by the same firm in t-5 and “Old with high tenure”, i.e. 
over 35 in t-1 and employed in the same firm in t-5. Tenure is not defined for 
workers from outside the business sector, i.e. those from “Other employment” 
and obviously also not available for hires from non-employment. These flows 
are only divided based on age. Considering the age limit of 35, our labels of 
“young” and “old” are obviously used purely for convenience. The reference 
group for staying workers is the group of young workers. As above, hiring flows 
are also divided based on type of previous employment, and the estimations are 
run separately for domestic firms, domestic multinationals and foreign 
multinationals. We present here the results for labour flows in domestic firms, 
the results for multinationals can be found in the appendix.  
 
Table 7 reports results for estimation of profitability, productivity and wage 
equations for domestic firms. We can see that the positive productivity and 
wage effects found in Table 4 for hiring from foreign MNEs are driven by 
hiring of younger workers. We also see that there is a positive productivity 
effect accompanied by a similar wage effect for hiring of older employees with 
relatively short tenure from domestic MNEs. This effect did not show up in our 
more aggregate results above. However, neither hiring from foreign or domestic 
MNEs has a net effect on profitability. Hiring of short tenured older workers 
from other domestic firms and young employees from employment outside the 
business sector both have a negative effect on profitability, with the first effect 
driven by low productivity and the latter by high wages relative to stayers. We 
can also see that the low wage, low productivity hiring flows from non-
employment observed in Table 4 are driven by hiring of young workers, i.e. 
this effect is most likely due to people moving from full-time studies into 
employment. The net effect on profitability for these flows is again 
insignificant.  
 
[Table 7 here] 
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In line with our more aggregate results in Table 4, separations do not affect 
profitability. The results show that the negative productivity and wage effects 
of job leavers arise from young workers leaving, i.e. these workers have higher 
productivity and higher wages than the average stayer. There are no 
differences between the contributions of older stayers to profitability and 
productivity changes as compared to the reference group of young staying 
workers, and marginally lower wage growth in these groups compared to the 
reference group.  
 
Results for similar estimations for domestic MNEs and foreign MNEs can be 
found in the appendix. The results for domestic MNEs are similar to those for 
domestic firms with most of the differences between the two types of firms 
apparent already in our more aggregate results above. The negative 
profitability effects of separation in foreign MNEs observed in Table 6 are 
driven by highly productive young workers leaving. The difference in their 
contribution to productivity compared to stayers is significantly higher than 
the difference in wages between these two groups. This may be indicative of 
foreign MNEs losing recently trained productive young employees and implies 
that Balsvik’s (2009) finding of future movers to MNEs having lower wages 
may not reveal the whole picture. Interestingly, as seen in Table 7, domestic 
firms need to pay young workers hired from foreign MNEs according to their 
productivity. Thus, if there is knowledge transfer from foreign MNEs to 
domestic firms taking place through mobility of these young workers, the 
workers appear able to internalise the returns to this knowledge when changing 
jobs. These findings could be interpreted in the context of a Loewenstein and 
Spletzer (1998) type model, where employees do not realise the full return to 
training until they change jobs.  
5.3 Robustness checks 
 
In this section we discuss some robustness checks related to the set-up of our 
data and empirical specifications. First we consider labour flows split based on 
educational background instead of age and tenure. This should enable us to 
gauge whether productivity effects of experience in MNEs are related to skill 
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level. This could be the case if the knowledge being transferred is e.g. related 
to management practices. New hires are grouped based on multinational status 
of their previous employer as well as educational level, and staying and 
separating workers are grouped based on educational level. The education 
levels considered are comprehensive, intermediate and university level. 
Otherwise the specifications used in the analysis are the same as those in the 
previous section.  
 
The results do not indicate significant profitability effects for most labour 
flows, but there are, however, some findings worth noting8. Hiring of highly 
educated workers from foreign MNEs into purely domestic firms has a positive 
effect on wages but no corresponding effect on productivity. This leads to a 
negative profitability effect for hiring of these workers. However, highly 
educated workers who stay with the firm have a positive and significant effect 
on productivity. These results are in line with evidence in Maliranta and 
Asplund (2007), where it is shown that hiring highly educated workers is 
initially costly to the firm, but that these workers contribute markedly to 
productivity growth in the long run due to the strong positive effect of the 
share of staying highly educated workers. This is consistent with the so-called 
Nelson—Phelps hypothesis mentioned in section 3, i.e. highly educated workers 
may have human capital that enables them to promote technical change and 
productivity growth in a firm.  Also consistent with the analysis of Maliranta 
and Asplund (2007), separation of highly educated workers has a positive effect 
on profitability in domestic firms as well as in both domestic and foreign 
MNEs.  
 
Secondly, we extend our basic analysis of the previous section to include firms 
with at least 10 employees instead of the previous 20 person limit. This 
basically adds to our group of domestic firms, and we find that our previous 
results of e.g. positive productivity and wage effects of hiring from foreign 
MNEs are robust to this change. Consistent with the results above, the wage 
effect offsets the productivity effect leading to no change in profitability 
growth.  
                                                            
8 Results not shown, available on request. 
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6 Conclusions 
This study has searched for evidence of spillovers from multinational to 
domestic firms by examining hiring and separation of employees and the 
impact these have on firms’ performance. The analysis is based on detailed 
linked employer-employee panel data which enables explicit comparison of 
productivity and wage effects. This focus on profitability allows us to assess the 
extent to which potential knowledge flows from multinational firms are actual 
spillovers as opposed to being internalised by the labour market. We are also 
able to distinguish between domestic firms, domestically owned multinationals 
and foreign owned multinationals and can therefore study whether there are 
differences based on multinational status and not ownership per se.  
 
The results show that hiring workers from foreign multinationals is related to 
both higher productivity and higher wages in local domestic firms. These 
effects cancel each other out, leading to no significant net impact on 
profitability. More detailed analysis of the labour flows indicates that these 
findings are driven by hiring of relatively young workers. By contrast, 
separation of this group of relatively young employees from foreign MNEs is 
related to a negative profitability effect due to their higher than average 
influence on productivity and lower than average wages compared to staying 
workers in these firms. The results indicate that these workers are able to 
internalise the returns to productivity enhancing knowledge when moving from 
foreign MNEs to domestic firms. However, due care should be taken when 
interpreting these results in case there are unobserved productivity shocks that 
are related to hiring flows from a specific type of firm. Hiring of workers from 
domestic multinationals to foreign multinationals has a negative effect on 
profitability due to these workers’ productivity being lower than that of the 
existing employees of foreign multinationals. This indicates that there are 
meaningful differences also between foreign and domestic multinationals.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
N Average St.Dev p1 Median p99
Local domestic firms
Employment 6350 60 109 18 35 436
Labour productivity 6350 46 468 32 418 16 917 41 097 131 580
Monthly earnings 6350 2 136 572 1 160 2 061 4 039
Profitability growth rate 6350 -0.029 0.196 -0.639 -0.022 0.523
Labour productivity growth rate 6350 0.026 0.238 -0.644 0.031 0.683
Wage growth rate 6350 0.064 0.149 -0.383 0.064 0.488
Log change in capital per labour 6350 0.050 0.555 -1.526 0.010 1.849
Domestic multinationals
Employment 1390 396 1152 20 124 5348
Labour productivity 1390 63 818 46 308 14 991 52 288 285 795
Monthly earnings 1390 2 624 604 1 492 2 555 4 400
Profitability growth rate 1390 -0.019 0.256 -0.768 -0.020 0.816
Labour productivity growth rate 1390 0.046 0.279 -0.711 0.045 0.887
Wage growth rate 1390 0.072 0.099 -0.209 0.072 0.344
Log change in capital per labour 1390 -0.033 0.484 -1.405 -0.024 1.538
Foreign multinationals
Employment 1279 178 326 20 73 1703
Labour productivity 1279 74 627 68 671 16 812 61 105 347 184
Monthly earnings 1279 3 035 984 1 460 2 870 6 268
Profitability growth rate 1279 -0.017 0.278 -0.903 -0.010 0.796
Labour productivity growth rate 1279 0.043 0.304 -0.918 0.048 0.928
Wage growth rate 1279 0.070 0.116 -0.298 0.069 0.421
Log change in capital per labour 1279 -0.127 0.630 -2.105 -0.097 2.048
Note: Labour productivity, monthly earnings and employment are end year values  
 
Table 2 Labour mobility 
Average 
share Average # Total #
Average 
share Average # Total #
Average 
share Average # Total #
Hire, from For. MNE 0.012 0.77 4 919 0.016 4.59 6 380 0.043 6.49 8 295
Hire, from Dom. MNE 0.021 1.42 9 019 0.043 15.56 21 630 0.033 5.95 7 605
Hire, from Dom. 0.108 6.22 39 489 0.067 20.13 27 984 0.078 12.38 15 828
Hire, from other empl. 0.007 0.40 2 530 0.004 1.07 1 489 0.004 0.60 763
Hire, from non-empl. 0.143 8.68 55 087 0.092 34.51 47 965 0.088 17.09 21 858
Separated 0.255 14.07 89 373 0.208 76.51 106 344 0.231 40.09 51 280
Local domestic firms Domestic MNE Foreign MNE
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics for local domestic firms by type of hiring 
Observations Average St.dev. Observations Average St.dev.
Employment 3 769 77 138 2 581 35 22
Labour productivity 3 769 48 339 38 928 2 581 43 736 18 987
Monthly earnings 3 769 2 209 625 2 581 2 030 463
Profitability growth rate 3 769 -0.03 0.21 2 581 -0.03 0.18
Labour productivity growth rate 3 769 0.03 0.25 2 581 0.02 0.22
Wage growth rate 3 769 0.07 0.15 2 581 0.06 0.15
Log change in capital per labour 3 769 0.05 0.56 2 581 0.06 0.55
Share of hired, from For. MNE 3 769 0.02 0.03 2 581 0 0
Share of hired, from Dom. MNE 3 769 0.04 0.04 2 581 0 0
Share of hired, from Dom. 3 769 0.12 0.10 2 581 0.09 0.09
Share of hired, from other empl. 3 769 0.01 0.02 2 581 0.01 0.02
Share of hired, from non-empl. 3 769 0.15 0.11 2 581 0.13 0.10
Share of separated 3 769 0.27 0.16 2 581 0.23 0.14
Number of hired, from For. MNE 3 769 1.31 3.20 2 581 0 0
Number of hired, from Dom. MNE 3 769 2.39 5.72 2 581 0 0
Number of hired, from Dom. 3 769 8.48 17.00 2 581 2.92 3.06
Number of hired, from other empl. 3 769 0.50 1.28 2 581 0.24 0.58
Number of hired, from non-empl. 3 769 11.53 25.55 2 581 4.51 4.24
Separated 3 769 18.22 38.29 2 581 8.02 7.08
Local domestic firms that hire from 
multinational firms
Local domestic firms with no hiring 
from multinational firms
Note: Hired shares are shares of end-year total employment, shares of separated workers are shares of start-year employment. Labour 
productivity, monthly earnings and employment are end-year values  
 
Table 4 Profitability, productivity and wage equations for local domestic firms 
Profits Productivity Wages
Hire, from For.MNE -0.152 0.308** 0.424***
(0.153) (0.145) (0.0967)
Hire, from Dom.MNE 0.00137 0.196 0.212***
(0.105) (0.127) (0.0657)
Hire, from Dom. -0.105*** -0.0267 0.0705**
(0.0399) (0.0458) (0.0274)
Hire, from Other Emp. -0.324* -0.108 0.279**
(0.185) (0.229) (0.136)
Hire, from Non-Emp. 0.0324 -0.178*** -0.217***
(0.0388) (0.0456) (0.0304)
Separated 0.0170 -0.0878*** -0.124***
(0.0364) (0.0323) (0.0205)
Observations 6350 6350 6350
R-squared 0.143 0.182 0.236
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2. Other variables include the initial wage and productivity levels (in logs), log change in capital per labor, regional 
dummies and interactions of industry and period dummies. Employment weighted estimation. Firms with at least 20 
employees included.  
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Table 5 Profitability, productivity and wage equations for domestic MNEs 
Profits Productivity Wages
Hire, from For.MNE -0.147 0.317 0.248
(0.473) (0.521) (0.194)
Hire, from Dom.MNE 0.0871 0.152 0.0822
(0.224) (0.264) (0.0915)
Hire, from Dom. -0.302 -0.441* -0.105
(0.207) (0.258) (0.147)
Hire, from Other Emp. -1.087 -1.852 -0.811
(1.165) (1.278) (0.583)
Hire, from Non-Emp. -0.312* -0.582** -0.247
(0.176) (0.269) (0.158)
Separated 0.296** 0.313** 0.0543
(0.127) (0.139) (0.0413)
Observations 1390 1390 1390
R-squared 0.458 0.436 0.389
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2. Other variables include the initial wage and productivity levels (in logs), log change in capital per labor, regional 
dummies and interactions of industry and period dummies. Employment weighted estimation. Firms with at least 20 
employees included.  
 
 
Table 6 Profitability, productivity and wage equations for foreign MNEs 
Profits Productivity Wages
Hire, from For.MNE 0.214 0.377 0.162
(0.192) (0.251) (0.111)
Hire, from Dom.MNE -0.481** -0.624*** -0.0934
(0.213) (0.186) (0.0916)
Hire, from Dom. 0.279 0.309 0.0914
(0.185) (0.211) (0.101)
Hire, from Other Emp. -1.280 -1.198 0.171
(1.076) (1.134) (0.543)
Hire, from Non-Emp. -0.151 -0.427** -0.289***
(0.176) (0.213) (0.104)
Separated -0.194* -0.220 -0.0215
(0.105) (0.136) (0.0532)
Observations 1279 1279 1279
R-squared 0.559 0.545 0.223
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2. Other variables include the initial wage and productivity levels (in logs), log change in capital per labor, regional 
dummies and interactions of industry and period dummies. Employment weighted estimation. Firms with at least 20 
employees included.   
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Table 7 Profitability, productivity and wage equations for local domestic firms: 
labour flows by age/tenure group 
Profits Productivity Wages
Hire, from For.MNE/Young -0.129 0.462** 0.618***
(0.183) (0.225) (0.143)
Hire, from For.MNE/Old/Low Tenure -0.408 0.0475 0.333
(0.329) (0.327) (0.222)
Hire, from For.MNE/Old/High Tenure -0.0124 0.210 0.122
(0.384) (0.329) (0.164)
Hire, from Dom.MNE/Young -0.0616 0.0191 0.119
(0.170) (0.198) (0.0969)
Hire, from Dom.MNE/Old/Low Tenure 0.176 0.509** 0.301*
(0.214) (0.259) (0.165)
Hire, from Dom.MNE/Old/High Tenure -0.143 0.229 0.398**
(0.234) (0.298) (0.171)
Hire, from Dom./Young -0.0646 -0.0601 0.0138
(0.0564) (0.0670) (0.0409)
Hire, from Dom./Old/Low Tenure -0.255*** -0.158* 0.0753
(0.0883) (0.0947) (0.0646)
Hire, from Dom./Old/High Tenure -0.0610 0.218* 0.237***
(0.126) (0.125) (0.0756)
Hire, from Other Emp./Young -0.594* -0.355 0.374*
(0.312) (0.371) (0.218)
Hire, from Other Emp./Old -0.0976 0.0647 0.140
(0.249) (0.296) (0.177)
Hire, from Non-Emp./Young 0.0768 -0.199*** -0.263***
(0.0504) (0.0580) (0.0411)
Hire, from Non-Emp./Old 0.00433 -0.0613 -0.107*
(0.0753) (0.0928) (0.0586)
Sep., Young -0.0189 -0.139*** -0.170***
(0.0518) (0.0442) (0.0283)
Sep., Old/Low Tenure 0.0577 0.0320 -0.0130
(0.0560) (0.0609) (0.0370)
Sep., Old/High Tenure -0.00709 -0.137 -0.118**
(0.0685) (0.0869) (0.0533)
Stay, Old/Low Tenure 0.0155 -0.0403 -0.0290
(0.0413) (0.0259) (0.0182)
Stay, Old/High Tenure -0.0230 -0.0325 -0.0115
(0.0258) (0.0300) (0.0159)
Observations 6350 6350 6350
R-squared 0.146 0.184 0.245
2. Other variables include the initial wage and productivity levels (in logs), log change in capital per labor, regional dummies 
and interactions of industry and period dummies. Employment weighted estimation. Firms with at least 20 employees included.
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 
 
Derivation of estimation equations with worker subgroups 
When dividing all workers into M different groups j = 1, fi , M based on 
individual characteristics such as age and experience, we obtain the following 
estimation equations9: 
 
εδχββα +++++=Δ ∑∑∑ ∑ − Ζ')/( )/(
1
,),/(,),/(,,),/(/ j
M
j
stayjLYjj sepajLYe ejj hirejeLYLY
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where 
1
,1
L
L
HR hireejej =  and 
0
,,0
L
L
SR sepajj = are the hiring and separation rates in 
worker groups and ∑= j stayj
stayj
j L
L
STAYSH
,,0
,,0
 is the share of each group of 
workers among staying workers. 
 
The coefficients of the hiring and separation rates are now interpreted as 
labour productivity effects of hiring and separating workers in each group, 
compared to (all) staying workers:  
 
)/(
)/()/( ,1,,,1
,,),/( LY
LYLY stayhireje
hirejeLY
−=β  and     (26) 
 
                                                            
9 For derivations in a model without employer types, see Ilmakunnas and Maliranta 
(2007).  
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and the wage equation coefficients are analogous wage effects. Now the 
intercept α indicates the growth rate in the reference group of stayers and the 
coefficients of the included STAYSHj variables (M—1 group variables) indicate 
differences in the growth rate in the reference group and in group j.  
 
We further obtain the profitability change equation 
εδχββα +++++=Π
ΠΔ ∑∑∑∑ − Ζ')/( )/(
1
,),/(,),/(,,),/( j
M
j
stayjLYjj sepajLYejj hirejeLYe
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          (28)
  
where the coefficient of a hiring rate is interpreted as the difference of the 
productivity and wage effects of the worker type in question, and similarly on 
the separation side. 
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Appendix Table 1 Firms’ ownership status  
Year t
Status in t-1 Status in t+1 1998 2000 2002 Total
Domestic Domestic 4,057 4,638 4,713 13,408
Domestic MNE Domestic MNE 456 571 664 1,691
Foreign MNE Foreign MNE 515 589 656 1,760
Domestic Domestic MNE 102 174 131 407
Domestic Foreign MNE 47 52 22 121
Domestic MNE Foreign MNE 15 21 23 59
Domestic MNE Domestic 51 36 45 132
Foreign MNE Domestic MNE 63 6 10 79
Foreign MNE Domestic 40 8 11 59
Total 5,346 6,095 6,275 17,716  
 
 
Appendix Table 2 Comparisons of domestic firms’ productivity effects of hiring 
from different sources 
For. MNE Dom. MNE  Domestic Other Empl. Non-Empl. 
For. MNE 0.112 0.335** 0.416 0.486***
(0.202) (0.154) (0.271) (0.151)
Dom. MNE -0.112 0.223 0.304 0.374***
(0.202) (0.134) (0.265) (0.139)
Domestic -0.335** -0.223 0.082 0.151**
(0.154) (0.134) (0.237) (0.063)
Other Empl. -0.416 -0.304 -0.082 0.07
(0.271) (0.265) (0.237) (0.236)
Non-Empl. -0.486*** -0.374*** -0.151** -0.07
(0.151) (0.139) (0.063) (0.236)
 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Comparison to hiring from
Hiring by 
domestic 
firms from
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Appendix Table 3 Profitability, productivity and wage equations for domestic 
MNEs: labour flows by age/tenure group 
Profits Productivity Wages
Hire, from For.MNE/Young -0.142 0.425 0.535
(0.827) (0.892) (0.389)
Hire, from For.MNE/Old/Low Tenure 0.307 0.573 -0.271
(0.408) (0.448) (0.190)
Hire, from For.MNE/Old/High Tenure -1.250 -0.733 0.562
(1.722) (1.927) (0.479)
Hire, from Dom.MNE/Young -0.114 -0.311 -0.118
(0.520) (0.654) (0.419)
Hire, from Dom.MNE/Old/Low Tenure 0.563 0.694 0.120
(0.397) (0.473) (0.155)
Hire, from Dom.MNE/Old/High Tenure -1.106** -0.689 0.400
(0.447) (0.508) (0.257)
Hire, from Dom./Young 0.322 0.229 0.0235
(0.325) (0.388) (0.212)
Hire, from Dom./Old/Low Tenure -1.346*** -1.556*** -0.229
(0.521) (0.570) (0.218)
Hire, from Dom./Old/High Tenure -0.631 -0.871 -0.490
(0.519) (0.554) (0.455)
Hire, from Other Emp./Young -2.621 -3.765* -1.372
(2.040) (2.122) (0.860)
Hire, from Other Emp./Old 1.049 -0.114 -1.556
(1.890) (2.189) (1.043)
Hire, from Non-Emp./Young -0.344 -0.833** -0.474**
(0.267) (0.394) (0.222)
Hire, from Non-Emp./Old -0.261 -0.351 -0.0170
(0.494) (0.501) (0.171)
Sep., Young -0.0151 0.0173 -0.100
(0.205) (0.218) (0.0900)
Sep., Old/Low Tenure 0.709*** 0.802*** 0.262**
(0.210) (0.247) (0.115)
Sep., Old/High Tenure 0.380 0.276 0.0276
(0.358) (0.337) (0.102)
Stay, Old/Low Tenure -0.132 -0.217** -0.137***
(0.0978) (0.104) (0.0370)
Stay, Old/High Tenure -0.0296 -0.0685 -0.0997***
(0.0979) (0.105) (0.0321)
Observations 1390 1390 1390
R-squared 0.474 0.453 0.415
2. Other variables include the initial wage and productivity levels (in logs), log change in capital per labor, regional dummies 
and interactions of industry and period dummies. Employment weighted estimation. Firms with at least 20 employees included.
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Table 4 Profitability, productivity and wage equations for foreign 
MNEs: labour flows by age/tenure group 
Profits Productivity Wages
Hire, from For.MNE/Young -0.00856 0.148 0.0976
(0.365) (0.401) (0.193)
Hire, from For.MNE/Old/Low Tenure 0.357 0.742 0.230
(0.514) (0.565) (0.204)
Hire, from For.MNE/Old/High Tenure 0.233 0.0879 0.0275
(0.501) (0.569) (0.224)
Hire, from Dom.MNE/Young 0.102 0.391 0.367*
(0.354) (0.409) (0.220)
Hire, from Dom.MNE/Old/Low Tenure -0.803 -1.292 -0.209
(0.592) (0.807) (0.344)
Hire, from Dom.MNE/Old/High Tenure -1.062** -1.620*** -0.621**
(0.500) (0.507) (0.272)
Hire, from Dom./Young 0.473* 0.545* 0.144
(0.254) (0.281) (0.127)
Hire, from Dom./Old/Low Tenure -0.113 -0.105 0.147
(0.665) (0.665) (0.188)
Hire, from Dom./Old/High Tenure -0.104 -0.360 -0.377
(0.755) (0.966) (0.431)
Hire, from Other Emp./Young -0.391 -2.192 -1.198
(1.825) (1.860) (0.907)
Hire, from Other Emp./Old -2.025 -1.672 0.308
(1.547) (1.667) (0.664)
Hire, from Non-Emp./Young -0.224 -0.677*** -0.518***
(0.235) (0.257) (0.110)
Hire, from Non-Emp./Old 0.711 0.700 -0.0139
(0.518) (0.548) (0.244)
Sep., Young -0.415** -0.551*** -0.149**
(0.174) (0.198) (0.0758)
Sep., Old/Low Tenure -0.0374 0.144 0.168**
(0.233) (0.254) (0.0854)
Sep., Old/High Tenure 0.0622 0.0726 0.0626
(0.217) (0.288) (0.108)
Stay, Old/Low Tenure -0.0956 -0.143 -0.0757*
(0.0855) (0.0913) (0.0386)
Stay, Old/High Tenure -0.0550 -0.102 -0.0766*
(0.0815) (0.0909) (0.0401)
Observations 1279 1279 1279
R-squared 0.565 0.556 0.261
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2. Other variables include the initial wage and productivity levels (in logs), log change in capital per labor, regional dummies 
and interactions of industry and period dummies. Employment weighted estimation. Firms with at least 20 employees included.  
 
International Trade and the Distribution of
Wages
Pertti Haaparanta and Hanna Pesola
Abstract
We study how international trade aﬀects both intra- and intersectoral
wage distributions and unemployment. To do this we utilise the firm-
worker matching model developed by Burdett and Mortensen and extend
it to genuine multisector models in a standard trade theory framework.
The major results we reach are as follows: a) factor price equalisation does
not hold in the H-O-version of the model despite the fact that sectors
are paying at least partly the same wages; b) aggregate changes like a
change in the aggregate firm/job destruction rate can have implications
for the sectoral allocation of factors of production (in contrast to some
existing theories where only intersectoral diﬀerences matter); c) the theory
is consistent with the observations that exporting firms tend to be larger
firms; d) the firm heterogeneity is endogenous.
1 Introduction
One of the most exciting areas of research in international trade has recently
been the research on the implications of firm heterogeneity on the structure of
international trade. Motivated by the empirical research on the characteristics
of exporting firms vis a vis firms producing solely for the home market, theo-
retical research starting from Melitz (2003) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) has
clarified the issue of how the firm heterogeneity in terms of (labour) produc-
tivity is transformed through self-selection to exporting status. The theory has
also considered e.g. the role of trade costs in aﬀecting the selection process.
Recently, some eﬀort has been made to explain the firm heterogeneity. Manasse
and Turrini (2001) and Yeaple (2005) explain firm heterogeneity through the
existence of skill diﬀerences between entrepreneurs (Manasse and Turrini) or of
existence of skill diﬀerences between workers and the selection of technologies
(Yeaple). Yeaple e.g. shows that firms selecting new technologies also employ
the highly-skilled workers and export.
This paper provides a theory of firm heterogeneity based on imperfections
in labour markets. The labour market imperfections take the form of search
frictions resulting in imperfect matching and unemployment. Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) was among the first studies to show that the search fric-
tions give firms some monopsony power. Together these two eﬀects lead to
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an equilibrium where ex ante identical firms will pay diﬀerent wages and are
ex post heterogenous. The idea has been extended further by Acemoglu and
Shimer (2000), Manning (2003), and Mortensen (2003) both in theory and em-
pirics. We extend here the basic theory to a general equilibrium setting involving
several sectors and international trade. The theory results in a theory of both
intra- and intersectoral wage distributions. The main focus will be on the impli-
cations of trade for these distributions. This is done by extending the standard
Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade, for which we mostly consider only the small
open economy cases.
The theory presented answers one puzzle that cannot be explained by the
existing theories. There exists now quite a bit of research showing the existence
of an industry wage premium even after controlling for worker skills (e.g Man-
ning (2003), Mortensen (2003)) and that at least part of these industry skill
premiums are aﬀected by international trade: import competition reduces the
skill premium while exporters pay larger premiums. This paper presents evi-
dence on exporter wage premiums using Finnish data and then develops a simple
Ricardian theory of size and both intra- and inter-industry wage distributions
of firms. One of the implications of theory is that exporting firms are larger
and more productive than firms competing with imports. We also examine a
Heckscher-Ohlin version of the model.
The main diﬃculty we face in extending the Burdett-Mortensen model to a
multisector economy is that without some rigidities between sectors like intersec-
toral labour mobility costs there will be complete specialization in production.
We get around that problem by assuming the existence of mobility costs that
depend on the allocation of labour between sectors e.g. due to congestion.
The major results we reach are that: a) factor price equalisation does not
hold in the H-O-version of the model despite the fact that sectors are paying at
least partly the same wages; b) aggregate changes like a change in the aggre-
gate firm/job destruction rate can have implications for sectoral allocation of
factors of production (in contrast to some existing theories where only intersec-
toral diﬀerences matter); c) the theory is consistent with the observations that
exporting firms tend to be larger firms; d) the firm heterogeneity is endogenous.
The next section documents diﬀerences in the wage distributions between ex-
porters and non-exporters in Finland. We then describe our model and provide
some simulation results.
2 Exporting and wages in Finland
As a background for our theoretical analysis, we use a detailed linked employer-
employee data set to describe the distribution of wages in exporting and non-
exporting firms. Our data consist of information on Finnish firms, plants and
workers for the years 1996 to 2004. To alleviate the selection bias that will arise
if the best performing firms self-select into exporting, we match exporting firms
with a control group of firms that do not export and compare individual level
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wages between these groups. To improve the quality of the matches, we focus
on manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees. The matching procedure is
described in the appendix. The data used in our analysis exhibit the stylised
facts on characteristics of exporting and non-exporting firms found in previous
literature: exporting firms are larger, more productive, pay higher wages and
employ a more highly-educated labour force than non-exporting firms. Details
of the data and descriptive statistics for the matched sample of exporting and
non-exporting firms can be found in Table 1 and Table 2 in the appendix.
In order to compare wage distributions of exporting and non-exporting firms,
we estimate the distribution of wages conditional on individual characteristics
and industry using quantile regression and use this information to obtain the
unconditional distributions for exporting and non-exporting firms.1 We also es-
timate a counterfactual wage distribution for non-exporting firms assuming the
same characteristics distribution as in exporting firms. Figure 1 shows the cu-
mulative wage distributions for exporting and-non-exporting firms as well as the
counterfactual wage distribution for non-exporting firms. We can see that even
when controlling for the distribution of characteristics wages are slightly higher
in exporting firms. The diﬀerence between the unconditional distributions is
statistically significant.
To examine the impact of exporting across the wage distribution, we es-
timate quantile regressions controlling for a wider range of firm and worker
characteristics. The results in Figure 2 show that the exporter wage premium
is highest at the lower end of the wage distribution and decreases for the higher
quantiles. For the highest earners, the diﬀerence in wages between exporting
and non-exporting firms is not significantly diﬀerent from 0.
3 The closed Ricardian economy
Consider an economy producing two goods with labour. The unit labour pro-
ductivity in sector i, i = 1,2, is ai. The goods are produced by firms, each of
which employs just one worker. 2 The gross revenue of each firm in sector i is
piai, where pi = price of sector i good. One of the most crucial assumptions
we make is that while there is a free entry of firms (subject to entry costs) we
assume that once firms have entered they cannot switch between sectors. The
main reason for this is that without this assumption the Burdett-Mortensen
type of theory cannot account for the existence of both intra- and interindustry
wage distributions, see below. Ex ante all potential firms are identical but ex
post they are sector specific. Thus, the theory we build should be interpreted
as a Ricardo-Viner, sector specific factor theory.
1Quantile regression (see e.g. Koenker and Bassett, 1978) finds the
θth regression quantile, 0<θ<1, as a solution to the minimisation problem
min
β
%
S
i:yi≥xiβ
θ |yi − xiβ|+
S
i:yi≤xiβ
(1− θ) |yi − xiβ|
&
.
2The theory built can be generalised to produce also a theory for the size distribution of
firms.
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The second crucial building block of the model is the assumption that labour
markets are not frictionless. Firms have to search for workers and workers have
to search for firms. In this model we assume workers just to be responding
to the wage oﬀers made by firms. To facilitate the analysis and to keep in the
tradition of international trade theory we assume that all the workers/consumers
have identical homothetic preferences. They take as given the prices of the
goods and thus their utility is linear in wages (assuming in addition that they
take as given the profit income they earn). The distribution of the number of
wage oﬀers each worker receives is assumed to be a Poisson distribution with
parameter λ indicating the expected number of oﬀers received per period, λ
= number of firms/number of workers. We assume that there is a continuum
with mass 1 of workers and a continuum of firms with mass λ. This makes the
Poisson approximation to the true (binomial) distribution good. The theory also
requires the mass of potential employers to be larger than the mass of workers,
λ > 1 Acemoglu and Shimer (2000). The firms maximise their expected value.
Firms make oﬀers which the workers who receive the oﬀers either accept or
reject. We assume that firms employ all the workers that accept their oﬀers. Let
F (w) denote the distribution of wage oﬀers, i.e. F (w) is the number (mass)
of firms oﬀering at most a wage w. It can be shown (see e.g. Burdett and
Mortensen (1998), Manning (2003) and Mortensen (2003) section 1.2.1.) that
there does not exist any pure strategy equilibrium with each firm oﬀering the
same wage. Hence, F is non-degenerate. Also, the economy wide equilibrium
distribution of wage oﬀers must be continuous (e.g. Mortensen (2003) section
1.2.1). Also, firms with higher productivity oﬀer wages at least as high as firms
with lower productivity (see e.g. Mortensen (2003) section 1.2.3.). Finally, with
free entry, the expected profits of all firms must be equalised. This requirement
ties together the wage distributions of firms facing diﬀerent productivities.
Once a firm and workers have been matched they remain matched as long as
the firm runs. We assume that the all the firms face a random shock, distributed
independently across firms, of having to close down. The probability of being
hit by the shock is Poisson distributed with parameter δ indicating the firm/job
destruction rate. The unit value of the firm/job, after the match, is, in sector
i, for a firm having oﬀered wage w
Vi (w) =
piai − w
r + δ + λ (1− F (w)) (1)
where r = rate of interest. The value equals the discounted present value of
future profits from the match with discount factor reflecting also the probabil-
ity of the match being broken either by an exogenous shock or by the worker
receiving a better wage oﬀer.
If h (w) denotes the probability of the wage oﬀer being accepted the expected
value of the firm is h (w)V (w). The acceptance probability is
h (w) = u+ (1− u)G (w) (2)
where u= rate of unemployment andG (w)= fraction of the employed accepting
an oﬀer less than w. The idea here is that all unemployed workers and those
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workers whose current wage is below the wage oﬀer accept the oﬀer. We will
concentrate only on the steady state distributions. It can be shown that in the
steady state
G (w) =
δF (w)
δ + λ [1− F (w)] (3)
To understand this, the dynamics of the unemployment rate is given by the
diﬀerential equation
.
u = δ (1− u)− λu
and the dynamics of people employed at or below the wage w, E (w)
.
E (w) = λF (w)u− [δ + λ (1− F (w))]E (w)
The steady state solution is
u
1− u =
δ
λ
(4)
and
E (w) = (1− u)
µ
δF (w)
δ + λ [1− F (w)]
¶
Since E (w) = (1− u)G (w), (3) is obvious. Thus, the steady state expected
present value of the firm is, using (3) and (4)
PVi (w) =
µ
δ
δ + λ (1− F (w))
¶ ∙
piai − w
r + δ + λ (1− F (w))
¸
(5)
To simplify the model we assume that there is no possibility for intertemporal
trade, or rather that the only saving technology available is one with r = 0.
This gives
PVi (w) =
δ (piai − w)
(δ + λ (1− F (w)))2
(6)
Consider now the entry of firms. We assume that once the firms have made
the decision in which sector to enter they cannot switch the sector. Let the entry
cost be c in terms of the numeraire good. Assume good 2 to be the numeraire.
When making the decision of entry they naturally choose the sector in which the
expected profit is highest. As we assume consumer preferences to be homothetic,
both goods will be produced in the closed economy equilibrium. This means
that, in equilibrium, the expected profits must be equal across sectors and across
firms in each sector. Furthermore, in equilibrium also p1a1 = p2a2 ⇔ pa1 =
a2, with p ≡ p1p2 . This is, since, as shown in Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
the firms with lower gross revenue would be paying lower wages than the firms
in the other sector. The wage distributions would have one common wage,
the lowest wage oﬀered by the sector with the highest gross revenue and the
highest wage oﬀered by the low gross revenue sector must be the same. Given
that the equilibrium distribution of wage oﬀers, F (w), must be continuous, this
equality cannot hold unless pa1 = a2. This has two crucial implications for the
closed economy equilibrium: a) The equilibrium goods pricing is identical to
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the standard Ricardian pricing, and b) In the closed economy equilibrium there
will only be intrasectoral variation of wages but no intersectoral diﬀerences in
wage distributions. To get to both of these, one way would be to extend the
model with consumer search to induce price distributions, an endeavour we leave
for future papers. Another way would be to assume that the number of firms
in each sector is exogenously given. This is the avenue we take in the case
of open economy equilibrium in the barebones model of the next section: we
assume that the number of firms in each sector is given by the closed economy
equilibrium. Without this assumption there would be intersectoral variation
in the global economy; but, since the equilibrium would be such that only one
sector is active in each economy, there would by definition be only intrasectoral
variation of wages in each economy. A third way is to introduce a sector specific
factor explicitly, and we follow this idea in the general model of the paper.
To close the model, we assume that the unemployed workers have access
to a technology producing the numeraire good, each unemployed worker can
produce b units of the good 2. Naturally b < a2. The lowest wage oﬀered will
be equal to b: it can be shown that at the lowest wage oﬀered the firm oﬀering
that wage cannot aﬀect the number of workers contacting it by changing the
wage oﬀer marginally Burdett and Mortensen (1998). This is obvious from (6)
as at the lowest wage F (w) = 0. Thus, the optimal choice of wage is b.
Since entry is free, the equilibrium wage distribution is a solution to the
equation
δ (a− w)
(δ + λ (1− F (w)))2
=
δ (a− b)
(δ + λ)2
(7)
where a ≡ pa1 = a2. The solution is
F (w) =
µ
δ + λ
λ
¶"
1−
µ
a− w
a− b
¶ 1
2
#
(8)
This is the equilibrium distribution as profits for all firms oﬀering the wage
within the support of the distribution are equalised, while a firm oﬀering a
wage below b would not attract any workers and its profits would be 0, and
given the entry cost, it would be losing money. The firm oﬀering a wage above
the maximum wage in the support would certainly attract workers but then
a deviation by other firms to oﬀer a wage slightly above that wage would be
optimal etc, but these firms would make less money than the firm oﬀering the
lowest wage.
The largest wage paid, wmax can be solved from the equation with the solu-
tion
µ
δ + λ
λ
¶"
1−
µ
a− wmax
a− b
¶ 1
2
#
= 1 (9)
wmax = a−
µ
δ
δ + λ
¶2
(a− b) (10)
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The wage distribution, as measured by the diﬀerence between maximum and
minimum wages oﬀered, is the more dispersed, ceteris paribus, the higher the
level of productivity, as measured by a, the lower the income while unemployed,
and the lower the unemployment rate, δδ+λ . The unemployment rate, however,
is endogenous, as the match frequency λ is endogenous and the solution to
δ (a− b)
(δ + λ)2
= c (11)
giving
λ =
∙
δ (a− b)
c
¸ 1
2
− δ (12)
giving the equilibrium unemployment rate as
u =
δ
δ + λ
=
µ
cδ
a− b
¶ 1
2
(13)
and the maximum wage as
wmax = a− cδ (14)
The allocation of firms and employment to sectors must be such that em-
ployment in each sector is able to produce the output demanded at the given
price. Assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences with α as the share of good 1 in
aggregate expenditure, the equilibrium condition for market for good 1 is
α
"
(1− u)
Z wmax
b
wg (w) dw + ub+ λc
#
=
a2
a1
Q1 (15)
where g = G0, the density of wages paid. The last term equals, with the free
entry condition, aggregate profits in the economy, as λ is the measure of firms
in the economy. Using (3) and (8) one can calculate
G (w) =
δ
λ
"µ
a− b
a− w
¶ 1
2
− 1
#
(16)
which can be used with integration by-parts to getZ wmax
b
wg (w) dw = (17)
2wmax − b− δ
2λ
h
(a− b)
1
2
³
(a− b)
1
2 − (a− wmax)
1
2
´i
as the average wage in the economy. With expressions for the mass of firms and
unemployment rate and the maximum wage, (15) gives the aggregate output of
good 1 in the economy.
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Since in the closed economy equilibrium firms in both sectors are similar
(except for producing diﬀerent goods) the share of firms in each sector is given
by their share of employment. Thus, the share of firms in sector i is
σi =
Qi
ai
Q1
a1
+ Q2a2
(18)
To complete the characterisation of the closed economy equilibrium, it can
be noted that firms paying higher wages are also larger in terms of their labour
force. This is as the average size of firms paying wage w is
lim
ε→0
G (w)−G (w − ε)
F (w)− F (w − ε) =
g(w)
f(w)
=
δ (a− b)
(δ + λ) (a− w) (19)
which is increasing in the wage rate.
4 Small open Ricardian economy
To show the basic idea and mechanics of the model let us consider first how one
can generate wage and firm size distributions in an otherwise standard Ricardian
model. Consider now the equilibrium in a small open economy facing world
market price ratio pw. Assume, for definiteness, that pw > a2a1 , i.e. the world
market price of good 1 exceeds the closed economy equilibrium price. If the
firms can move freely between sectors, it is clear that we get the same result as
in the standard Ricardian model: the economy will be completely specialised, in
this case in production of good 1. This is as now pwa1 > a2 and the equalisation
of profits cannot take place for any continuous wage oﬀer distribution.
But this is still an interesting case and gives some first ideas of the impacts
of international trade on wage distributions and unemployment rate. By substi-
tuting pwa1 for a in (13) one sees that trade reduces unemployment rate (since
all the previous formulas still apply, there is just one sector in the economy):
trade opening is equivalent to an economy wide productivity increase. Simi-
larly, (14) implies that the trade increases the largest wage oﬀer made, implying
higher wage inequality in the sense that the diﬀerence between the highest and
lowest wages in the economy increases.
Broadly similar conclusions hold when the model is extended by assuming
that once firms/workers have entered a sector they cannot switch between sec-
tors, i.e. there is a very high mobility cost. Accordingly, assume now that the
the number (mass) of firms is fixed and their distribution across sectors is given
by (18). Then it is known that the open economy equilibrium is characterised
by a distribution of wages that is a combination of sectoral wage distributions.
Sector 2 firms will oﬀer, in equilibrium lower wages than sector 1 firms. As the
wage distribution must have a connected support there exists a threshold level
of wage, the highest wage oﬀered by sector 2 firms and lowest wage oﬀered by
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sector 1 firms. The distribution of wages in sector 2 is now determined by the
equation
δ (a2 − w)
(δ + λ (1− F2 (w)))2
=
δ (a2 − b)
(δ + λ)2
(20)
with the highest wage paid by the sector satisfying the equation
F2 (w) = σ2 (21)
The solutions are
F2 (w) =
µ
δ + λ
λ
¶"
1−
µ
a− w
a− b
¶ 1
2
#
(22)
and
w = a2 −
∙
δ + λ(1− σ2)
δ + λ
¸2
(a2 − b) (23)
The wage distribution in sector 1 can be solved from the equation
δ (pwa1 − w)
(δ + λ (1− F1 (w)))2
=
δ (pwa1 − w)
(δ + λ (1− F1 (w)))2
(24)
with the solution
F1 (w) =
µ
δ + λ
λ
¶"
1−
µ
a− w
a− w
¶ 1
2
#
(25)
and the overall wage distribution is given by
F (w) = F2 (w) + F1 (w) (26)
The highest wage paid in the economy is given as the solution to
F1 (wmax) = 1 (27)
The solution is
wmax = pwa1 −
µ
δ
δ + λ
¶2
(pwa1 − w) (28)
Exporting firms are more profitable than firms competing with imports, and
they also are on average larger (as measured by the number of employed persons)
than the firms competing with imports. Export sector firms also grow in size
compared to what they were in the closed economy equilibrium. Exporting firms
also pay higher wages than firms in the other sector. The highest wage paid is
higher in the open economy than it is in the closed economy. In this sense, the
opening of trade increases wage dispersion.
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5 General model: Wage distributions in a small
open economy Heckscher-Ohlin model
The model can be extended also into a Heckscher-Ohlin type of framework with
an imperfectly intersectorally mobile factor (capital) in addition to labour. As
is usual the key assumption to be made is that capital intensities diﬀer between
sectors. With this, the solution can be obtained in steps analogous to those in
the previous section. Among the results one can easily show that factor price
equalisation does not any more hold. The intuition is clear: due to the labour
market imperfection one cannot anymore talk about a single wage and also
firms are earning rents (which naturally will be competed away but still there
is no necessary relationship between unit price and unit cost). This section also
extends the model to allow firms in both sectors to oﬀer the same wages at
least for a range of wages. This is necessary, as we saw above that that is the
relevant empirical case. The analogous extension can be applied to the models
previously presented.
5.1 Basics
There are two-sectors in the economy, 1 and 2. In both sectors two intersec-
torally mobile factors of production, capital (or land) and labour, are used. As
above, let us consider capital to be general capital: it can be used in another
employment relationship if the current use comes to an end. The capital is
acquired before the firms make their wage oﬀers. Let us assume that labour
productivity in sector i is given by
fi (ki) , f 0i > 0, fi” < 0 (29)
Then the value of an existing employment relationship to the firm paying wage
w, J (pifi (ki) , w), is given by the Bellman-equation
rJ (pifi (ki) , w) = pifi (ki)− w − δJ (pifi (ki) , w)+ (30)
λ (1− F (w)) [V (pifi (ki) , w)− J (pifi (ki) , w)]
Here V (pifi (ki) , w) = value of a vacant job. Similarly, the value of a vacant
job satisfies the Bellman-equation
rV (pifi (ki) , w) = h (w) [J (pifi (ki) , w)− V (pifi (ki) , w)]− (31)
c− δV (pifi (ki) , w)
where the probability that the firm’s wage oﬀer is accepted hi (w) is, like above
hi (w) =
δ
δ + λ (1− F (w))
At the time the firm is making its decision on how much capital to acquire
its profits are, assuming again that the world rate of interest = 0
πi (w) = δ [V (pifi (ki) , w)− rkki] (32)
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By solving the value of a vacant job from (30) and (31) this can be rewritten as
πi (w) =
h (w) [pifi (ki)− w]− d (w) c
h (w) + d (w)
− δrkki (33)
where, like above, d (w) = δ + λ (1− F (w)) = probability that the oﬀer is
declined. The first order condition for the choice of the capital stock is
h (w)
h (w) + d (w)
pif 0i (ki) = δrk (34)
giving the optimum choice as
ki = ki
µ
pi
δrk
z (w)
¶
, k0i > 0 (35)
where z (w) ≡ h(w)h(w)+d(w) . The direct implication here is that the firms oﬀering
higher wages also have larger capital stock.
To specify the equilibrium, assume that good 2 is used as the numeraire and
that the recruitment requires as costs c units of sector 2 goods. In equilibrium,
since firms are free to choose the sector in which they operate, they must have
the same expected profits. Also, all the firms must have equal expected profits
regardless of the wage oﬀers they make. To specify the equilibrium, the last
equilibrium means that the wage oﬀer distribution equalising profits within each
sector Fi (w) must satisfy the equation, using (33) and (35)
hi (w)
h
pifi
³
ki
³
pi
δrk
zi (w)
´´
− w
i
− di (w) c
hi (w) + di (w)
− δrkki
µ
pi
δrk
zi (w)
¶
= π (36)
Here π = the expected profits of a firm actually oﬀering wage b. The sector
in which the firm is producing will be determined in equilibrium. But (36)
determines the wage distribution for each sector. The actual wage distribution
observed in the economy is determined by the conditions requiring profits to be
equalised across sectors. To get there, one must understand the properties of
the sectoral distributions. Thus, rewrite (36) as
zi (w)
∙
pifi
µ
ki
µ
pi
δrk
zi (w)
¶¶
− w
¸
− (1− zi (w)) c− δrkki
µ
pi
δrk
zi (w)
¶
= π
(37)
This equation can be solved for zi (w) and it can then in turn be used to solve
for the wage oﬀer distribution. Now use the envelope theorem in (37) and take
total diﬀerentials
∙
pifi
µ
ki
µ
pi
δrk
zi (w)
¶¶
− w + c
¸
dzi = (38)
zidw + (1− zi) dc+ kid (δrk)− fi (ki) dpi + dπ
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From (38) we get an expression for the change in the probability of having a
wage oﬀer accepted as a a function of the wage rate
z0i (w) =
zi
pifi
³
ki
³
pi
δrk
zi (w)
´´
− w + c
(> 0) (39)
The second derivative is
zi” (w) = (40)
z0i (w)
h
pifi
³
ki
³
pi
δrk
zi (w)
´´
− w + c
i
− zi (w)
h
f 0i
δrk
− 1
i
h
pifi
³
ki
³
pi
δrk
zi (w)
´´
− w + c
i2 =
−zi (w)
f 0i
δrk
< 0
using (39).
Using the definitions of h (w), d (w) and z (w) we have
zi (w) =
δ
δ + [λ+ (1− Fi (w))]2
which gives
Fi (w) = 1 + λ− δ
1
2
µ
1
zi (w)
− 1
¶ 1
2
(41)
From this we get the properties of the wage oﬀer distribution for sector i:
F 0i (w) =
δ
1
2
2
z0i
z2i
µ
1
zi (w)
− 1
¶− 12
(> 0) (42)
and, crucial for the density of wage oﬀers,
Fi” (w) =
δ
1
2
2
µ
1
zi (w)
− 1
¶− 32
× (43)(
zi”zi − 2z0i
z3i
µ
1
zi
− 1
¶
+
(z0i)
2
2z4i
)
This shows, that depending on the model parameters and productivity functions,
the wage oﬀer distribution can have any shape, and the shape can even vary.
We have not yet completely determined the aggregate equilibrium. What is
lacking is the equilibrium in the market for capital. The equilibrium condition
is
(1− x)
Z w2
b
k2
µ
1
δrk
z2 (w)
¶
dF2 (w) + x
Z w1
b
k1
µ
p1
δrk
z1 (w)
¶
dF1 (w) = K
(44)
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where K = supply of capital and x= share of workers in sector 1 (see below).
This immediately showsthat the capital rental rate depends on the supply of
capital. This then means that the factor price equalisation does not hold: coun-
tries with diﬀerent endowments of capital have diﬀerent capital rentals and thus,
also diﬀerent wage oﬀer distributions.
The profits of a firm oﬀering wage b are
δ
δ + λ2
∙
pifi
µ
ki
µ
pi
δrk
δ
δ + λ2
¶¶
− b+ c
¸
− c− δrkki
µ
pi
δrk
δ
δ + λ2
¶
(45)
With free entry the profits should whither and the matching rate is determined
by
δ
δ + λ2
∙
pifi
µ
ki
µ
pi
δrk
δ
δ + λ2
¶¶
− b+ c
¸
− c− δrkki
µ
pi
δrk
δ
δ + λ2
¶
= 0 (46)
The interesting feature of (46) is that the capital rental plays a crucial role in the
determination of the matching rate and unemployment. E.g. if the firm paying
the lowest wage is from sector 2, the numeraire sector, then changes in prices,
e.g. due to trade policy changes, come only through the capital rental. With
a higher price in sector 1, the capital intensive sector, capital rental increases.
The marginal firm’s profits decline and it becomes profitable only, if λ falls, i.e.
it becomes easier to find workers who accept low wages. To make this happen,
the unemployment rate increases, due to the exit of firms and the decline in the
demand for labour at the low end of wages.
5.2 Worker decisions
To finally fully complete the model we still need a way to analyse how workers
get allocated to the sectors. Assume that workers have to decide in which sector
to search for a job. Assume further that once the decision is made they stay
in the sector until they get unemployed again. Assume first that unemployed
workers can costlessly search for a jobs in both of the sectors regardless of their
previous employment. With these assumptions it is natural to require that
in equilibrium the expected discounted incomes an unemployed person can get
must be equalised between the sectors. This condition determines the allocation
of workers between sectors.
The first implication of the change is that both sectors have their own wage
distributions with sector specific maximum wages and matching intensities. We
retain the assumption that the workers have the same outside opportunity b.
Thus, now we have
Fi (wi) , wmaxi , λi
Given this the analysis for each sector for given sectoral allocation of labour is
as in the previous subsection. The only diﬀerence comes from the behaviour
of the workers. In sector i the employed at wage wi and unemployed workers’
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expected incomes are given as solutions to the asset valuation equations
rVi (wi) = wi + δUi + λi
"Z wmaxi
b
max {Vi (wi) , Vi (x)} dFi (x)− Vi (wi)
#
(47)
rUi = b+ λi
"Z wmaxi
b
max {Ui, Vi (x)} dFi (x)− Ui
#
Here Vi (wi) = the expected lifetime income of a sector i employed earning cur-
rently wage wi, and Ui = expected lifetime income of a currently employed
worker who has decided to search for a job in sector i. We have here re-
tained the assumption that both the unemployed and employed workers receive
employment-wage oﬀers with equal intensity. This implies that the reservation
wage, the wage that equates the currently employed worker’s utility with the
unemployed worker’s utility, equals the outside opportunity. This fact has been
used in these equations. Obviously Vi (wi) ≥ Ui and V 0i (wi) ≥ 0.
(47) are valid value equations for workers’ welfare assuming that workers’
preferences are homothetic, as for given goods prices these equations are the
value functions for expected income and also value functions for welfare when
expected income is deflated by the proper consumer price index.
In equilibrium
U1 = U2 (48)
must hold to make unemployed workers indiﬀerent between sectors in their
search for jobs. To fully close the model assume that the aggregate mass of
workers in the economy equals unity. Let x = the share of workers employed in
sector 1. Then we know that
λ1 =
m1
x
, λ2 =
m2
1− x
where mi = mass of firms in sector i.These can, for given allocation of labour be
substituted in the sectoral free entry (0-profit) conditions to determine the num-
ber of firms in each sector. Then (48) can be used to determine the allocation
of labour between sectors.
It is easy to see that with these assumptions when prices are fixed the econ-
omy will be, in general, completely specialised. This is so as the 0-profit condi-
tions fix the mass of firms in each sector. Then the sector with a larger number
of firms relative to workers, with higher λ, will attract all the workers and the
reallocation of workers does not at all aﬀect the matching intensities.
To get around this we assume that the workforce has in the past been allo-
cated to both sectors. E.g. in the autarky equilibrium both sectors will produce
with homothetic preferences. Assume now that if there is a change, e.g. trade
liberalisation, changing the relative welfare levels of the unemployed, and there
is an incentive to search for a job in a diﬀerent sector there is a cost attached
in moving to the other sector. We assume this cost to be increasing and convex
in the number of workers in the sector attracting new job applicants relative to
the number of workers staying where they are. This specification captures e.g.
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the diﬃculties in finding housing in the area where the production facilities of
the sector attracting workers are located. The mobility cost function is
M =M
µ
x
1− x
¶
,M 0,M” > 0
if workers are moving from sector 2 to sector 1 and
M
µ
1− x
x
¶
,M 0, ” > 0
if they are moving from sector 1 to sector 2.
5.3 Simulation results
It is very hard to get any analytic results from the model. Thus, we have
constructed a numerical version of the model where the sectors have CES-
production functions with diﬀerent elasticities of substitution etc. We have
used it for some experiments reported next.
We choose the parameters of the model to fit some aspects of Finnish data.
The job destruction rate is initially set at 8% to equal the estimated job de-
struction rate for the manufacturing sector in 2005 (Ilmakunnas and Maliranta
(2008)). The interest rate is set at 2% and the capital share in the CES produc-
tion function is set at 0.45 in sector 1 and 0.35 in sector 2. In 2005, the capital
share of value added in manufacturing in Finland ranged from 0.14 in the man-
ufacture of motor vehicles to 0.54 in the manufacture of electrical equipment.
The elasticity of substitution parameters are set at -0.25 and -0.20 for sectors 1
and 2 respectively. Total factor productivity in sector 1 is set 5% higher than in
sector 2. The minimum wage is treated as exogenous in these simulations and
is set at 15 500e annually in sector 1 and 13 000e annually in sector 2. These
are in line with our data set. The recruiting cost is set at 17% of the annual
wage, in line with the average recruiting cost reported e.g. in the technical fibre
products industry (see Tamfelt (2007)).
Figure 3 shows simulated sectoral wage distributions based on our model.
The resulting distributions have a shape reasonably close to reality and we can
see that the distribution of sector 1, the more productive sector, stochastically
dominates the distribution of sector 2. The employment share of the more
productive sector is initially 56%, and the unemployment rates are 0.96% and
1.03% in sectors 1 and 2 respectively. Figure 4 shows the result of an experiment
where the job destruction rate falls from 14% (as in Finland in 1993) to 8%
(Finland 2005). We can see that the fall in the job destruction rate shifts the
cumulative distributions down slightly in both sectors implying higher wages
in both sectors. The highest wage paid increases in both sectors, and with a
fixed minimum wage, this also implies an increase in wage dispersion in the
economy. The fall in the job destruction rate decreases unemployment in both
sectors, with the low initial values in this case implying changes that are small
in absolute terms. Interestingly, such an aggregate shock also implies a small
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Figure 3: Sectoral wage distributions
shift in the allocation of labour between sectors, with the employment share of
sector 2 increasing slightly. This is in contrast to some existing theories where
only intersectoral diﬀerences matter.
Figure 5 depicts the impact of a 10% increase in both sectors’ total factor
productivity. This results in a shift in the wage distributions of both sectors
similar to that following a fall in the job destruction rate, albeit larger in magni-
tude. Wage dispersion thus increases following the change. The unemployment
rate also falls again in both sectors. The allocation of workers between sectors
does not change.
We also experimented with some sector specific changes. A 10% increase
in TFP in one of the sectors leads to a shift in the wage distribution of that
sector implying higher wages. The wage distribution in the other sector re-
mains unchanged. The employment share of the sector experiencing the TFP
increase rises in both cases while the unemployment rate in that sector falls.
The unemployment rate in the other sector remains practically unchanged.
Sector specific changes in the job destruction rate have somewhat asymmet-
ric eﬀects. An increase in the job destruction rate of the more productive sector
decreases the employment share of that sector slightly and increases the unem-
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ployment rate in both sectors. Interestingly, the increase in the unemployment
rate is actually more pronounced in the less productive sector where the job
destruction rate remains unchanged. These changes are accompanied by shifts
in the wage distributions that imply slightly higher wages in the less productive
sector and slightly lower wages in the more productive sector compared to the
situation before the change.
In the case of an increase in the job destruction rate only in the less pro-
ductive sector, the employment share of the more productive sector increases as
would be expected. There is a marked drop in the unemployment rate of the
less productive sector, while the unemployment rate in the sector not experi-
encing a change in the job destruction rate increases slightly. This somewhat
counterintuitive result is, however, accompanied by a substantial shift in the
wage distribution of the less productive sector which implies significantly lower
wages across the whole distribution and will be related to more hiring. In the
more productive sector with no change in the sector’s own job destruction rate
the wage distribution remains unchanged.
Some of these results may be aﬀected by the fact that the minimum wage
in each sector is currently exogenous. This issue will be addressed in further
work. The simulations are also quite sensitive to changes in the elasticity of
substitution which limits the range of feasible values.
6 Conclusions
We have here modelled endogenous firm and wage heterogeneity by applying
the Burdett-Mortensen model and its extensions to multisector trade models.
These models have been then used to study how e.g. trade liberalisation aﬀects
wage and firm heterogeneity and the unemployment rate. The mileage one gets
from these models is seen by looking at the results: a) factor price equalisa-
tion does not hold in the H-O-version of the model; b) aggregate changes like
a change in the aggregate firm/job destruction rate can have implications for
sectoral allocation of factors of production (in contrast to some existing the-
ories where only intersectoral diﬀerences matter); c) the theory is consistent
with the observations that exporting firms tend to be larger firms; d) the firm
heterogeneity is endogenous and the firm heterogeneity in the exporting sec-
tor increases when trade is liberalised; e) unemployment is aﬀected by trade
policies, unemployment can either go up or down with trade liberalization.
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A Data
This study uses an extensive panel data set from Statistics Finland that links
information on employers, that is, firms and plants, and their employees. The
data set is formed by linking data from various Statistics Finland databases:
Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data, Business Register, Industrial
Statistics and Financial Statements Statistics. The data set is based on a 1/3
sample of individuals who were 16 to 69 years old in 1990. These individuals
were followed until 2004, and the sample was extended each year by adding a
1/3 sample of 16-year-old persons. The data set contains extensive informa-
tion on individuals’ characteristics including details on their education, family,
labour market situation, income etc. The firm- and plant-level variables include
information on industry, ownership, economic activity etc. Information on the
employer is linked to each individual based on the employer at the end of the
year. These data are collected for all available years on all firms and plants that
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employ at least one individual in the sample. We use data for the years 1996
to 2004 in order to have consistent information on key control variables. We
also restrict our analysis to the manufacturing sector, which enables us to better
control for plant productivity. Table 1 shows descriptions of the variables used
in the analysis.
The analysis of wages paid by exporting and non-exporting firms is hindered
by the potential selection bias caused by better performing firms self-selecting
into exporting. To tackle this, we match each exporting firm to a similar non-
exporting firm using the “Coarsened Exact Matching” method proposed by
Iacus et al. (2009). The matching is done year by year using lagged values
of productivity, foreign ownership, firm size, industry and region. The quality
of matches is greatly improved when the sample is restricted to firms with
at least 20 employees, so we focus on this group in our analysis. We also
exclude firms that fail during our observation period and thus do not use this
information for matching purposes. 3 The matched sample of firms is then
linked to the data on their employees resulting in a data set with 152 041 person-
year observations. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for the matched sample
used in the analysis. The data display many of the stylized facts on exporters
and non-exporters: exporters tend to be more productive, larger and pay higher
wages. Exporting firms also have a slightly more educated workforce, although
the diﬀerence is not as pronounced as in some previous studies.
3Matching results are available on request.
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Variable Definition / Measurement
Individual characteristics
Age Age in years
Tenure Tenure at current employer in years
Education 3 indicators for education level: comprehensive school, secondary 
education, university education
Wages Logarithm of real annual earnings in euros (2004)
Gender Indicator for female employees
Plant 1  level characteristics
Exporter Indicator for plants with exports > 0
Sales per employee Plant sales per employee in euros
Labour productivity Value added per hours worked
Industry 15 industry dummies
Region 6 region dummies (NUTS2)
Firm 1  level characteristics
Firm size 4 indicators for firm size classes: 20 to 49 employees, 50 to 99 employees, 
100 to 299 employees, more than 300 employees
Foreign ownership Defined on the basis of ultimate beneficiary owner (UBO) with a 20 % 
threshold used in classifying a plant as foreign owned.
Other
Years 9 year dummies
Notes
1. Plant refers to the physical location of a certain economic activity. Firms may consist of many plants.
Table 1: Variable descriptions
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Variable Exporters Non-exporters
Log annual earnings 10.19 10.09
(0.44) (0.53)
P90/P10 1.09 1.11
P90/P50 1.04 1.05
P50/P10 1.04 1.06
Sales/employee 204 465 127 665
(207 287) (175 020)
Labour productivity 35.17 25.65
(20.82) (27.70)
Age 40.12 40.28
(10.80) (11.20)
Tenure (years) 11.13 10.66
(10.04) (9.95)
Female % 0.35 0.46
Comprehensive school % 0.28 0.28
Secondary education % 0.61 0.63
University education % 0.11 0.09
Foreign owned % 0.10 0.06
Firm size 20-49 employees (%) 0.07 0.14
Firm size 50-99 employees  (%) 0.11 0.12
Firm size 100-299 employees  (%) 0.19 0.19
Firm size > 300 employees  (%) 0.63 0.54
Observations 129 390 22 651
Standard deviations in parentheses
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
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